Answer Range for Test #1

1. Why, according to Diamond, have so few democracies broken down during the “Third Wave” of democratization? Do any of these factors explain why the Thai military was able to successfully depose the democratic regime in Thailand?

Diamond discusses these on p.18-20 of his article. First, most of the countries are wealthy, and therefore are not likely to breakdown since no country with a per capita income above $8773 in 2000 dollars has ever reverted to authoritarian rule. Second, public opinion and normative changes within countries make non-democratic alternatives less legitimate. Third, international and regional forces make authoritarianism less legitimate.

I don’t think these factors explain why the Thai coup occurred, except for the fact that Thailand has a per capita income below the no-reversal threshold.

2. Are countries with Muslim majorities less likely to become democracies? Why or why not? What evidence do Ibrahim, Sen, or Diamond offer for or against this proposition?

This depends on how the answer was phrased. It is not impossible for these states to become democracies since several have, but as Diamond’s Table 5 shows, very few are democracies. Why they are less likely is less clear. Diamond shows that having a Muslim majority is not an absolute barrier. Sen says that these societies have consultative traditions that are essential to democracy.

3. What are three of Sach’s “Big Five development interventions” and what role does a state with high capacity play in achieving them?

Boosting agriculture, providing clean water and sanitation, improving basic health care, investing in education, and bringing power. High state capacity is essential to achieving these.

4. What is the relationship between democratic rights and state capacity and between economic wealth and state capacity? Does encouraging democracy undermine the ability of developing states to build their
capacity? Should we expect states to become more capable as they become richer?

Wealth does not cause good governance (or greater state capacity) but greater state capacity increase wealth. We should not expect that states will become more capable simply by becoming richer. Democracy reduces corruption (but presidential rather than parliamentary systems increase corruption). Overall, more democratic rights improve state capacity, so greater democracy does not undermine capacity-building efforts.

See [http://www.public.iastate.edu/~pol_s.340/demgood.htm](http://www.public.iastate.edu/~pol_s.340/demgood.htm)

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5. Discuss how legacies of colonial rule and integration into the global economy affect the capacity of post-colonial state?

The nature of colonial rule left some states with weak capacity and other states with strong capacity. British rule in India and French rule in Tunisia, for example, left behind better state bureaucracies than Belgian rule in Congo or Italian rule in Libya did. Colonial states that ruled directly rather than indirectly, that developed local staff rather than relying on foreign colonials, and that replicated European institutions left behind stronger states.

Most developing states were integrated into the economy in ways that made them dependent on the metropolitan economy and on foreign trade and aid for post-colonial growth, and they industrialized later. This made them more reliant on the states but with a state that was weak.

(see http://www.public.iastate.edu/%7Epol_s.340/building.htm)

6. According to Anderson and Berger, what role did European imperialism and the Cold War play in the “export” of the European model of the “sovereign territorial state” to Asia and Africa?

Both argue that imperialism and the Cold War were crucial to the export of the STS model to these regions. Imperial political structures weakened Asian and African political institutions and imposed the European model onto them. These efforts continued during the Cold War as the US and the USSR sought to build states that matched their socio-political models.
7. Based on Bose and Osaghae, how did the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and the Indian National Congress in India enable those post-colonial states to avoid the difficulties that plagued Pakistan and Nigeria?

The ANC and the Indian Congress sought to unite diverse religions and ethnicities around a civic and secular concept of nationalism. They sought to incorporate minority groups into their organizations. In Pakistan and Nigeria, independence movements organized on religious and ethnic lines and had limited appeals to each other supporters beyond opposition to colonialism. Once colonial rule ended, there was little to unite them.

8. What are two reasons why the absence of inter-state war in post-colonial Africa has produced “weak” states, according to Herbst.

Herbst focuses on the limited nationalism of post-colonial African states because they populations have not experienced the common sacrifice found in inter-state war. The absence of warfare meant that the states never developed the fiscal structures, especially the taxation policies, that war-fighting European states developed to fund their wars.