Reasoning with
the Categorical Imperative
Universalizability
1. Faced with a decision
whether to perform a particular act, we must first formulate a maxim (rule or
principle) for the act. A maxim
consists in a type of act along with the goal or purpose to be achieved by
performing the act. On Kant's example,
the maxim is: In order to get money that I need, I will make a false promise to
repay it.
2. Having formulated our
maxim, we must ask whether we can imagine
our maxim functioning as a universal law for all rational beings. We cannot imagine our maxim universalized in
this way when it would be self-defeating: if everyone acted according to our
maxim, we could not act according to it, and so couldn't achieve the purpose or
goal of our maxim. Kant calls this a
contradiction in reason. On Kan't
example, we could not imagine a world in which rational beings made false
promises whenever it suited them. In
such a world, we could not obtain our goal of getting money by making a false
promise because no one would believe us (or believe anyone else!).
3. If we cannot imagine our maxim
as a universal law, then we have a perfect
duty not to perform the act that is covered by the maxim (and that
occasioned its formulation). On Kant's
example, we have a perfect duty never to make false promises (for whatever
purpose, not just getting money).
4. If we can imagine our maxim as a universal law, then we must ask
ourselves whether we can will that
it be a universal law. We cannot will that our maxim be a universal law
when it would create a system of nature that contradicted itself. On Kant's example, we can imagine a world in which our maxim to neglect our talents is
universalized. The maxim is: In order
to enjoy a life of leisure and self-indulgence, I will neglect my talents. But,
Kant thinks that we cannot will that
this maxim be universalized. If this
maxim were universalized, then nature would contradict itself. Talents are given to us by nature to be
developed for all sorts of purposes. If
we had a law of nature that made it impossible to develop our talents, then
nature would have simultaneously given us talents (which necessarily require
cultivation) yet made it impossible to develop them.
Kant
calls this a contradiction in the will.
We can also see how this works from the standpoint of will--acting in
order to achieve some goal. To will
that we could never develop our talents is to will that we could never acquire
certain skills. Yet we need skills to
achieve all sorts of goals that we might some day wish (will) to achieve. Thus, willing a maxim that made it
impossible to develop our talents would conflict with willing to achieve the
various goals for which those talents would be necessary.
If
we cannot will that our maxim be a universal law for all rational beings,
then we have an imperfect duty to do the opposite of the maxim. On Kant's example, we have an imperfect duty
to cultivate some of our talents some of the time. Since the maxim says that we will neglect our talents, letting
them rust, then we have the imperfect duty to do the opposite of neglecting our
talents--which is developing them.
5. If we can will that our maxim be a universal law for all rational beings,
then we are morally permitted to perform the act that we are contemplating.
Summary
1. Formulate a maxim of our contemplated act.
2. See whether the maxim can
be imagined as a universal law of
nature. If no, then we have a perfect duty not to perform the act.
If yes, then on to step 3.
3. See whether our maxim can
be willed as a universal law of
nature. This means that our maxim would
create a system of nature that is consistent with itself. If no,
then we have an imperfect duty to do the opposite
of what the maxim says. If yes, then we are morally permitted to
perform the contemplated act.
Respect
The
second formulation of the Categorical Imperative commands us to treat all
rational beings, including ourselves, with respect. Kant tells us that treating someone with respect involves
treating that person always as an end-in-himself, and never merely as a
means to our ends (purposes, goals). As
an end-in-himself, a person is a free, rational chooser. He decides what to do by virtue of reason,
and freely acts on that choice. Treating
someone with respect has two dimensions, each of which corresponds to perfect
and imperfect duties.
1. The first dimension of
treating someone as an end-in-herself involves not interfering or restricting
her as a free, rational chooser. This
dimension, then, is negative. It requires
not getting in the way of a person's reasoning or acting as an independent
agent. Common kinds of acts that
interfere with people as ends-in-themselves are: lying (more generally,
deceiving), stealing, coercing, brainwashing, and physically forcing people to
act or not to act. For example, when we
deceive someone, we restrict her ability to reason fully about the choices open
to her and their consequences. When we
coerce a person to do something, our threat of harm limits her choices,
rendering her less free to choose as she sees fit. And, of course, the reason we steal from an individual is because
we believe that she would not freely choose to lend, give, or sell the object
to us. Because lying, stealing, coercing,
etc. interfere with people as ends-in-themselves, they are kinds of acts that
fail to treat people with respect.
Therefore, they treat people merely as a means to our ends.
2. We are permitted, however, to treat people as a means to our ends so long as we also treat them as ends-in-themselves at the same time. This happens every day. When we ask someone if we can borrown her notes from class or when we buy food at the store, for example, we are using people as a means to our ends or purposes. But that is alright because the people are also being treated as ends-in-themselves, with respect. They are being treated with respect because they are free to refuse our request, in the case of the notes, and because they have freely chosen to work in the grocery store. In other words, the people by means of whom we are meeting our ends have agreed either directly or indirectly to our acts. Lending us notes, selling us food, exchanging services, and so forth, are common examples of people consenting to our actions and sharing in our ends. These examples involve treating people simultaneously as a means to our ends and as ends-in-themselves.