REPORT
2004 TASK FORCE
ON ASSURING SUCCESSFUL VEISHEA
AND OTHER STUDENT/COMMUNITY
CELEBRATIONS

November 30, 2004
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2004 Task Force on Assuring Successful VEISHEA
And Other Student/Community Celebrations

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Executive summary

VEISHEA, one of the nation’s largest student-organized festivals and one of Iowa State’s oldest and most cherished traditions, began in 1922. However, over the years the event’s official agenda – student recruitment, showcasing academic programs, linking various communities, developing student leadership, fundraising, and positive social opportunities – have shared the stage with an unofficial agenda – partying, drinking, and rioting. Since the late 1980’s, when the first VEISHEA-associated riot occurred, the unofficial agenda began overshadowing the official one. In 1992 an 8,000-person riot received national media coverage and a disturbance occurred again in 1994. In 1997 a VEISHEA campus visitor and non-student was murdered at an Iowa State fraternity house, prompting Iowa State administration to rule that future VEISHEAs would be alcohol-free. During 2004, a riot of approximately 2,000 people disrupted the festival and prompted Iowa State University President Gregory Geoffroy to suspend VEISHEA for 2005 and, together with Mayor Ted Tedesco and GSB President Sophia Magill, appoint this Task Force to study causes and recommendations.

A review of past VEISHEA disturbances reveals a number of commonalities. First, all were celebratory riots (riots not connected to one, specific issue); all were affected by alcohol use and abuse; all occurred in good weather; all involved both Iowa State students and non-students. The disturbances were taken seriously, reviewed, and various task forces compiled lists of recommendations. Many of the solutions recommended by these task forces were implemented and are still in place. For example, Iowa State and Ames police instituted various programs designed to build positive relationships with students and to involve them in their mission of maintaining peaceful communities; keg ordinances and rental leases have been revised; the festival was changed from three days to two, and held earlier in the year.

The VEISHEA riots are part of a national trend of celebratory riots that have increased in recent years. Nationwide, there were 64 of these disturbances between 1985 and 1995, an average of 5.8 per year. There were 29 in 2000, 25 in 2001 and 30 in 2002. While celebratory riots are unconnected to a single protest issue, violence may still be the goal of a few instigators. Other young people, some affected by alcohol, some unaware they are breaking the law by their presence, some just seeking a good time, contribute to the riot. At Iowa State, crowds and riots were sparked when police enforced alcohol policies or responded to neighbors’ complaints about unruly parties.

A number of factors that contribute to the initiation and perpetration of crowd violence have been present at troublesome VEISHEAs: (1) social cues that a riot may occur, perpetuated by the media, Iowa State policies, student conversations, and the reputation of VEISHEA itself; (2) excessive alcohol consumption; (3) the availability of an instant crowd afforded by large off-campus parties, high density housing in Campustown, attendance at official VEISHEA events and (more recently) cell phone use; (4) good weather.
A review of seven other universities that have experienced similar riots also reveals commonalities. For example, all seven reported that non-students, alcohol, parties, and off-campus disturbances were factors. Six reported that police action was a factor. While it is clear that alcohol is a factor, the 2004 Task Force ended our deliberations with consensus on only some aspects of this issue and many questions. We did not achieve consensus on the following questions: Do more stringent alcohol policies contribute to, or decrease the likelihood of crowd violence? Does keeping underage people out of bars and keeping alcohol from residence halls help decrease drunkenness, or force these partiers to unregulated venues? We refer questions of alcohol abuse prevention and legislation to experts in these areas.

Whatever decision is made regarding the future of VEISHEA, issues of student alcohol abuse will remain for Iowa State University.

The Task Force has divided its recommendations into four major categories. There was wide consensus on (1): general recommendations to reduce the probability of disturbances throughout the year; (2) recommendations to change VEISHEA; and (3) recommendations that would accompany a decision to cancel VEISHEA. Pros and cons of most recommendations are also considered. There was much less consensus on the fourth category, (4) recommendations to seriously consider.

**Recommendation 1:** It is clear that the issues surrounding VEISHEA transcend the event itself. Resolutions of underlying problems will affect the future health of the Ames and Iowa State communities. As President Geoffroy works to communicate broader messages, the committee encourages and supports the concept of a “Town Hall” meeting prior to making a decision about the future of VEISHEA.

**General recommendations to reduce the probability of disturbances**

**Recommendation 2:** The University administration should encourage Iowa State University students to become responsible members of the campus and Ames communities by understanding community rules and regulations and the consequences of breaking them. To advance these goals, we recommend:

- Requiring a freshman seminar to educate students about living on a university campus.
- Providing an orientation for students who decide to move off campus.
- Creating educational programs about proper party procedures and conduct.
- Informing students and others that it is illegal to remain in a riot area even if you have not been specifically ordered by a police officer to leave.
- Having representative groups of students, such as GSB, help students understand rules and regulations through *Daily* ads, a code of conduct handbook and/or additional measures.
- Getting students involved in and committed to reducing the likelihood of future disturbances.
- Providing expanded alcohol education.
- Making it clear to students and parents that violations of bootlegging, underage drinking, and other student conduct policies will not be tolerated by the University.
Recommendation 3: The University should institute policies that would help motivate people to disperse from a riot area. To advance these goals, we recommend:

- Changing Regents/ISU Student Disciplinary Regulations to include rioting, disorderly conduct, failing to disperse and hindering emergency efforts of police, fire and medical personnel. All such rules should apply regardless of whether the conduct occurs on or off campus and regardless of whether university or city officials issue orders to disperse.
- Changing Student Disciplinary Regulations to state that students who violate Student Disciplinary Regulations during a disturbance will be subject to enhanced penalties under the Student Disciplinary Regulations. However, students should be allowed to show that they actively tried to quell the disturbance as a means of avoiding or reducing penalties.
- Changing Student Disciplinary Regulations to clarify that interfering with safety officials (including police, fire and medical responders) who are responding to a disturbance is a violation subject to enhanced penalties, and that assaulting, throwing objects at, or otherwise endangering safety officials, peer security, student government officers or university officials and employees engaged in trying to quell a disturbance is grounds for immediate suspension and dismissal from the University.

Recommendation 4: Iowa State and the City of Ames should improve procedures for preventing nuisance parties. To advance this goal, we recommend:

- Creating and publicizing a Web site on nuisance parties.
- In conjunction with local landlords, reviewing regulations of nuisance parties, bootlegging and serving alcohol to underage people. Consider adding additional requirements or incentives for landlords to include provisions in leases to prevent and control such events, including requiring that landlords provide tenants with a disclosure of applicable city nuisance regulations.
- Amending nuisance party regulations to increase the financial consequences of hosting nuisance parties in the following way: Implement a special response fee ordinance that requires cited residents to reimburse the city for the cost of police responses to disorderly parties after the second police response to an address within 90 days, where at least 25 people are gathered, and when at least two citations are issued.

Recommendation 5: Iowa State and the City of Ames should attempt to identify the best practices for responding to developing and ongoing disturbances. To advance these goals, we recommend:

- Convening a summit among university and city administrators, students, community representatives and law enforcement agencies from locations around the country where campus disturbances have occurred to discuss best practices for responding to developing and ongoing disturbances.
- Ensuring that all involved police agencies employ the same riot control philosophy.
- Supporting the recommendations of the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy.
- Developing, in conjunction with Campustown businesses and the Ames and Iowa State University police departments, a consistent and efficient emergency evacuation plan. All Campustown employees should be trained in these procedures. This plan
should be publicized and posted in all Campustown businesses and rental properties, and made available to neighborhood organizations.

**Recommendation 6:** The following alcohol-related recommendations should be adopted by the appropriate entities:

- The City of Ames should examine amending the beer keg party regulation to require issuance of a permit based on number of kegs purchased or placed on hold by persons at the same address.
- The state and city should examine increasing criminal and civil penalties to require issuance of a permit based on the number of kegs purchased or placed on hold by persons at the same address (including forfeiture of profits) for bootlegging, serving alcohol to underage people, nuisance parties, and failing to prevent consumption by underage people.
- Iowa State should change Student Disciplinary Regulations (SDR) to make clear that alcohol-related violations that result in a public disturbance will be subject to enhanced penalties under the SDR.

**Recommendation 7:** The University and City of Ames should implement a comprehensive communications campaign. This recommendation applies regardless of the decision on the future of VEISHEA; however, the message would need to be tailored based on the decision. The campaign could include:

- Information on how to host successful parties.
- Information on negative consequences of illegal activities, especially celebratory riots.
- Ways to positively engage the media, including activities such as background meetings, and openness about underlying causes and responsibilities.
- Ongoing proactive social marketing.

**Recommendation 8:** The University, The City of Ames, and the Government of the Student Body should work together to address the need for the development of alternative social venues and outlets that appeal to the social needs of underage and of-age students.

**Change VEISHEA**

**Recommendation 9:** Iowa State should consider changing official VEISHEA events to decrease the likelihood of a disturbance. Specifically, we recommend considering:

- Offering several late-night/all-night/large-draw entertainment events.
- Relocating post-dusk VEISHEA events away from Campustown.

**Recommendation 10:** VEISHEA planners should shape events so that they showcase Iowa State’s educational mission and encourage civic participation and respect for the Ames community. To advance this goal, we recommend:

- Inviting and encouraging active participation from all colleges in a coordinated effort that includes students and alumni.
- Appealing to prospective students by highlighting the past, present, and future achievements of the University in accordance with the land-grant mission.
Discontinue VEISHEA

**Recommendation 11:** If VEISHEA is cancelled, the University should offer opportunities during the year for campus organizations to showcase themselves and to replace lost income that VEISHEA generates.

**Recommendation 12:** If VEISHEA is cancelled, the University should schedule alternative social and educational events throughout the year.

**Recommendations to seriously consider**

**Recommendation 13:** The University and the City of Ames should examine how alcohol restrictions and their enforcement may contribute to rioting. Specifically, we recommend considering with input from appropriate experts and stakeholders:

- Changing restrictions on underage people in bars.
- Changing restrictions on alcohol in residence halls.
- Adopting consistent year round policies.
- Working with alcohol vendors to consider methods to avoid creation of crowds.

**Recommendation 14:** Hold VEISHEA earlier in the year.

**Recommendation 15:** Change the name of VEISHEA.
Introduction

Background

Iowa State University’s annual VEISHEA celebration was marred in the early morning hours of April 18, 2004, after a large crowd moved into Campustown following the break-up of a party on Hunt Street. The group grew and erupted into violence, resulting in 37 arrests and more than $100,000 in public and private property damage.

Some in the crowd threw rocks, concrete and bottles, broke windows, set fires, damaged police cars and pulled down streetlights. The riot was marked by confusion and anger. Many participants appeared to view the situation as an entertaining and engaging spectacle or game. Communication via cell phones, lack of awareness of and/or adherence to riot law, and a general sense of police versus rioters were elements of the disturbance.

