Liberalism as a Theory of
International Politics
-
how are order and justice reconciled?
Core Tensions and Themes
-
philosophy
of history: humanity progresses
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normative
theory: programs for peace
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empirical
theory of IR: explain and predict
Questions Explored
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How
are individual or group preferences aggregated?
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Why
do states cooperate so often?
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Why
is so much cooperation institutionalized?
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What
are the causes of peace?
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How
do states achieve mutual security?
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Why
do states fail to cooperate when both would gain?
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How
are interests accommodated?
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How
do the internal structures of states shape their foreign policy?
Categorizing Liberalism
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Classical
Liberals
o
Locke,
Smith, Kant, Mill
o
Mill
on nationalism in “On
Representative Government” (1861)
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Commercial
Peace Theories
o
Economic
interdependence reduces incentives to wage war
o
Free
trade produces peace (Smith, Cobden)
-
Liberal,
or Democratic, Peace Theories
o
Liberal
or democratic states act differently than other kinds of states
§
‘Monadic’
theory: democracies are inherently more peace (
§
‘Dyadic’
theory: democracies create a separate peace (Kant)
·
Neo-Kantian
theories: integrate Kantian insights with other liberal theories (Russett & Stam, Doyle)
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Neo-liberal
institutionalists
o
formal
and informal institutions foster cooperation under anarchy
o
institutions
aggregate and reconcile competing preferences
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State-Society
Theories
o
How
do coalitions form within societies to shape foreign policy?
o
Examine
relations between state as the government apparatus and political actors in
society
§
Transnationalist theories: how do coalitions form between groups across
states and IOs
Key Liberal Assumptions
International order is anarchic
-
but
cooperation under anarchy is possible
International relations are doubly interdependent
-
‘strategic
interdependence’: one actor’s best ‘move’ depends on the moves of other actors
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‘substantive
interdependence’: states depend on each other for material resources and political
support
Multiple actors exist and act politically
-
not
just states but individuals and private groups (e.g., non-governmental
organizations, firms, political parties, social networks) and international
organizations (IOs)
-
societal and trans-national groups promote different
interests (pluralism)
State interests depend on societal politics
-
survival
or power-seeking assumptions are insufficient
-
configuration
of state motives is based on societal dominance or bargains
Uncertainty can be reduced
-
institutions
can increase information levels
Leading Hypotheses
Compatibility of state preferences alters degree of
cooperation (or conflict)
-
outside
of harmony and discord, cooperation is possible
-
configuration
of interests determines feasible bargaining ranges
Degree of institutionalization alters degree of cooperation
-
highly
institutionalized settings increase possibility of cooperation
-
minimally
institutionalized setting reduce possibility of cooperation
-
institutions
transmit information about actors reputations and capabilities
States seek “self-enforcing” bargains absent effective
institutions
-
reduce
incentives to cheat
-
anarchy
does not prohibit cooperation
States and other actors with transparent and reliable political
structures are more likely to cooperate
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democracies
are more reliable partners that autocracies
-
democracies
are less likely to fight wars with each other
Competing Causal Mechanisms
Rational
bargaining
-
states
rank preferences
-
cooperation
achieved when sum of gains is superior to status quo (non-cooperation)
-
opportunities
for trans-national linkages
Liberal
institutional affinity
-
when
they can accurately recognize each other, liberal democratic polities are
cooperative
-
illiberal
polities and mis-identified states will have less
cooperative relations
Collective
Action Problem
-
egoistic
actors (states, others) will not cooperate to provide public goods when they
can free-ride off others contributions
Theories of the Liberal Democratic
Peace
Defining Terms
-
‘liberal’
and ‘democratic’ are distinct
-
liberal
republics may not be fully democratic (i.e., suffrage may be limited)
-
some
democracies may not be liberal (i.e.,majoritarian
democracy without constitutional limits on state authority)
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Democracy:
rule by the people
§
Problem
of nationalism (who are the people)?
-
Kant
argued that liberal republics would be pacific with each other
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Illiberal
democracies would not be
Dyadic Liberal Democratic Peace Theory
-
Focus
on dyads (pairs of states)
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Argue
that liberal dyads rarely fight wars with each other and have lower levels of
militarized disputes
-
Says
nothing about war-proneness of liberal states on their own
|
|
|
Illiberal State |
|
|
Nil
war |
No
change |
|
Illiberal State |
No
change |
No
change |
M. Doyle’s Revision of Kantian Peace
1. liberal republics: representative
legislatures, separation of powers, rule of law
- restrains use of force by state
- rotation in office prevents lasting personal animosities
2. respect for human rights among
liberal republics
- publicity or transparency greater among LRs
- morally deserving of accommodation
3. social and economic interdependence
-
benefits
of trade valued by republics
-
markets,
not states, determine supply and demand
-
transnational
relations generate lobbies against war
Key Hypotheses
-
Liberal
republics rarely fight with each other
-
Liberal republics fight with
illiberal states at higher rates than illiberal states fight among themselves
-
Level
of warfare in the international system depends on prevalence of republican
states
"Kantian Tripod" (Russett & Oneal)
1. joint democracy
2. joint membership in international
organizations
3. economic interdependence (trade with
partners as % of GDP)
Three elements reduce the level of conflict substantially
(by 71% on average for non-allied, contiguous, minor-power states, 1886-1992)
Realist variables matter, but so do Kantian variables