Neo-Liberal Institutionalism
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modification
of structural realism and liberal institutionalism
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not
really an alternative, competing theory
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key
difference from realism: institutions have independent causal, not
epiphenomenal to power
Rational Choice Theories of Institutions
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borrow
from micro-economic theories
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realist
argue coop. is hard because of cheating and the relative gains
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liberals
argue that coop. is hard mostly due to cheating and collective action problem
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creating
institutions, especially qualitative multilateral ones, can alleviate
collective action problem and relative gains concerns
Collective
Action Problem (M. Olson)
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Achieving
cooperation is costly: to organize and to monitor and enforce
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Those
taking part have an incentive to ‘free-ride”: partake in benefits of
cooperating but not pay the costs of achieving cooperation
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Limits
provision of public goods and may create “tragedy of commons”
o
e.g.,
sanctions against
Public
Goods
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non-rival:
my consumption does not effect your consumption
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non-excludable:
cannot prevent non-contributors from benefiting, or exclusion is prohibitively
costly
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e.g.,
light-house, public security
Institutions and the Collective
Action Problem
-
institutions can overcome coll. act. prob.
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created
by hegemon or small groups of states
-
foster
cooperation
o
provide
information about who violates rules
o
can
coordinate sanctions against violators
o
extend
“shadow of the future”: belief that states likely to interact again in the
future