Although no serious injuries were reported there was significant risk to those at the scene. Those with minor injuries (including inhalation of pepper spray and tear gas) were treated on the scene and at a local hospital.

The events of April 18 marked the fifth time serious VEISHEA-related incidents had occurred since 1988, although the previous six VEISHEA celebrations (1998 through 2003) had been peaceful.

Iowa State University President Gregory Geoffroy suspended VEISHEA 2005, outlining a one-year suspension that would provide student leaders, faculty, staff, administrators, Ames city leaders and community members an opportunity to develop a plan to minimize the likelihood of future problems.

VEISHEA task force, commission announced

On May 12, 2004, President Geoffroy, Ames Mayor Ted Tedesco and Government of the Student Body President Sophia Magill appointed the “Task Force on Assuring Successful VEISHEA and Other Student/Community Celebrations.” The task force was asked to assess the underlying causes of the 2004 VEISHEA disturbances, and to develop recommendations to minimize the likelihood of similar incidents happening again – at VEISHEA or any other event. (Appendix A) Catherine Woteki, College of Agriculture dean, chaired the VEISHEA task force. Michael Bugeja, director ISU’s Greenlee School of Journalism; Shawn Eagleburger, Interfraternity Council chair; Pete Englin, dean of students; Steve Schainker, Ames city manager; and GSB President Magill served on the executive committee. Working group membership is listed in the Appendix B. Kate Bielenberg, Office of the President, provided administrative support to the task force.

On June 3, 2004, Geoffroy, Tedesco and Magill announced formation of a separate group, the “Commission on Improving Relations Among ISU Students, the University, the City of Ames and the Ames Community.” The commission was asked to broadly examine the sense of community among Ames residents, the City of Ames, the university and ISU students, and
to develop recommendations to improve those relationships. We have forwarded to the Commission a number of recommendations that fell under their purview. (See Appendix D)

**Task force operations**

The full task force held eight meetings, all open to the public. Guiding principles and operations were established. Members of the public were provided five minutes each to address the committee during the last 30 minutes of each meeting, if they so desired. Members of the media were provided a 15- to 20-minute briefing and question/answer period with the executive committee at the conclusion of each meeting.

The VEISHEA task force met on the following dates:
- May 27, 2004 – 3:30 to 5:30 p.m., Cardinal Room, Memorial Union
- June 21, 2004 – 9:30 to 11:30 a.m., Great Hall, Memorial Union
- July 28, 2004 – 1 to 5 p.m., Scheman Building, Iowa State Center
- Sept. 7, 2004 – 1 to 5 p.m., Great Hall, Memorial Union
- Sept. 29, 2004 – 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., Sun Room, Memorial Union
- Sept. 30, 2004 – 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., Great Hall, Memorial Union
- Oct. 21, 2004 – 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., Union Drive Community Center
- Nov. 18, 2004 – 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., Great Hall, Memorial Union

The task force established three working groups to gather information, conduct research and draft recommendations and sections of a report that would be provided to President Geoffroy, Mayor Tedesco and GSB President Magill by Nov. 30, 2004. Working group meetings also were open to the public. Working Group 1 studied the events and chronology of VEISHEA 2004 and reviewed previous VEISHEA disturbances. Members met 11 times. Group 2 examined the underlying causes of celebratory riots, and met six times. Group 3 examined recommendations from other institutions that have experienced celebratory riots and disturbances. Group 3 met six times.

For the full task force and working groups, all agendas, minutes, reports, appendices and handouts were posted online for public review at: [http://www.iastate.edu/news/04/veishea/meetings/tf/tf.shtml](http://www.iastate.edu/news/04/veishea/meetings/tf/tf.shtml). Materials also were made available at ISU’s Parks Library and at the Ames Public Library.

The full task force reviewed all findings developed and presented by the working groups. Task force members built consensus on findings, conclusions and recommendations for which strong agreement existed that implementation of the recommendation would reduce the probability of future disturbances. They eliminated recommendations they did not believe would reduce the probability of future disturbances, and identified areas about which they did not agree.

Prior to and during the task force’s final meeting, members reviewed and edited the draft report. Each member had the opportunity review the final report and indicate his or her general agreement with its recommendations.
GUIDING PRINCIPLES of the 2004 Task Force on Assuring Successful VEISHEA and Other Student/Community Celebrations

The time for blame has ended, and the time for resolution has begun. The task force process is structured to find resolutions to what transpired on April 17-18—not to cast blame. The executive committee has asked that all co-chairs and members of the task force use this principle to conduct a systematic investigation of the events and underlying causes so that appropriate recommendations can be formulated to execute the charge: minimizing the likelihood of similar disturbances in the future, be they associated with VEISHEA, ISU athletics celebrations, or any other event regardless of the time of year.

Constituents should share a common viewpoint. While recommendations to execute the above charge may vary, and while broad representation may contribute to that process, members of the task force, the community, the campus and even the media should share a common viewpoint: celebratory riots are dangerous, physically and psychologically; tarnish the image of Ames as a community-minded, welcoming place; and undermine the educational mission of Iowa State University. Thus, all constituents should act consensually to safeguard community and educational mission.

Leadership from the entire Ames community—Iowa State University students, administration, faculty, and staff; permanent residents of Ames; and City officials—should drive a process of investigation, resolution, recommendation, and implementation focused on civic involvement, with all its rights and responsibilities. The task force embraces civic involvement and recognizes that the entire community will contribute to the process of investigating events and formulating recommendations, and ultimately, in implementing strategies to address the problem of celebratory riots in Ames. Participation of the student body, in particular, will play a significant role in this task. With individual rights come collective responsibilities, an educational component that should inform all of our deliberations.
A historical perspective: Where we’ve been

The three traditions of VEISHEA
VEISHEA has a long tradition as a positive social event that showcases Iowa State University, increases campus pride, and builds bridges among Iowa State employees, students, alumni and other supporters. However, two other traditions have become associated with VEISHEA. One of these is the tradition of VEISHEA as a time to party and drink. The other is the completely negative tradition of VEISHEA as an occasion to riot.

The official VEISHEA tradition
VEISHEA began in 1922 as a combination of separate events organized by different units of Iowa State. The event has a rich tradition and has served a number of purposes for the university and its constituents. The 1992 VEISHEA Task Force (Galloway 1992) identified nine traditional purposes of VEISHEA:

1. To provide an opportunity for students, faculty, and staff to showcase the academic programs of the university and its extension services.
2. To provide opportunities for the development of student leadership.
3. To provide an opportunity to link the university to the Ames community and to the citizens of Iowa.
4. To provide students an opportunity for positive social interaction.
5. To provide an opportunity for student recruitment.
6. To provide a focal point for alumni activity and interaction with the university.
7. To recognize distinguished alumni and friends of the university (e.g., the parade marshal).
8. To provide fundraising opportunities for student organizations.
9. To affirm and sustain the traditions of the university.

The 1992 task force argued that VEISHEA was no longer serving some of its traditional purposes and that participation in the event was declining. The task force’s survey indicated that “Student participation in the organized events of VEISHEA is very low” and “less than one-half of all students surveyed were interested in becoming more involved in VEISHEA.” The 1992 task force also stated that “[t]he interest and involvement of the university’s faculty, staff, department chairs, and deans in the planning and implementation of VEISHEA and its event appear to have diminished.” The 1992 task force called for changes in VEISHEA to strengthen this tradition and increase participation.

There is continuing anecdotal evidence for the decline in support for this first tradition. For instance, there is minimal participation by colleges and academic departments, and the event does not serve as a major recruiting tool or showcase for the university. However, there appears to be a great deal of support among certain groups for this tradition. A fall 2004 survey of ISU introduction to sociology students (N=747) indicated that 88.4 percent agreed strongly or agreed somewhat that “VEISHEA is an important part of campus life,” 93.5 percent agreed that “Iowa State should continue to support
VEISHEA,” and 92.4 percent indicated they disagreed strongly or disagreed somewhat that “VEISHEA should be cancelled.” Other strong supporters of the official VEISHEA include the event’s student organizers and the many students, alumni, and community members who continue to participate in sponsored activities.

The unofficial VEISHEA tradition
The second tradition, which also has a long history, is that VEISHEA is an occasion for students, alumni, and others to party. It is sometimes called the “unofficial VEISHEA,” since much of it takes place outside of official VEISHEA events. The 1992 task force survey found that more students participated in the parties of unofficial VEISHEA than in official events. Much of this partying involves the consumption of alcohol. Although it is important to recognize the difference between these two VEISHEA traditions, in the public perception they are linked to each other and to the history of rioting during VEISHEA weekend.

The tradition of VEISHEA as an occasion to riot
The tradition of rioting during VEISHEA weekend constitutes a third, completely negative tradition. Because of this tradition, VEISHEA as a whole—its name, its events, and the weekend upon which it is celebrated—produces a variety of social cues that a riot may take place (see The role of social cues in precipitating riots). The impact of this third tradition on future VEISHEA celebrations cannot be underestimated.

A review of past disturbances, perceived factors, and solutions

Mixed-issue campus disturbances at Iowa State University
McCarthy et al. (2002) defined a “mixed-issue campus disturbance” as one “that resulted in a public conflict between aggregates of (mostly student) participants and authorities (usually the police), but did not start as an issue-based protest gathering.” Using this definition, we have identified the following eight such events at Iowa State University since 1985:

• In 1985, during VEISHEA weekend’s “Ash Bash,” which was sponsored by Greek Houses on Ash Avenue, cars were overturned and burned.

• In 1988, a riot took place early Sunday morning during VEISHEA weekend. People in a crowd of approximately 5,000 threw bottles, bricks and rocks and made a bonfire from furniture. The rioting followed smaller disturbances the two previous nights, which were associated with parties being shut down in the campustown area. Of the 45 people arrested, 25 were ISU students.

• In 1992, during VEISHEA weekend, people in a large crowd (est. 8,000) threw rocks, cans and bottles at police. Twenty-seven rioters were arrested and 47 were treated for injuries.

• In 1994, during VEISHEA weekend, people in a large crowd threw cans, bottles and rocks at police. A total of 20 people were arrested, 11 of whom were students.
• In 1998, students in a crowd of approximately 300 chanted profanities, set off fireworks, and attempted to tear down a light pole in the Towers Residence Hall courtyard before being dispersed by police. The event, which formed spontaneously, was viewed as a protest against the first “Dry VEISHEA,” which took place later that spring.

• In 1999, during a planned protest event three weeks before the second “Dry VEISHEA” and near the anniversary of the previous Towers Residence Hall disturbance, students committed acts of vandalism and chanted profanity in a crowd that moved from the Towers to The Knoll and then to Jack Trice Stadium, stopping at various points on campus in between to rally loudly. The event was viewed as a protest against “Dry VEISHEA.”

