Selected papers:

  • The Political Intergenerational Welfare State: A Unified Framework [with Min Wang]
    • [Download], Discussion paper, ISI Delhi.

      Abstract: This paper characterizes an intergenerational welfare state with education and pension under probabilistic voting where voters internalize the general equilibrium effects materializing in their life-span. We show that as public education is introduced in the economy through the political process, it always increases (reduces) the accumulation of human capital (physical capital), but strikingly, has no effect on the political equilibrium of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security tax. In fact, contrary to the popular belief, it reduces the generosity of pension benefits and therefore the idea of using public education as a weapon to handle the present social security issue stumbles. On the other hand, the introduction of a politically determined PAYG social security most definitely reduces physical capital accumulation, however its impact on human capital accumulation depends on how the education investment is financed. We also demonstrate that the general equilibrium effects are crucial to sustain the social security program, and explain why the presence of PAYG social security may not provide sufficient incentive for either public or private investment in education. Finally, we show that the simultaneous arrangement of public education and pension can increase the long-run growth if and only if the relative political influence of the old is small so that the pension program is thin.

  • Voting under Temptation. [with Min Wang]
    • [Download], Economics Letters, Vol. 118 Issue 3 (March 2013).

      Abstract: Within the confines of linear tax and complete market, we show that the efficiency force for a negative capital tax may not be strong enough to reverse the politico-economic force for a positive redistributive taxation under temptation and self-control preferences.

  • Linking consumption externalities with optimal accumulation of human and physical capital and intergenerational transfers.
    • [Download], Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 148 Issue 2 (March 2013).

      Abstract: This paper opens a new perspective from which one can explain the presence of government intervention in education even in the absence of human capital externality. It argues that consumption externalities can provide rationale for government intervention in education. Within the context of overlapping generations economy, it has also been shown that competitive equilibrium either underaccumulates both physical and human capital or overaccumulates both. Thus the result rules out the possibility of competitive equilibrium deviating from the social optimum in its allocation of physical and human capital in opposite directions. Immediate policy issues have also been discussed.

  • Hierarchy of Players in Swap Robust Voting Games. [with Sonali Roy]
    • [Download], Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 38 Issue 1 (January 2012).

      Abstract: Ordinarily, the process of decision making by a committee through voting is modeled by a monotonic game the range of whose characteristic function is restricted to {0, 1}. The decision rule that governs the collective action of a voting body induces a hierarchy in the set of players in terms of the a-priori influence that the players have over the decision making process. In order to determine this hierarchy in a swap robust game, one has to either evaluate a power index (e.g., the Shapley-Shubik index, the Banzhaf-Coleman index) for each player or conduct a pairwise comparison between players, whereby a player i is ranked higher than another player j if there exists a coalition in which i is more desirable as a coalition partner than j. In this paper, we outline an alternative mechanism to determine the ranking of players in terms of their a-priori power. This simple and elegant method uses only minimal winning coalitions, rather than the entire set of winning coalitions.

  • On the efficiency of 'single window'. [with Krishna B. Athreya ]
    • [Download], Economic Theory, Vol. 43 Issue 2 (May 2010).

      Abstract: In many countries, the process of obtaining government approval for different projects involves interaction with multiple government agencies at various levels. This often makes the approval process inefficient by unnecessary lengthening it. In this paper we study the effect of a re-organization of the approval process towards making it a single window clearance system, on the efficiency of the entire process. We have used the expected queue length and the expected waiting time in the system at the stochastic steady state as measures of inefficiency of an approval system.