Answer the question in the space provided (use the back page for question 8). Questions 1-4 are worth 10 points each; questions 5-8 are worth 15 points each.


1.    How is deterrence different from compellence?

deter by threatening with punishment if something done ; compel by applying punishment until something is done

2.    What are two requirements for successful deterrence/compellence?

2 of these 4: communicate the threat; make threat credible; make threat effective; promise implicitly not to impose punishment


3.    Give an example (fictional or real) of how, according to deterrence theory, “endangering what you seek to protect may better protect it.”

- the Way of the Gun film clip (pregnant hostage clip); US soldiers and dependents in Berlin and S. Korea

4.    In the Melian dialogue, in your view, why did Athen’s compellence attempt fail and why did the Melian’s deterrence attempt fail?

Show evidence of knowing Athens’s effort to force Melos to ally and Melos’s effort to keep Athens from laying siege/attacking. Possible reasons: Athenian never make their threat explicit; do not apply punishment. Melian’s threat is not credible to Athens; depends on Spartan choices.

5.    Explain the error (regarding deterrence logic, not facts) in this statement: “It is impossible for Iran to deter the US from attacking it over its enrichment of uranium because Iran is militarily weaker than the US is.”|

Deterrence does not require that countries be militarily stronger in order to threaten a severe cost. If Iran could punish the US in a way that harmed the US more than stopping Iran’s nuclear program would benefit the US, Iran would deter the US successfully.

6.    Why, according to LGC, was the United States able to coerce Japan successfully in 1854 but unable to successfully coerce Japan in 1941?

One of these three is fine: In 1854, US demands were limited – open ports or allow sailors refuge; in 1941, they were more extensive (abandon efforts in China). Or, Japan was unable to defend itself against US warships on its harbors in 1854, but could defend against US attacks in 1941, although it could not hope to win. Japan feared greater concessions would follow in 1941 which Japan could not resist well, but Japan believed it could resist better in the future in 1854.

7.    According to LGC, what are three reasons that Germany was not deterred from attacking Poland in Sep. 1939, despite the Anglo-French pledge to defend Poland in March 1939?

1) There was no credible military power to defend Poland in Eastern Europe because no alliance with the Soviet Union existed between UK/France and the USSR
2) Germany had reached a pact with the USSR to divided Poland, ensuring there was no military threat from the USSR
3) Hitler doubted that France and the UK would use force over Poland when they had not done so over Czechoslovakia; the Anglo-French guarantee lacked credibility based on their existing reputation
4) Anglo-French publics were opposed to war, making the use of force unlikely

8.    Is deterrence as a Realist strategy for preventing war compatible with collective security as a Liberal method of preventing war? Why or why not? Use an example to explain your position.

Either yes or no is fine. Arguments should reflect an understanding of what deterrence is and what collective security is (the latter based on Mingst’s 218-220 discussion.) And an example should be used to illustrate the point.