• In 2000, following an NCAA basketball victory, participants damaged cars, pulled down light poles, marched to The Knoll and then to Jack Trice Stadium, where they tried to pull a goal post down. They then tore down pieces of fence and threw them in Lake Laverne.

• The April 18, 2004, disturbance resulted in destruction of Campustown property and the arrest of 37 individuals, including 22 Iowa State University Students and three recent alumni.

Although all these events meet the definition of “mixed-issue campus disturbance,” they vary considerably in their character and severity. The events of 1998, 1999 and 2000 resulted in less damage than the other events and their participants showed less hostility toward police. Representatives of local law enforcement agencies on the 2004 VEISHEA task force reported that policing of these events took into account the festive feeling of the events and attempted, at least to some extent, to accommodate the crowds’ high spirits without compromising the safety of participants or bystanders. These same law enforcement representatives noted that there was “something different” about the attitude of the rioters involved in the April 18, 2004 riot; from the police perspective, crowds were decidedly more hostile than during earlier disturbances.

Contemporaneous accounts
In order to assess popular opinions regarding the nature of the mixed-issue disturbances on VEISHEA weekend 1988, 1992, 1994 and 2004, and the murder that took place during VEISHEA weekend 1997, we reviewed task force reports and news articles included in the VEISHEA documents collection distributed to the 2004 task force; news articles, columns, and letters to the editor that appeared in April 2004 issues of the *Ames Daily Tribune*, *Des Moines Register*, and the *Iowa State Daily*; and reports made to and personal observations of current task force members. Our review included only those factors that someone (reporter, letter-writer, official, etc.) identified as directly causing, contributing to, or escalating the riots and other disturbances associated with the celebration of VEISHEA.

This review suggests a number of factors that contemporaneous observers believed were important for understanding these events. (Appendix D provides the details of this analysis.) The factors identified were many and varied. However, we identified several patterns:
• Reports of all five events identified contributing factors related to alcohol, especially binge-drinking and over consumption, and congregation issues, including the number of revelers from outside Ames converging on town for VEISHEA and the high concentration of student housing in the area of the disturbances.

• Reports of all five events identified factors that escalated the situation once it had begun, but the nature of those factors differed from one disturbance to another.

• Reports of all five events identified external factors, most relating to the university and its policies, the City of Ames and its ordinances, tensions affecting the student community, and the rental property situation, but again the nature of those factors differed from one event to another.

Additional factors identified as contributing to at least four of the five events include the impact of out-of-town revelers on the climate of VEISHEA; large parties during VEISHEA weekend that get out of control; media attention on VEISHEA, much of it negative, that may have influenced the expectations and, therefore, the behavior of the revelers; too few "alternative" official VEISHEA events at night; and the relationship between Iowa State University's conduct code and penalties for misconduct and students' off-campus behavior.

Observers of the April 18, 2004 riot pointed to two factors that may have contributed to the riot that were not identified by observers of previous disturbances. First, they noted the influence of technology on crowd size. The use of cell phones to disseminate word of the disturbance and the broadcasting of riot coverage on radio station KURE may have contributed to the size of the crowd. Observers also noted that many onlookers in the 2004 riots were unwilling to give up ground to police because of the bystanders’ perceived “right to be there.” Since this review of previous disturbances at Iowa State University is based on a limited number of contemporaneous reports, its findings should be treated with caution. Current research on the dynamics of mixed-issue disturbances casts doubt on some of the claims made by contemporaneous observers.

Previous recommendations
VEISHEA Task Force 2004 is not the first group to propose solutions to VEISHEA disturbances. It is instructive to review past events, proposed solutions, and the present status of those solutions. As the problems grew less severe over the years, commitment towards sustaining the solutions sometimes waned. Some policies were altered or executed with fewer financial and personnel resources. Nonetheless, the majority of the solutions were in place when the 2004 disturbance occurred.

Recommendations for ordinance and law changes were implemented but were not studied to determine impact. Some ordinances were altered, reviewed, and abandoned (e.g., allowing minors into bars; see Appendix E).
VEISHEA 1988

Several large parties grew out of hand Thursday, Friday and Saturday nights. Empty cups were sold for free beer, and inadequate state liquor laws provided few measures of control. Police intervened and some parties were shut down, but police were ill equipped to handle disturbances the first two nights. On Saturday, several large parties on Welch Avenue grew out of control and led to approximately 5,000 people congregating on the street and stopping traffic, possibly as a reaction to earlier parties being shut down. A large bonfire was started, and there was some damage to nearby homes and yards as participants searched for fuel. Bottles and bricks were thrown at officers and into the crowd, resulting in some minor injuries. VEISHEA weekend weather was ideal for outdoor evening activities and likely contributed to the congregation of large crowds. A large number of non-students also appeared to have played a key role in each evening's events. Of the 45 people arrested, only 25 were students.

Recommendations

An Ames/ISU ad hoc committee on the riot found that city and university law enforcement and administrative personnel did not have sufficient impact to influence large crowds. The consensus was that an organized effort needed to be made to develop the presence of student leadership in organized events such as VEISHEA, football, and other major activities. More effective crowd dispersal required better training, equipment, and statewide coordination. Choosing facilities best suited to controlling large crowds required a review of University facilities.

Specific recommendations that resulted in action included the following:

1. **Encourage police to cultivate a positive relationship with young people.** Strong support of this solution has resulted in a variety of initiatives in the Ames and Iowa State police departments. For example, the Ames Police Department (APD) has enrolled 172 students in its Citizen Police Academy. The department has developed a Ride Along Program, in which Iowa State students can ride with a police officer; employment opportunities and internships; a Community Resource Officer Program, in which an officer is assigned full-time to providing and/or coordinating crime prevention programs, and assisting with neighborhood dispute resolution; presentations on crime prevention, alcohol and other drugs, sexual assault, self defense, theft, I.D.s; a sexual assault response team and crisis intervention team; and Cops & Jocks, a liaison program between the APD Ames and Iowa State Athletic Department.

   The Iowa State Police Division, comprised of college-educated officers, has: instituted a 12-week Citizen Police Academy comprised of students, faculty, and staff; employs approximately 100 students; developed a ride-along program; served as advisors to VEISHEA; sponsored Destination Iowa State car washes; provided training for Cyclone Aides; sponsored internships, conducted numerous prevention programs to college and high school students; and instituted an outreach program in which police serve as a liaison with residence halls.

2. **Revise keg ordinance so that only two kegs can be tapped at once.** The ordinance is in place. If there is more than one keg, a permit must be obtained.
3. **VEISHEA** committee should **promote activities between 9 p.m. and 4 a.m.** VEISHEA activities are currently promoted during the day.

4. **Encourage rental property owners to limit party activity within their buildings.** Rental property owners have incorporated restrictions into their leases. There has also been an increase in private security hired by landlords. Additional changes in city ordinances having implications for VEISHEA are available in Appendices I and II. Information on nuisance party regulations and letters that are sent to property owners/managers if they are in violation are available in Appendix 3.

5. City should **upgrade street lighting** along Welch Avenue. This was done.

6. City’s Parks and Recreation Department should **provide alternate activities** for high school students. This was implemented but discontinued after 1992.

Recommendations that were **not** implemented included exploring the possibility of letting underage people into bars; creating a city ordinance to prohibit the sale of carryout alcohol after 1 a.m. and opening Iowa State’s State Gym, Beyer Hall and tennis courts until midnight during VEISHEA.

**VEISHEA 1992**

A standoff between law enforcement personnel and a crowd of 8,000 followed an arrest for public intoxication at the intersection of Welch Avenue and Lincoln Way. Members of the crowd threw rocks, cans, and bottles at police, and considerable vandalism, physical violence, injury, and public intoxication occurred. Twenty-seven rioters were arrested and 47 were treated for injuries. Again, weather was warm with no precipitation. Later, a survey sponsored by the President’s Task Force on VEISHEA would indicate that students were expecting some sort of disturbance based on extensive media coverage. Also, at the time Iowa State was involved in several race-related issues. While the report and surveys indicated that race was not a factor in the actual riot, racial tensions were high during this time period. The celebration occurred shortly after the acquittal of the officers involved in the beating of Rodney King.

A President’s Task Force on VEISHEA was appointed after the riot. Specific recommendations that resulted in action included the following:

1. Schedule VEISHEA **events later into the night.** This is currently being done.
2. Hold events at **various locations** to diffuse number of people gathering in one spot. Currently, events are held at different locations, i.e. Lied, Memorial Union, Recreation Services, Welch Avenue, but none are held after midnight.
3. Require VEISHEA committee to submit plan to university president on how to **increase student involvement** in the preparation and execution of events. For the past six years, approximately 350 students do more than 90 percent of the planning and implementing of VEISHEA. This number has been consistent over the past six years. Prior to 1997 library records did not give any definitive number of students that helped in the planning and implementation.
4. **Hold classes the Friday before VEISHEA.** Classes traditionally were cancelled that day. As a result of this recommendation, classes are now held on the Friday before VEISHEA weekend.
5. Hold event in **mid-April** instead of early May to alleviate the image of VEISHEA as “the last blowout before finals.” This change is in place.
Recommendations that were **not** implemented included expanding the VEISHEA planning committee so that it is less oriented to the Greek system. VEISHEA is currently still considered primarily a Greek event by students and is led by a majority of Greek students. Another recommendation **not** implemented was eliminating VEISHEA if there are disturbances on the scale of those in 1988 and 1992.

**VEISHEA 1997**

Three non-students got into a fight and one of them, was stabbed to death at the Iowa State Adelante Fraternity. With the exception of that incident, VEISHEA 1997 was one of the calmest on record.

The 1997 VEISHEA Advisory Council was assembled in response to the homicide. The Council recommended continuing VEISHEA and made the following recommendations:

**General recommendations**

- University administrators and representatives of the City of Ames should meet to review and discuss their shared concerns and responsibilities prior to any commitment being made on staging future VEISHEA celebrations.
- Reiterated recommendations from the 1992 Presidential Tasks Force on VEISHEA for a variety of recreational options.
- The VEISHEA Committee should add positions dedicated to risk management and as a liaison with businesses.

**Alcohol recommendations**

- Vice President for Student Affairs and the Committee on Fraternities and Sororities should engage chapter advisers and corporation boards for Iowa State University's Greek houses in a dialogue on alcohol issues.
- Staff and budget in the Dean of Students' Office should be expanded to provide additional assistance to Greek chapters in both leadership development and alcohol education.
- Ames Police Department and Iowa State University should work together in developing a plan to establish risk management procedures, particularly in the area of the Greek houses, where small parties have tended to merge into larger crowds.

President Jischke and the VEISHEA Committee ultimately adopted the following additional measures that were not included in the Council’s recommendations:

- Seek a pledge from student groups to make VEISHEA safe and alcohol-free.
- Discourage the attendance of those seeking an alcohol-based party atmosphere by focusing the event on Iowa State and the City of Ames.

