Intelligence
- intelligence as information (right or wrong)
- “Intelligence is the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policymakers” (Lowenthal, 2002)

What to Target after Cold War?
- no clear enemy with Soviet decline
- what should IC do?

Traditional Focus
- foreign policy aims
- defense policies
- military capabilities
- others’ intelligence efforts

Trans-national organized crime
- drug trafficking
- financial crimes

Economic and commercial espionage
- espionage against foreign firms
- negotiation positions of governments
  - France expels US diplomats in Feb. 1995

Terrorism
- writ large and against US

Competing Demands
- support US military operations
- aid US business
- fight crime (terror as transnational crime)
- should IC be re-organized?
Rise of Congressional Oversight
- limited role prior to late 1970s
  o limited access to intelligence products
  o deferential to CIA and IC
- Church (Senate) and Pike (House) Committees in 1975
  o Rockefeller Commission (Ford admin)
  o Disclose abuses of wire-taps, surveillance, and disruption by FBI, CIA, and Army intelligence
  o Senate and House intelligence committees created (1976, 1977)
- SSCI and HPSCI Oversight
  o Limited access to NIEs and no raw intelligence initially
  o 1980s: get copies of NIEs and access to raw intel.
- Post-Cold War
  o Review of CW record
  o Reform proposals in 1996 by Brown commission and House IC21 study

National Intelligence Estimates

Estimate as “intellectual structure” (Sherman Kent)
- “a base of more or less solid factual evidence”
- “a top of highly reasoned conjecture”

NIEs as product of inter-IC process
- headed by a NIO but can be drafted by others
- input from all IC agencies
- reviewed by top IC officials
- risk of “lowest common denominator” consensus
- under-estimation as a “failure”
- is over-estimation a failure?
- over-reaction by US affects others conduct

Politicization of Intelligence
- analysis differs from policy-makers presumptions
- pressure to change analysis

Problems with Soviet Estimates
- Why was Soviet decline not predicted by CIA?
  o CIA dissents on 1986 estimate of increases in Soviet programs
  o Schultz-Gorbachev conversations not reported to CIA analysts
- 1989 CIA review found that every major intelligence assessment from 1974-1986 overestimated Soviet nuclear weapons plans
- DIA v. CIA fight
- Over-estimate supports

Ballistic Missile Estimate
- 1995 NIE concluded "no country, other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada."
- 1998 Congressionally appointed Rumsfeld Commission disagree: “U.S. might well have little or no warning before operational deployment.”
- 1999 NIE: "We project that during the next 15 years the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China, and North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq"
- “could” v. “likely” standard
Pre-War Iraq Estimate
- Oct. 2002 NIE: Iraq’s Continuing Programs for WMD
- Senate Committee concludes: “most of the major key judgments… overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence.”