In October 1998, as part of an on-going review of VEISHEA, recommendations were:

- Continuing VEISHEA as an **alcohol-free event**. While this recommendation remains in place, it is now clear that the phrase, “VEISHEA is alcohol-free” is confusing to the public and needs to be better defined. Does it refer to just university-owned and affiliated property and events?
- **Offer alternative events**. Current examples include “Dew the Rec” and comedians. However, funding, dates, and lead time restrictions hinder bringing in acts.
• Begin VEISHEA **planning earlier** in the year. Planning is now year-round.
• Provide **more promotion to Cyclone athletic** events that occur during VEISHEA, like the spring football game. This recommendation is currently in place.
• Improve the **VEISHEA Web site**. The site has been improved, but still needs more improvement.
• **Increase peer security.** The implementation of peer security has been mixed. While peer security, coordinated by the VEISHEA Planning Committee, was heavily involved in the past, in the last few years fear of volatile crowds and injury prompted a reduced effort. Greek Patrol was changed to Foot Patrol, consisting of Student Affairs staff that patrolled until 2:00 a.m. For a few years, a team of staff and students visited various party locations with bags, goodies, and information on laws. But for the past three years, the Party Response Team has not functioned, due to budget, time limitations and safety concerns.

A recommendation that was originally implemented but subsequently relaxed was to promote VEISHEA as more of a family event, stressing an emphasis on the Cyclone family (those associated with the university) to deter out-of-towners who use VEISHEA as an excuse to come to Ames and party. VEISHEA was not promoted as an exclusively Cyclone Family event and there was no overt effort to deter the attendance of out-of-towners.

**Events of VEISHEA 2004**
Good weather enhanced a high turnout at both official and unofficial events. Official daytime celebrations were considered successful and did not appear to be connected to the night disturbances that followed. Bars experienced capacity crowds and large parties were organized. Calls from Ames citizens reported loud parties or people on their property and some property managers summoned security to break them up.

The task force found wide discrepancies in accounts and interpretations of the night’s events. The following chronology is taken from Ames Police Chief Loras Jaeger’s written report submitted April 27, 2004 to the Ames City Council and mayor and from additional eye-witness accounts. (See Appendix 10 for street maps.) However, we were unable to ascertain what occurred between the breakup of the Hunt Street party until the group turned onto Welch Avenue.

In addition to this chronology, a number of themes emerged. There was a great deal of confusion from people on the scene about what was taking place. People emerging from bars and businesses were confused; some participants were unable to hear commands from the police; bystanders were not aware of the riot law that states that they must disperse. Multiple perspectives from staff, students, and police exist on the propriety of the number of police and their tactics. Many participants viewed the various police agencies (Iowa State University Police, Ames, Story County Sheriff’s, and Iowa Highway Patrol) as one organized entity.

Contributing to the growing crowd were cell phones and media coverage. At various times the riot activities dissipated and then surged again in other areas. There was a general sense of police versus rioters. Videos and pictures present a picture of
participants viewing the disturbance as a game or an adventure – something fun and exciting, until they were sprayed or inhaled gases. Thirty-four arrests were made for simple misdemeanors and three for felonies. Fifty-nine percent of the arrestees were students, and eight percent were recent former students or alumni.

Chronology of events

11:20 p.m., Saturday, April 17
Ames police received a complaint regarding a large party of approximately 350-400 people at the corner of Chamberlain and Hunt Streets.

11:45 p.m., Saturday, April 17
Occupants of one apartment were selling beer (bootlegging) from kegs. Two uniformed officers and a supervisor entered the apartment building to affect the arrest.

Chronologically, two additional officers outside the apartment were checking identifications and encountered an intoxicated individual. This individual attempted to run away, fell or was pushed down, and was subsequently arrested. The two officers making the arrest were targeted with rocks, bottles, and cans.

A decision was made to close the party. The crowd size required additional officers and six to eight officers were organized and convened near Cap Timm Field. Some wore face shields and helmets because of the objects previously thrown at officers. The police were in full view of many at the apartment. Full “riot gear” was still stored at the Iowa State Armory and not being worn.

12:10 a.m., Sunday, April 18
Police officers moved onto the apartment property and asked party-goers to leave if they were not residents of the apartment. It is believed that many in attendance had already left after the first arrest and before the team arrived to move people on. Approximately 100 people were on the corner, standing on both sides of the street when police officers returned. Approximately 70 people dispersed in directions other than toward Welch, some going north toward Lincoln Way. There were no early reports of riotous behavior from the group moving north. The remainder moved east toward Welch Avenue. Police officers moved approximately 30 people toward Hayward and lost about a third of those to parties between Sheldon and Hayward. When they police arrived at Hayward, there were close to 1,000 people on Hunt, between Hayward and Welch, and approximately 300 more on Hayward. This is the crowd that spilled onto Welch.

12:30 a.m., Sunday, April 18
By the time the crowd on Hunt merged with the crowd that was already on Welch, there were approximately 2,000 people. The group that entered Welch Avenue broke off a sign and threw it at the Vogue Vision Center, shattering a window. Other windows in that building were then broken out. The group then moved to just north of the clock tower and one individual emptied a trash can and began throwing it in the air. After four or five throws, it struck and knocked down a student. Another trash can was placed below the clock tower and ignited. Matthew Goodman, a campustown vendor and member of the Ames City Council, extinguished the fire. A ketchup bottle was taken from a concession
stand and thrown, striking a student. The thrower and the struck individual squared off and were pulled apart by two student affairs staff members.

Two full beer cans were thrown from the post office parking area and landed in the intersection of Welch and Chamberlain, narrowly missing VEISHEA attendees. Damage to properties was occurring along Welch Avenue south of Chamberlain Avenue. At that point, police ordered the intersection cleared. Most staff and VEISHEA organizers moved to the first station. Police moved into the intersection and told people to leave. A few individuals were sprayed with irritants for non-compliance and the intersection quickly cleared. Approximately 400-500 people were at the intersection of Chamberlain and Hayward and were being moved by the Ames Police Department.

**1:00 a.m., Sunday, April 18**
The group of individuals re-organized and returned to Welch Avenue, arriving from south of the clock tower. The group was breaking windows, throwing rocks, pushing over portable toilets, etc. The rioters attempted to flip a Story County Sheriff Office patrol vehicle. Ames Police Department and Iowa State Police Division organized in the Ames fire station on Welch Avenue and put on full protective equipment commonly called “riot gear.” The law enforcement group left the station to disperse the group.

**1:00 – 4:30 a.m., Sunday, April 18**
Officers made repeated trips to and from the Welch Avenue fire station, attempting to disperse the crowd. Most riot activity occurred along Lincoln Way between Welch and Sheldon Avenues, with additional individuals creating disturbances in the campustown area. Approximately 3,000 people had gathered in the street and in front of Friley Hall. When the riot first began on Welch Avenue, Ames and Iowa State police formed riot lines. A few Story County sheriffs’ deputies may have been on Welch Avenue, but for the most part they handled the Lincoln Way and Welch intersection area. After Welch Avenue was cleared and the crowd ended up on Lincoln Way, the Story County Sheriff’s Office, Ames Police Department, and Iowa State Police Division worked together. Approximately four or five Iowa State Highway Troopers arrived, but they were never part of the riot line and mostly remained near the fire station. By 4:30 a.m. the crowd had essentially dispersed.
Campus disturbances nationwide

The tradition of rioting that has become associated with VEISHEA is not unique to VEISHEA or Iowa State University. The VEISHEA disturbances are part of a nationwide trend of what researchers are call “celebratory riots” or “mixed-issue campus disturbances.” Rioting at universities in the United States is almost as old as this country's university system itself. Most rioting, however, has been associated with protest against institutional policies, such as \textit{in loco parentis} policies and mandatory military training, or protest involving national issues, such as civil rights and anti-war movements.

A more recent trend is the rise in the number of riots that are unconnected to protest. The factors and dynamics of this recent trend are a relatively new field of study. Since these disturbances sometimes occur following a major sports victory, they are sometimes called “celebratory riots,” but researchers have also called them “mixed-issue campus disturbances” because they arise from a variety of situations. McCarthy, Martin, McPhail and Cress (2002; Martin 2004) have identified 208 such riots (those not related to protest) between 1985 and 2002. Between 1985 and 1995 there were 64 of these disturbances, or an average of 5.8 per year. No year during this period had more than 10 such disturbances. During 1996-2002 there were 144 mixed-issue disturbances, or an average of 20.6 per year. The three years with the most such riots are the three most recent years: 2000 (29 riots), 2001 (25) and 2002 (30).

Forms of collective action, including forms of rioting, often take place in waves. The United States faced waves of race riots in the 1910-1920s and 1940s, and a wave of urban riots in the 1960s. Protest tactics, such as sit-ins, and fads, such as college campus streaking, come in waves. Thus, it is important to view the disturbances that have occurred at Iowa State University as part of a larger national trend.

The dynamics of violence in mixed-issue disturbances

Many popular accounts of violence during riots (as well as now discredited social science explanations) portray rioters as losing their minds. Media portrayals of previous VEISHEA disturbances sometimes used this claim to explain crowd behavior. However, current research suggests that people in riots act purposefully (McPhail 1991; Postmes and Spears 1998). In order to understand a riot, it is important to understand the purposes of the rioters. “The goals [these people] have fashioned for themselves appear to influence their behavior even when those goals [may appear to us to be] trivial, vague, unrealistic, or self-defeating” (Tilly 1978).

McPhail (1994) offers a useful typology of violence in rioting: (1) Outcome violence is violence that results from people with non-violent goals, but who face resistance to these goals. (2) Intended violence is the result of people pursuing inherently violent goals. Both types of violence may take place in mixed-issue riots.

Below, we apply this typology to violence occurring in mixed-issue riots, specifically the April 18 riot. We examine how riots may be precipitated by resistance to alcohol regulation enforcement and how people in the riot area may escalate their involvement in response to the actions of police attempting to quell the riot. Then we examine the roles
of (1) social cues, (2) access of temporally available people to the riot area, and (3) community strain.

**Intended violence and the role of “entrepreneurs” (instigators)**
A review of the VEISHEA 2004 witness reports and video footage of the April 18 riot suggests that both intended violence and outcome violence were present. A majority of this violence was committed because it was fun for both the actors and their audience. Thus, the term “celebratory riot” seems appropriate for this particular mixed-issue disturbance, as it appears to have had the character of a game or adventure for many of its participants. Much of the action involved taunting police with chants and thrown objects. The gathering dispersed in response to police actions and then reformed. Destruction of property was greeted with cheering.

Buettner (2004), in her valuable study of the 2002 Ohio State riot, points to the importance of “entrepreneurs,” her term for those who take the lead in attempting to initiate the riot. These “entrepreneurs” tend to be young, white males. “For these ‘entrepreneurs’ the large gathering provides an opportunity to precipitate situations of greater risk—burning couches, overturning cars, setting cars on fire, and potentially engaging with the police in a situation where the large numbers provide them with some advantage.” (p. 173).

Buettner's study illuminates what may be one of the key factors in the escalation and continuation of the April 18 riot: the involvement of instigators bent on committing intended violence. Central Iowa and Iowa State University both have a large population of young, white males; additionally, more than 75 percent of the population of most blocks immediately surrounding Campustown is between the ages of 18 and 24. Of the 37 people arrested following the April 18 riot, most fit Buettner's profile of the typical riot instigator.

A fall 2004 survey of ISU introduction to sociology students (N=747) suggests that many students are interested in rioting. In this survey, 23.8 percent of male respondents and 10.5 percent of female respondents agreed strongly or agreed somewhat that “I would like to participate in a riot during my college years.” The survey also found that potential instigators would have a willing audience: 48.9 percent of male respondents and 27.6 percent of female respondents agreed that “I would like to watch a riot during my college years.”

Accounts of the April 18 riot clearly indicate that several instigators were instrumental in beginning and leading the violence. When police attempted to break up the party on Hunt Street, one man began the chant of “Riot! Riot!” from a balcony. Soon a few people started a fire by the clock tower. During the confrontation with the police on Lincoln Way, one man (nicknamed “Spartacus” by students watching from Friley Hall) urged on the crowd, threw tear gas canisters back at police, and led people in periodic assaults on light poles.

**Outcome violence and alcohol restrictions**
Research suggests that alcohol is an important part of university life for many college students and has been for centuries. Many students believe that alcohol eases social
interaction and relieves stress; they expect alcohol to be available at social events. A 2003 survey of Iowa State University students (Kellogg and Dunn 2003) found that nearly 73 percent had used alcohol in the past 30 days and 41.5 percent had engaged in high-risk drinking at least once during the past two weeks. A majority of students agreed that alcohol helps break the ice (71.4 percent), enhances social activity (69 percent), facilitates a connection with peers (56.4 percent) and allows people to have more fun (56.1 percent).

Alcohol can contribute to rioting in two ways. First, alcohol lowers inhibitions and impairs thinking and coordination. Second, policies that restrict alcohol may lead to rioting by (1) driving drinking into large off-campus parties and (2) creating encounters between partiers and police attempting to enforce alcohol restrictions or respond to problems created by drinking. Buettner (2004) suggests that the emergence and spread of the mixed-issue campus disturbance may be connected to the raising of the drinking age in the mid-1980s to comply with a federal mandate. (In Iowa, the legal age to buy alcohol was raised from 19 to 21 in 1986.) The more restrictive drinking rules resulted in movement of drinking to large, unregulated off-campus parties and created the possibility of more frequent hostile encounters with police.

In addition to the federally-mandated drinking age, Iowa State University students face a number of restrictions on alcohol consumption, such as:

- An Ames City ordinance forbidding people below the drinking age from entering local bars. This ordinance restricts the ability of those who are underage to socialize with their friends who may legally drink in bars; this restriction, in turn, drives people to unregulated off-campus parties, where people of all ages may socialize freely.
- Department of Residence rules limiting possession and consumption of alcohol in residence halls. These residence hall policies have grown stricter as the university has attempted to deal with problems related to alcohol consumption.
- University administration-mandated “Dry VEISHEA.” This ban on all alcohol consumption on campus, in fraternities and sororities, at official VEISHEA events, and at all campus events that occur during VEISHEA, applies only during VEISHEA and includes even adults who might normally drink legally.

Alcohol restrictions can lead to “outcome violence” as people with the goal of partying and consuming alcohol resist police who attempt to enforce the restrictions or deal with the problems created by large house parties. Buettner (2004) argues that one path of escalation from party to disturbance occurs when police attempt “to break up large and boisterous parties and are met with an angry response…. [I]ndividuals who were out to party and have a good time (as opposed to the entrepreneurs who intended to engage in antisocial activities) see the police action as an obstacle to meeting their original goal” (p. 174). This claim agrees with the assessment by other scholars that much crowd violence results from interactions between crowd members and police. “Most collective violence… grows out of actions which are not intrinsically violent and which are basically similar to a much larger number of collective actions occurring without violence in the same periods and settings.” (Tilly 1978).
Previous VEISHEA disturbances appear to have begun when police enforced rules related to off-campus parties where alcohol was served or other alcohol-related infractions. The 1992 disturbance began during a 12:15 a.m. public intoxication arrest. The 1988, 1994 and 2004 disturbances began with police breaking up off-campus parties.

The first VEISHEA riot task force recognized the possibility of drinking restrictions leading to rioting. The 1988 task force identified four “factors [that] contributed to the events of [VEISHEA] weekend.” Two of them were “(1) raising the drinking age and subsequent University restrictions on campus and Greek activities; [and] (2) the relocation of large parties to off-campus locations where controls over drug and alcohol abuse are more difficult to enforce.” (1988 was the first VEISHEA during which residence hall units could not hold parties.) However, rather than recommending loosening restrictions, the task force called for examining additional restrictions. This resulted in a restriction on the number of open kegs permissible at private parties.

Despite the attempts of local and state government to regulate alcohol consumption and off-campus parties, many students do not clearly understand the details and consequences of city ordinances and state laws that proscribe off-campus party activities, such as bootlegging, and other students simply choose to ignore the regulations. The Off-Campus Party Research Project (2004), which conducted a survey in fall 2003, found that Iowa State University students, when asked about their familiarity “with the legal and financial consequences” for a range of alcohol-related offenses were, at best, "somewhat familiar" with those consequences. The same study found that Iowa State University students who had hosted parties thought it was unlikely that police would come to their parties. This belief might contribute to a perception that large off-campus parties will not often be targeted by police, that off-campus parties can be profitable, and that on VEISHEA weekend in particular, those who host off-campus parties have the upper hand. This perception may also contribute to defining police arriving at a party as a social cue for rioting or to outcome violence resulting from the party eventually being shut down. This type of outcome violence seems to have contributed to all of the past VEISHEA disturbances. (See Appendix 1.)

Task Force members agree that alcohol use and abuse played a role in the disturbance of April 18, 2004. We are also clear that alcohol use and abuse played a role in disturbances and celebratory riots at the other universities that we surveyed. The Task Force believes it is important to report these facts to the public and emphasize that Iowa State is not alone in seeking solutions to alcohol-related problems. The University of Maryland recognized these facts and appointed a Task Force on Alcohol rather than a Task Force on the associated celebratory riots.

Alcohol-related problems are serious and our community is experiencing them year-round. These problems affect the whole community, and a concerted effort to address them must be mounted and maintained. Alcohol-related problems will continue to plague our community --- with or without VEISHEA. Year-round incidents of destructive, alcohol-related behavior are reported by law enforcement and medical offices on campus and in the city.
Outcome violence and crowd management
While outcome violence seems to have contributed to the April 18, 2004 riot, changes in policing tactics over the past thirty years have made outcome violence less likely during riots throughout the United States. The dominant protest policing model in the United States into the 1960s was the escalated force model, which is characterized by the use of force to disperse demonstrators and/or mete out physical punishment in lieu of arrests. When using this model, police begin with a show of force and then increased levels of force until people disperse. Such practices often led to outcome violence when police used them against previously peaceful protestors (McPhail, Schweingruber and McCarthy 1998; Schweingruber 2000).

The negotiated management model, which is now the dominant model in the United States, differs from the escalated force model in that police have more tolerance for community disruption, have more contact and communication with demonstrators, and attempt to avoid making arrests and using force. This model is less likely to be used to deal with campus disturbances that are not related to protest events (McCarthy, Martin and McPhail 2004). This is somewhat understandable since the negotiated management model assumes that police can communicate with the leaders of a crowd, which is unlikely during a campus riot. However, the escalated force model may create outcome violence. “[A]ntagonism against the police often increases as the large-scale tactics of the police affect bystanders (e.g., hit by a ricocheted wooden bullet, engulfed in tear gas, sprayed with mace or pepper spray)” (Buettner 2004, p. 174-5).

Research indicates that only a minority of people in a riot area commit violence. Others may be there to see and hear what other people are doing, to accompany family or friends, to protest (violently or nonviolently) the “precipitating incident,” to loot, and to advocate non-violence. Campus riots also involve many people who are there to watch and, in many cases, cheer on violent activities. Although they may distinguish themselves from those who are committing violence, bystanders create a formidable challenge to police officers seeking to stop the disturbance. People who are in the area for what they perceive as legitimate purposes may be affected by police actions. Those affected may include observers who have been ordered to leave the area and people present for reasons unrelated to the riot.

First-hand accounts collected by the Task Force suggest that people had a wide range of purposes for being at the riot. In addition to those who wanted to participate or watch violence, people came to transport friends, help the injured, and protect property. Others were there for purposes unrelated to the riot; some of them were subsequently targeted by rioters or police.

Many people who submitted first-hand accounts of the riot complained about overuse of force by police. In particular, many people believe they were unfairly sprayed with pepper spray. Some on the scene blamed police for precipitating and/or escalating the riot. (Some students surveyed after the 1992 riot also believed that the presence and actions of police precipitated the disturbance.) A smaller number of accounts complimented the police and their tactics. Although complaints about police actions outnumbered compliments, generalizing from this sample should be done with caution since the sample was self-selected.
The Iowa Law Enforcement Academy, which trains and certifies Iowa law enforcement agencies in crowd management tactics, reviewed and evaluated Ames Police actions at the riot and reported that “We believe the tactics used by the officers were sound…. We believe that the officers did a competent job with the tactics and numbers of officers they had to work with that evening. Based on the after action briefing, we feel that the Ames Police Department acted in the most professional manner in handling a very volatile situation.” (Ciechanowski 2004).

The ILEA report indicates that Ames police used the tactics that they had been trained to perform. It is beyond the expertise of this task force to evaluate how effective these tactics are. The task force also did not attempt to determine to what extent the other law enforcement agencies that policed the April 18 disturbance used the same tactics or employed the same policing philosophies the Ames Police Department did.

The role of social cues in precipitating riots
The spread of the “campus riot” as a cultural repertoire may make many large campus gatherings occasions for instigators to initiate violence. In addition, specific social cues may suggest to people before or during an event that a riot is likely to occur. Social cues do not cause anyone to riot, but they may serve as invitations for those who desire to do so. Others may respond to the same social cues by urging non-violence or leaving the area. In her study of the 2002 Ohio State riot, Buettner (2004) identified several of these cues, including communication and actions of university administration who encouraged students not to riot, inadvertently communicating expectations of trouble; media stories reporting on the potential for disturbances; activities of police, who planned for a riot; other students, who speculated that a riot would occur; and alumni, who told students stories about previous campus disturbances.

The 1992 task force survey indicated that ISU students expected a disturbance because of media reports and rumors among students. The April 18, 2004 riot was also preceded by media reports about previous riots and rumors about upcoming violence. Messages predicting rioting may attract to VEISHEA additional people who are interested in a riot, both instigators and spectators. Unfortunately, each disturbance may perpetuate the likelihood of future disturbances, as more messages are sent indicating that future VEISHEAs may be occasions for rioting. Because of its history of rioting, VEISHEA signals to many people that a riot may occur.

During the course of a gathering, social cues may indicate that a riot is about to take place. At least two of these cues took place when a party on Hunt Street was broken up by police. First, someone from a balcony began a chant of “Riot! Riot!” Another cue was that police arrived wearing what some people believed was riot gear. Each disturbance may also increase the likelihood of future disturbances by affecting participants’ attitudes. “As might be expected, the experiences of the different actors shape the perceptions each person and their reference group take to the next party/event. Entrepreneurs who escape detection may be emboldened. Partiers who feel unjustly persecuted and the unwitting bystander harmed in the confusion of the disturbance will resent the police, and the police will expect the worst when they next confront a group of partying young adults.” (Buettner 2004, p. 175).
The role of rioter availability and access
Riots cannot begin or continue unless a sufficient number of people who are temporally available have access to the riot area (Snyder 1979, McPhail 1994). For instance, urban riots in the 1960s began near high-density housing or major traffic thoroughfares. Large college campuses and adjacent off-campus student housing districts are conducive to riots because of the availability of potential rioters and bystanders. Entirely limiting availability of potential rioters and bystanders on a large residential college campus is impossible without fundamentally changing the nature of the university.

The Campustown neighborhood
The April 18, 2004 riot took place in an area that contained or bordered: (1) higher density off-campus housing, (2) large residence halls, (3) large off-campus parties, (4) bars filled to capacity, and (5) VEISHEA events taking place in Campustown. Additional residence halls and many student rental units are within easy walking distance to the riot area. Out-of-towners in Ames for VEISHEA provided another pool of available people.

Upzoning of the Campustown area, which has occurred over the past six years, has contributed to an increased number of students renting properties conducive to off-campus parties, and reducing the number of non-students in the neighborhood. According to the city’s proposed University Impacted Sub-Area Plan, the allowable density in this area will increase in the next five years.

Weather and available rioters
Time of year also affects the availability of rioters, as can be seen from the nationwide pattern of campus disturbances from 1985-2002. Campus disturbances are less likely to occur during the traditional summer break (only 9 percent of the total took place in June, July, and August) when fewer students are on campus. Disturbances are also less likely to occur during the coldest months of the year (only 10 percent in December, January, and February). Riots are more prevalent during the spring semester (48 percent in March, April, and May) than the fall semester (34 percent in September, October, and November). Precipitation is also likely a deterrent to riot participation. No VEISHEA disturbances have taken place when it was raining or snowing. Moving VEISHEA (or a replacement festival) to a colder time of year might decrease the chances of a riot taking place. However, riot-friendly (higher temperature) weather may occur in winter just as riot-unfriendly weather (rain) may take place during the spring.

The impact of community strain on riots
Like other college towns, the Ames/Iowa State community has its share of town-gown conflict. It seems logical that riots may be a result of community strain related to this conflict, that disenfranchised students may be more likely to become rioters, and that the April 18, 2004 riot was a protest related to some community issue. However, we believe the evidence for these connections is weak.

A number of factors related to campus/community conditions and/or student attitudes have been suggested as underlying causes of the April 18 riot. These include:
1. Increased strain in the relationship between students and the university, related to student grievances about tuition increases, the effects of budget cuts, and other university actions.

2. Increased strain in the relationship between students and the City of Ames, related to student grievances about the passage of an anti-couch ordinance, aggressive enforcement of over-occupancy regulations, and other city ordinances and actions.

3. A lack of broad ownership in Iowa State University by the larger Ames community.

4. A lack of campus pride by students, faculty, and administration, as suggested by a purported low level of knowledge about and enthusiasm for campus traditions.

Establishing a connection between these factors and the riot is difficult to do. Many of the student grievances deal with matters that are quite recent. Since other Iowa State campus disturbances occurred before these developments, any connection between them and the riot is speculative. In addition, there is little evidence that this riot was a protest riot, e.g., the rioters’ chants did not refer to tuition increases or anti-couch ordinances.

Since this riot is part of a national wave of riots, it is doubtful that unique local factors are responsible. Establishing, for example, a correlation between diminished campus pride and rioting would require a large-scale study of college campuses, including those that haven’t experienced riots. No such study has been conducted. Previous research on riots also suggests caution about attributing the causes of riots either to community-level factors or rioters’ individual predispositions. Observers of urban riots during the 1960s assumed that cities where rioting occurred (or rioting was more severe) had worse conditions, e.g., social disorganization, deprivation, ineffective political representation. However, none of these hypotheses were confirmed (Spilerman 1976, McPhail 1994). Thus, claims about connections between campus riots and campus/community conditions should be approached with skepticism. Likewise, studies of riot participation have failed to show that individuals’ deprivation or disenfranchisement make them more likely to riot (McPhail 1971; for an overview see McPhail 1994).

The ideas that communities are more likely to have riots if they exhibit strain (what social scientists call the structural strain hypothesis) and that individuals who are deprived are more likely to participate in rioting (the deprivation-frustration-agression hypothesis) are intuitively appealing. However, neither has mustered empirical support in previous studies of riots. Improving relationships between students, the university, and the community are worthwhile goals. However, we should be cautious about the claim that they will affect the probability of future disturbances.
REFERENCES


Galloway, Thomas. 1992. Report to President Martin C. Jischke from the President’s Task Force on VEISHEA. Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa.


A look at other universities that have experienced celebratory riots

Working Group 3 of the VEISHEA 2004 Task Force spoke with representatives of institutions that have experienced celebratory riots and studied reports from established task forces to deal with the situations. Institutions include University of Colorado, Minnesota State University, Northeastern University, Ohio State University, Penn State University, University of Maryland, and University of Oregon and past Iowa State VEISHEA task forces from the years 1988, 1992, 1994 and 1997. Seven are public institutions and one is private.

A matrix of variables was developed and applied to each institution. A complete table is in Appendix G.

Variables cited as factors at all eight institutions
Non-students
Alcohol
Off-campus disturbance
Parties

Variables present at seven institutions
Police action cited as a factor

Variables present at six institutions
Fire-setting a factor
Alcohol-vender issues

Variables present at four institutions
Event set by calendar
Event is sports-related
Riot cited as “tradition”
Town/gown issues cited
Landlord issues cited

Variables present at three institutions
Cell phones cited as factor
Media issues cited

Variables present at two institutions
Institutional event
On campus disturbance

Variables present at only one institution
Weather cited as factor
Municipal event
Analyzing variables and solutions at other universities

Matrix variables were analyzed according to three clusters: (1) Pre-disposing factors—existing attitudes and beliefs associated with an event; (2) Precipitating factors—those that trigger a riot, from parking bans to dispersing a party; (3) Maintaining factors—those components that enable or help sustain a riot, such as large crowds of curious onlookers who believe they are doing nothing wrong but who also egg on or provide cover for riot participants.

Recommendations from other institutions did not take these factors into account. Some task forces tried to change the culture of campus or community; others tried to change the expectation associated with a riot; some tried a mix of the two. Working group #3 noted the value of long-term educational and leadership initiatives aimed at changing the culture but felt past task forces (at other universities as well as ISU) did not address these factors: (1) Not all rioters were intoxicated; (2) Most students present at the riot scene were caught in the developing situation and were uninformed that their presence was problematic and probably illegal; (3) Since non-students are not exposed to culture-changing initiatives, their participation in riots will continue apart from these directives.

Nonetheless, other communities and task forces viewed culture-changing directives as proactive, enjoying widespread support, and minimizing the likelihood of future disturbances.

Other, successful short-term task force recommendations from other institutions seemed to focus on changing expectations surrounding an event rather than the culture associated with an event. Those recommendations included the following:

1. Standing committees comprised of students and community members; monitoring or even creating action plans to minimize riots.

2. Enhanced, targeted police enforcement and campus/community monitoring at historically troublesome areas, where riots are likely to occur.

3. Expanded orientation sessions so that students are aware of consequences associated with disruptive behavior, i.e. showing up to witness the event.

4. Parental notification, before and after an event associated with riots, such as VEISHEA. Publication, dissemination, and development of student codes associated with illegal assemblies and riotous behavior.
Where do we go from here?  
Recommendations

Introduction
The Task Force reviewed and discussed recommendations that arose from the working groups and that were derived from analysis of how other university communities have responded to celebratory riots. After an initial list of possible recommendations was developed, task force members scored each recommendation as to whether they thought it would decrease the probability of future disturbances, and they offered written comments on the pros and cons of each recommendation. The Task Force discussed the recommendations during public meetings, grouping some together, and dropping others as not applicable to our situation or not effective in reducing the probability of future disturbances.

The Task Force recognizes that it was not charged with deciding the future of VEISHEA; however, the question of VEISHEA’s fate arose frequently over the course of its six months of deliberations in working groups and in full task force meetings. Task Force members agreed that we cannot continue to hold VEISHEA without any changes and expect that violence will not occur in the future. Also, the effectiveness of adopted recommendations must be continually evaluated. The Task Force recommendations are therefore arranged in three broad categories: general recommendations to reduce the probability of disturbances occurring throughout the year, recommendations to be considered for changing VEISHEA, and recommendations to be considered if the decision is made to discontinue VEISHEA. In addition, the Task Force offers recommendations related to alcohol policies, holding VEISHEA earlier in the year, and changing it name, that warrant serious consideration.

Recommendation 1: It is clear that the issues surrounding VEISHEA transcend the event itself. Resolutions of underlying problems will affect the future health of the Ames and Iowa State communities. As President Geoffroy works to communicate broader messages, the committee encourages and supports the concept of a “Town Hall” meeting prior to making a decision about the future of VEISHEA.

General recommendations to reduce the probability of disturbances
Recommendation 2: The University administration should encourage Iowa State University students to become responsible members of the campus and Ames communities by understanding community rules and regulations and the consequences of breaking them. To advance these goals, we recommend:

- Requiring a freshman seminar to educate students about living on a university campus.
- Providing an orientation for students who decide to move off campus.
- Creating educational programs about proper party procedures and conduct.
- Informing students and others that it is illegal to remain in a riot area even if you have not been specifically ordered by a police officer to leave.
- Having representative groups of students, such as GSB, help students understand rules and regulations through Daily ads, a code of conduct handbook and/or additional measures.
• Getting students involved in and committed to reducing the likelihood of future disturbances.
• Providing expanded alcohol education.
• Making it clear to students and parents that violations of bootlegging, underage drinking, and other student conduct policies will not be tolerated by the University.

The educational programs would be designed to influence students and others in ways that would prevent disturbances by affecting their underlying causes. These programs would be intended to result in (1) fewer problems resulting from large off-campus parties; (2) fewer students and others who will remain in or come to a riot area; (3) more students and others who will discourage violence before a potential disturbance begins and leave the area once it begins; and (4) fewer students or others willing to instigate or engage in violence.

Pros
This recommendation takes advantage of several important strengths of the Iowa State community. Its focus is on something that we do well (teaching and learning=education); it is student focused; and it engages the positive norms, values, and goals held by the vast majority of Iowa State students. It also proactively addresses several major problems implicated in celebratory disturbances at ISU and throughout the United States. For example, successful educational programs will help reduce the size of off-campus parties and help hosts learn how to conduct a successful, safe party. In addition, well-informed hosts will be able to identify potential problems as they arise and understand what to do if parties appear to be getting out of control. Successful educational programs should also reduce the duration and severity of future disturbances by reducing the crowd of so-called "innocent bystanders." Few people realize that just their presence at a disturbance increases the likelihood of violence and a full-scale riot, and few understand that remaining at the site of a disturbance is illegal. Without a large crowd, potential instigators (entrepreneurs) will be less likely to engage in dangerous behavior, and those who persist in such behavior will be easier to identify and arrest.

Cons
A major assumption of this recommendation is that Iowa State students will be actively involved in creating and implementing key aspects of the educational programs. A related assumption is that the majority of students will learn, accept and endorse key ideas. If, instead, the majority of students view the programs as punishment or an administrative mandate, or if they merely reject the basic ideas as irrelevant, then the programs will have little positive impact.

Another weakness of this approach is that it cannot directly reach non-Iowa State student visitors and may also miss transfer students. Other potential problems include funding, staffing, and logistics, such as ensuring that students moving off-campus receive appropriate orientation.

Recommendation 3: The University should institute policies that would help motivate people to disperse from a riot area. To advance these goals, we recommend:
• Changing Regents/ISU Student Disciplinary Regulations to include rioting, disorderly conduct, failing to disperse and hindering emergency efforts of police, fire and medical personnel. All such rules should apply regardless of whether the conduct occurs on or off campus and regardless of whether university or city officials issue orders to disperse.
• Changing Student Disciplinary Regulations to state that students who violate Student Disciplinary Regulations during a disturbance will be subject to enhanced penalties under the Student Disciplinary Regulations. However, students should be allowed to show that they actively tried to quell the disturbance as a means of avoiding or reducing penalties.
• Changing Student Disciplinary Regulations to clarify that interfering with safety officials (including police, fire and medical responders) who are responding to a disturbance is a violation subject to enhanced penalties, and that assaulting, throwing objects at, or otherwise endangering safety officials, peer security, student government officers or university officials and employees engaged in trying to quell a disturbance, is grounds for immediate suspension and dismissal from the University.

The majority of people in a riot are not committing violence. Although they may distinguish themselves from those who are committing violence, the presence of these bystanders creates a formidable challenge to police officers seeking to stop the disturbance. People who are in the area for what they perceive as legitimate purposes may be affected by police actions and then may increase their involvement in the riot. People who understand that remaining in a riot area is illegal and a violation of Student Disciplinary Regulations may be less likely to do so. Similarly, a strong deterrent may discourage people to engage in violence during a riot.

Pros
This recommendation directly addresses one of the key maintaining factors in celebratory disturbances -- the gathering of crowds. Without a large crowd, instigators disposed to violent or other unsafe behavior become isolated, identifiable, and more easily controlled by the police. This recommendation is more likely to have a positive effect when combined with the educational aspects in Recommendation 2.

Cons
Actions by the university or police designed to discourage rioting may signal to some people that a riot is likely to occur. Making and publicizing changes to Student Disciplinary Regulations should be made with this in mind.

If improperly implemented, heightened sanctions may be viewed by many Iowa State students as a misguided and off-target band-aid to the larger problem.

Recommendation 4: Iowa State and the City of Ames should improve procedures for preventing nuisance parties. To advance this goal, we recommend:
• Creating and publicizing a Web site on nuisance parties.
• In conjunction with local landlords, reviewing regulations of nuisance parties, bootlegging and serving alcohol to underage people. Consider adding additional requirements or incentives for landlords to include provisions in leases to prevent and
control such events, including requiring that landlords provide tenants with a disclosure of applicable city nuisance regulations.

- Amending nuisance party regulations to increase the financial consequences of hosting nuisance parties in the following way: Implement a special response fee ordinance that requires cited residents to reimburse the city for the cost of police responses to disorderly parties after the second police response to an address within 90 days, where at least 25 people are gathered, and when at least two citations are issued.

The April 18, 2004 disturbance and two previous VEISHEA disturbances began at off-campus parties. Policies that reduce the size or frequency of these parties could reduce the likelihood of a disturbance.

Pros
The proactive, educational, and preventative aspects of this recommendation are big advantages. Nuisance parties appear to be at the core of many celebratory disturbances, either as the instigating trigger or as a readily available source of interested on-lookers who inadvertently contribute to the problem and who later may participate in the disturbance. Another major advantage of this recommendation is bringing key community constituencies into the mix. Landlords and other businesses (especially alcohol-related ones) are at least partially responsible for both the problem and potential solutions.

Cons
Alcohol restrictions may lead to more drinking at off-campus parties. Programs designed to prevent disturbances may send signals that disturbances may occur. Care should be taken to craft policies that avoid these possible unintended consequences.

Landlords and the other community constituencies may resist change. Legal changes are difficult to effect. Changes in nuisance party regulations and enforcement may be met with skepticism or outright hostility by some Iowa State students.

**Recommendation 5**: Iowa State and the City of Ames should attempt to identify the best practices for responding to developing and ongoing disturbances. To advance these goals, we recommend:

- Convening a summit among university and city administrators, students, community representatives and law enforcement agencies from locations around the country where campus disturbances have occurred to discuss best practices for responding to developing and ongoing disturbances.
- Ensuring that all involved police agencies employ the same riot control philosophy.
- Supporting the recommendations of the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy.
- Developing, in conjunction with Campustown businesses and the Ames and Iowa State University police departments, a consistent and efficient emergency evacuation plan. All Campustown employees should be trained in these procedures. This plan should be publicized and posted in all Campustown businesses and rental properties, and made available to neighborhood organizations.
The actions of police play an important role in the dynamics of a riot. Research suggests that bystanders and passersby who become affected by police actions may increase their participation in a riot. Police should attempt to mitigate the negative impact of their riot response on bystanders and passersby by ensuring that all police enforcement agencies employ the same riot control philosophy.

The goal of the proposed summit would be to have Ames area police and police from other university communities discuss and adopt best practices for dealing with disturbances. Many important suggestions for effective practices are contained in the recommendations of the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA), specifically: (1) use an amplification system to communicate with the crowds for dispersal in an unlawful assembly; (2) assign a supervisor to each squad of law enforcement with communication capacity to a central command center; (3) establish and maintain a command post as soon as practical; (4) evaluate chemical munitions with regard to the types that were most effective and ensure that adequate supplies are available; and (5) if departments other than the Ames Police Department become involved in these situations, continue holding multi-jurisdictional training and coordination and planning sessions.

The majority of people in a riot are not committing violence. Although they may distinguish themselves from those who are committing violence, the presence of these bystanders creates a formidable challenge to police officers seeking to stop the disturbance. Police find it difficult to distinguish between people committing violence and those there for other reasons. During the April 18, 2004 riot, some people reported they were attempting to leave the riot area when they were affected by police actions. An evacuation plan would be designed to evacuate as many people as possible from the riot area as quickly as possible.

Pros
Such a summit might result in breakthroughs that would not only benefit Iowa State, but also other college communities across the nation.

Cons
A summit will be expensive in time and money. We may already have learned much of what others have to offer from reading their reports. The ILEA report may contain some unintended bias because the ILEA trained the same police forces that it was evaluating.

**Recommendation 6**: The following alcohol-related recommendations should be adopted by the appropriate entities:

- The City of Ames should examine amending the beer keg party regulation to require issuance of a permit based on number of kegs purchased or placed on hold by persons at the same address.
- The state and city should examine increasing criminal and civil penalties (including forfeiture of profits) for bootlegging, serving alcohol to underage people, nuisance parties, and failing to prevent consumption by underage people.
- Iowa State should change Student Disciplinary Regulations (SDR) to make clear that alcohol-related violations that result in a public disturbance will be subject to enhanced penalties under the SDR.
The April 18 disturbance and two previous VEISHEA disturbances began at off-campus parties. Policies that reduce the size or frequency of these parties could reduce the likelihood of a disturbance.

Pros
There is considerable financial incentive for bootlegging and the penalties—even when enforced—are so low that their deterrence function is minimal. If successful, this recommendation could decrease the frequency and size of nuisance parties, and thereby decrease the opportunity for such parties to contribute to the celebratory disturbance problem.

Cons
There are legal limits to the amount the City can impose as fines for violations. Increasing fines might heighten tensions with officers, or resistance to police when violators are arrested.

Alcohol restrictions may lead to more drinking at off-campus parties. Programs designed to prevent disturbances may send signals that disturbances may occur. Care should be taken to craft policies that avoid these possible unintended consequences.

**Recommendation 7**: The University and City of Ames should implement a comprehensive communications campaign. This recommendation applies regardless of the decision on the future of VEISHEA; however, the message would need to be tailored based on the decision. The campaign could include:
- Information on how to host successful parties.
- Information on negative consequences of illegal activities, especially celebratory riots.
- Ways to positively engage the media, including activities such as background meetings, and openness about underlying causes and responsibilities.
- Ongoing proactive social marketing.

Pros
A comprehensive media campaign could improve the effectiveness of several other recommendations (e.g., Recommendation 2). By changing media coverage of VEISHEA and other events to more positive aspects—including a focus on how student groups are working to educate their peers on the causes of disturbances and on ways of reducing such problems, rather than continuing to focus on past riots and the expectation of additional problems—the media might help reduce the potential of a disturbance while enhancing the reputation of Iowa State students and the community.

Cons
The media might choose to focus even more heavily on past disturbances and the likelihood of a new one. This can contribute to the problem by maintaining an expectation by many VEISHEA participants that a disturbance will occur. Such expectations can become self-fulfilling prophecies.
**Recommendation 8:** The University, the City of Ames, and the Government of the Student Body should work together to address the need for the development of alternative social venues and outlets that appeal to the social needs of underage and of age students.

One option would be to encourage bars/restaurants in Campustown, downtown Ames, and on-campus hangouts to remain open past 2:00 a.m. for students to gather and socialize. No alcohol can be sold or consumed in these establishments past 2:00 a.m.

**Pros**
This alternative creates an environment that supports the underlying need for students to gather and socialize. This does not cause students to separate from their friends.

**Cons**
This alternative creates a set of enforcement issues and could contribute to underage drinking.

**Change VEISHEA**

**Recommendation 9:** Iowa State should consider changing official VEISHEA events to decrease the likelihood of a disturbance. Specifically, we recommend considering:
- Offering several late-night/all-night/large-draw entertainment events.
- Relocating post-dusk VEISHEA events away from Campustown.

Since official VEISHEA events on Welch Avenue are close to many large house parties and bars, moving post-dusk official events to central campus may decrease the number of people available for a night-time riot in the campustown area. VEISHEA events on Welch Avenue should run until dusk and other expanded or enhanced events should be held on central campus after dusk until the early morning hours.

Likewise, scheduling large-draw entertainment events at night could result in fewer people available in Campustown to start a riot. However, even if a large number of students are attracted to these events, there may still be enough students to start a disturbance.

**Pros**
Such events create alternatives to the bar and party scene and might reduce the off-campus nuisance party problem in the Welch Avenue area thereby reducing the likelihood of disturbances being triggered by such parties. Such events would also help keep the fun in VEISHEA for Iowa State students, and provide an opportunity for underage students to interact in a large group setting.

**Cons**
It has been difficult to identify, sponsor, and run successful alternatives in the past, despite considerable effort. Such events may be very expensive. An emphasis on such events reduces the educational focus of VEISHEA even further, especially if these events become part of official VEISHEA. If large events are staged, they could create additional large crowds that could increase the opportunity for disturbances to erupt.
Recommendation 10: VEISHEA planners should shape events so that they showcase Iowa State’s educational mission and encourage civic participation and respect for the Ames community. To advance this goal, we recommend:

- Inviting and encouraging active participation from all colleges in a coordinated effort that includes students and alumni.
- Appealing to prospective students by highlighting the past, present, and future achievements of the University in accordance with the land-grant mission.

Pros
The main advantage of this recommendation is that it focuses clearly on the primary mission of the university and encourages pride and respect for the whole community.

Cons
Improving “Official VEISHEA” and broadening the civic and community focus may not affect chances of disturbances, if traditions of partying and or rioting are too strong. Carrying out this recommendation would take a lot more time by faculty and staff, who are already stretched beyond the breaking point by recent budget cuts. In this Internet era, the original function of VEISHEA has largely been subsumed by widespread availability of information about educational opportunities on the Web. It is unclear who would run the event -- students or community leaders.

Discontinue VEISHEA
If the decision is made to discontinue VEISHEA, consideration must be given to implementing the Task Force’s general recommendations as they pertain to disruptive behaviors and consequences, police enforcement, town-gown relations, educational initiatives, good citizenship, legal policies, and alcohol and other related concerns. At the same time, attention must be given to offering students and their organizations opportunities to stage social events throughout the year.

Some argue that the VEISHEA tradition is no longer strong and no longer successful. The task force that was assembled after the 1992 VEISHEA riot suggested that VEISHEA was no longer serving its traditional purposes and that participation in the event was declining. In our review of the 2004 riot, the current task force has found continuing anecdotal evidence of declining support for the official Iowa State tradition and increased support for its replacement -- a time to party and riot.

Past task forces have proposed canceling official VEISHEA as one way to prevent future riots. However, it is unclear if this would reduce the probability of another riot associated with University-sanctioned events that would replace VEISHEA, or in association with unofficial events. It is possible that continuation of the unofficial VEISHEA tradition without university sponsorship may provide occasions for individuals interesting in rioting. In addition, the variety of mixed-issue disturbances that make up the nationwide wave reveal that other campus events, such as sporting events, can also be occasions for rioting. Iowa State University has already witnessed campus disturbances that did not occur during VEISHEA.
Historically, VEISHEA has attracted significant number of out-of-town visitors, many of whom attend off-campus parties. This problem has diminished significantly based on reports of past VEISHEA disturbances that were larger than the 2004 disturbance. Canceling VEISHEA will likely reduce the number of out-of-town visitors, reducing the size of off-campus parties.

**Recommendation 11:** If VEISHEA is cancelled, the University should offer opportunities during the year for campus organizations to showcase themselves and to replace lost income that VEISHEA generates.

**Pros**
Student organizations need fundraising opportunities. Fundraising could be incorporated into several existing events. Open houses with exhibits and displays for colleges and campus organizations should not be restricted to one, annual event. This recommendation could be incorporated into existing, non problematic celebrations, i.e. Homecoming, Greek Week, Residence Hall Week, and Engineers Week. Spreading activities throughout the year may reduce the potential for a disturbance associated with one large celebration.

**Cons**
It will likely be harder to attract audiences and participants if events are spread throughout the year. Scheduling conflicts may become more frequent. Students may not have the same level of interest in planning and organizing smaller events as they do now for VEISHEA. Participation in smaller events may not generate the revenues that student organizations have come to rely on from VEISHEA.

**Recommendation 12:** If VEISHEA is cancelled, the University community should schedule alternative social and educational events throughout the year.

**Pros**
Evening events for students throughout the year can give all students, including underage students, more opportunities to interact and socialize. Multiple evening events for students as alternatives to bars and off-campus parties must be offered if VEISHEA is cancelled. This would reduce the potential for a disturbance associated with one large celebration, while still giving opportunities to gather and socialize.

**Cons**
Creating events with broad, student-appeal may be difficult and scheduling will be challenging. Reduced student participation in planning/organizing large events may occur. Identifying financial sponsors may be difficult.

**Recommendations to seriously consider**
Members of the task force are agreed that drastic changes may need to be made to VEISHEA to break the connection between the event and the tradition of rioting. However, there is not agreement about what sort of changes may accomplish this, whether these changes are worth making, and the potential risks of these changes.
Although we have not reached agreement on these possible changes, we recommend that they be given serious consideration. This consideration should be done in consultation with VEISHEA stakeholders and with appropriate experts.

The Task Force discussed at great length the role of alcohol in the April 2004 riot. Alcohol use and abuse by students is a national phenomenon and is reflected in our own community. The Task Force was deeply divided on alcohol issues. Because our goal was to achieve consensus on our recommendations, we have placed the most controversial alcohol-related recommendations under the heading “Recommendations to seriously consider,” along with other issues upon which we could not agree.

Recommendation 13: The University and the City of Ames should examine how alcohol restrictions and their enforcement may contribute to rioting. Specifically, we recommend considering with input from appropriate experts and stakeholders:

- Changing restrictions on underage people in bars.
- Changing restrictions on alcohol in residence halls.
- Adopting consistent year round policies.
- Working with alcohol vendors to consider methods to avoid creation of crowds.

Restrictions on access to bars and on alcohol on campus may lead to rioting by (1) driving drinking into large off-campus parties and (2) creating encounters between partiers and police attempting to enforce alcohol restrictions or respond to problems created by drinking. Some members of the task force believe that carefully lifting or changing restrictions may decrease the chances of rioting.

Following the violence and murder that occurred during the 1997 VEISHEA weekend, Iowa State instituted “Dry VEISHEA,” a ban on all alcohol consumption on campus, in fraternities and sororities, at official VEISHEA events, and at all campus events that occur during VEISHEA. The ban applies only during VEISHEA and includes even those adults who might normally drink legally. This policy, like other restrictions on alcohol, may contribute to an environment conducive to rioting by (1) driving drinking into large off-campus parties and (2) creating encounters between partiers and police attempting to enforce alcohol restrictions or to respond to alcohol-related problems.

Because a disturbance requires availability of a large number of people, changes instituted by alcohol vendors that avoid the creation of crowds could decrease the possibility of a riot.

There is probably no more effective way to reduce the occurrence of a disturbance than by preventing the formation of large, unmanageable outdoor gatherings of people. A responsible, revised bar ordinance may reduce students’ interest in off-campus parties, and reduce the availability of rioters in Campustown by attracting hundreds of young adults to downtown bars. Downtown Ames is more than a mile away but is served effectively by Cy-Ride’s excellent Moonlight Express drunk bus.

Department of Residence policies may drive students out of residence halls on weekends to look for off-campus parties because they are not allowed in the bars. Residence halls were formerly a more popular venue for socializing than they are now. The university
may have exacerbated the problem by mandating even stricter policies for VEISHEA, when students of legal drinking age are prevented from doing so. The formation of an alcohol licensee association may form a common ground for the licensees to enact preventative policies and procedures rather than having them imposed through legislation.

Misuse of alcohol is a major social and health issue for college students. Alcohol consumption has many negative outcomes, including increased aggression, vandalism, date rape, traffic accidents, and medical treatment for overdose. Strategies to reduce alcohol’s negative effects use educational programs coupled with environmental interventions that limit availability through campus policies, city ordinances, and enforcement. If Iowa State and the City of Ames were to make alcohol policies more lenient and access to alcohol easier for underage students, it might not reduce the risk of future riots and might increase the probability of alcohol abuse and its effects. Additionally it may attract a large number of individuals from other communities to Ames to party and drink.

We have no means of proving that adding one solution to the mix is better than another, and no means of knowing how one solution will affect another. Other universities cannot provide us with a model; no other university community that has experienced celebratory riots has been able to prove its recommendations work.

**Recommendation 14:** Hold VEISHEA earlier in the year.
Time of year affects the likelihood of campus disturbances. Disturbances are most likely to occur in the spring and are less likely during the coldest months of the year. Moving VEISHEA (or a replacement festival) to within two weeks of spring break might decrease the chances of a riot taking place.

**Pros**
There is considerable evidence that warmer temperatures increase the likelihood of violent behavior, including riots. Additionally, there is evidence that violence during past VEISHEAs is associated with warmer weather. Moving VEISHEA earlier, so that daytime temperatures are likely to be reasonably comfortable (e.g., 50s) and nighttime temperatures are likely to be cold enough to discourage the gathering of large crowds might reduce the likelihood of violent disturbances.

**Cons**
Weather is variable; there are no guarantees that the desired temperature ranges will be reached in any given year. In some years, the weather may be so cold that it inhibits participation in official VEISHEA. Riot-friendly (higher temperature) weather may occur in winter just as riot-unfriendly weather (rain) may take place during the spring.

**Recommendation 15:** Change the name of VEISHEA.
Because of the tradition of rioting during VEISHEA weekend, official VEISHEA as a whole—its name, the events that comprise it, and the weekend upon which it is celebrated—produces a variety of social cues that a riot may take place. Changing the name of VEISHEA is one way to attempt to break the connection between the festival
and the riots. However, a name change should be made in conjunction with other major changes to VEISHEA or the change will be correctly perceived as only cosmetic.

Pros
At present, virtually all Iowa State students and most Iowa citizens associate VEISHEA with violence and riots. Such associations or expectations increase the likelihood of aggressive or violent behavior, especially when accompanied by some form of provocation (e.g., closing down a nuisance party). Changing the name would decrease this expectation and provide an opportunity to create and publicize a new name with a new focus on positive aspects of Iowa State students and the university community.

Cons
If not presented properly, many students will view this as little more than a band-aid to a larger problem. The name change could take several years to become a new tradition. In the interim, the new name could be considered by many as the "event formerly known as VEISHEA."