“The Process-Outcome Connection in Foreign Policy Decision Making:

A Quantitative Study Building on Groupthink”

Mark Shafer and Scott Crichlow

International Studies Quarterly

Volume 46, Issue 1

March 2002

Table A

Cases Included in the Analysis

Case 1 -- Mayaguez -- Decision by the Ford administration on May 14, 1975 to land marines in Cambodia to search for the Mayaguez hostages, to board and seize the Mayaguez, and to conduct air strikes targeting the Cambodian mainland (Ford, 1979; Head et al., 1978; Janis, 1982; Lam, 1989; Rowan, 1975; Turner, 1991).

Case 2 -- US involvement in Angola -- Decision by the Ford administration in the summer of 1975 to increase covert aid to Zaire. This aid was to be funneled to the FNLA and UNITA, organizations combating the Marxist-oriented MPLA for control of Angola (Bender, 1981; Isaacson, 1992; James, 1992; Spikes, 1993; Stockwell, 1978).

Case 3 -- Entebbe -- Decision by the Rabin government on July 3, 1976 to launch Operation Thunderbolt, a military engagement aimed at rescuing the hostages held at the Entebbe airport (Peres, 1995; Rabin, 1979; Stevenson, 1976).

Case 4 -- “Deep Cuts”/SALT II -- Decision by the Carter administration on March 19, 1977 to propose a substantial increase in the reductions sought by the United States. This included reducing US and USSR nuclear launchers and a cut in Soviet heavy missiles from 300 to 150 (Brzezinski, 1983; Carter, 1982; Moens, 1990).

Case 5 -- Ogaden War -- Decision by the Carter administration in February 1978 not to become involved in the Ogaden War. Proposals had been made to send a carrier task force to the region to restrain Soviet action or to grant covert aid to Somalia. The Soviets had responded to Ethiopia’s requests for aid in repelling the Somali invasion (Drew, 1978; Moens, 1990).

Case 6 -- Relations with China -- Decision by the Carter administration, finalized in December 1978, to proceed with the normalization of relations with China (Brzezinski, 1983; Carter, 1982; Moens, 1990).

Case 7 -- Supporting the Shah -- Decision by the Carter administration to continue its support for the Shah’s rule in Iran in November and December of 1978 after domestic unrest began to dramatically intensify (Brzezinski, 1983; Carter, 1982; Moens, 1990).

Case 8 -- Non-intervention in Nicaragua -- Decision by the Carter administration not to intervene militarily in Nicaragua in the summer of 1979 to prevent the Sandinistas from coming to power (Cottam, 1992; Morley, 1994; Pastor, 1987).

Case 9 -- Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt -- Decision by the Carter administration on April 11, 1980 to proceed with an attempt to rescue American hostages held in Iran (Brzezinski, 1983; Carter, 1982; Janis, 1982; Martin and Walcott, 1988; Moses, 1996; Smith, 1984; Turner, 1981).

Case 10 -- Attacking Osiraq -- Decision by the Begin government in October 1980 to bomb Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear reactor. The implementation of this decision was delayed until June of 1981 (Feldman, 1982; Nakdimon, 1987).

Case 11 -- Funding the Contras -- The decision by the Reagan administration to begin supporting and organizing paramilitary groups in Nicaragua in November of 1981 (Cannon, 1991; Jentleson, 1994; Gutman, 1988; Pastor 1987).

Case 12 -- Falklands I -- Decision by the Thatcher government on April 2, 1982 to respond to the Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands by sending a naval task force to the area (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 1991; Hastings and Jenkins, 1983; Thatcher, 1993).

Case 13 -- Falklands II -- Decision by the Thatcher government in May of 1982 to implement Operation Sutton, landing troops on the Falkland Islands (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 1991; Hastings and Jenkins, 1983; Thatcher, 1993).

Case 14 -- The Invasion of Lebanon -- Decision by the Begin government on June 5, 1982 to invade Lebanon and clear out a twenty-five mile strip north of the border in order to protect northern Israeli communities from PLO artillery raids (Maoz, 1990; Peres, 1995; Sachar, 1996; Schiff and Ya’ari, 1984).

Case 15 -- Confronting the Siege of Beirut -- Decision by the Reagan administration on August 4, 1982 not to sanction Israel, but instead to publicly and privately condemn that country’s violations of the Beirut cease-fire. Israeli troop movements and shelling were occurring as the PLO was presenting what was widely seen as a workable plan to implement their departure from the city (Cannon, 1991; Shultz, 1993; Tanter, 1990).

Case 16 -- Rejecting the “Walk in the Woods” -- Decision by the Reagan administration in September 1982 to reject the “Walk in the Woods” proposal in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Talks. The “Walk in the Woods” proposal, negotiated privately between Paul Nitze and Yuli Kvitinsky, was aimed at overcoming a number of disagreements in the official talks (Talbott, 1985; Talbott, 1988).

Case 17 -- Developing SDI -- The decision by the Reagan administration in February 1983 to develop the Strategic Defense Initiative (Cannon, 1991; Shultz, 1993; Talbott, 1988).

Case 18 -- Grenada -- Decision by the Reagan administration on October 22, 1983 to launch a military operation aimed at securing the safety of Americans in Grenada and restoring civilian rule in that country (Beck, 1993; Cannon, 1991; Payne et al., 1984; Shultz, 1993).

Case 19 -- Achille Lauro -- Decision by the Reagan administration on October 10, 1985 to have US military aircraft intercept the 737 transporting the hijackers of the Achille Lauro from Egypt to Tunisia, force it to land at a NATO base in Sicily, and bring the hijackers to the United States for trial (Crowe, 1993; Martin and Walcott, 1988; Shultz, 1993).

Case 20 -- Iranian Arms Sales -- Decision by the Reagan administration, finalized on January 6, 1986, to authorize arms sales to Iran (Cannon, 1991; Shultz, 1993).

Case 21 -- Removing Marcos -- Decision by the Reagan administration on February 23, 1986 to act to ease Ferdinand Marcos out of power in the Philippines. Steps quickly taken toward this end included an offer of asylum and a threat to cut off aid if forces supporting him attacked the rebels (Bonner, 1987; Brands, 1992; Shultz, 1993).

Case 22 -- Attacking Libya -- Decision by the Reagan administration in April of 1986 to launch an air attack against Libya, as a reprisal for the regime’s support of international terrorism (Davis, 1990; Martin and Walcott, 1988; Shultz, 1993; Zimmerman, 1994).

Case 23 -- Funding UNITA -- Decision by the Reagan administration on November 12, 1985 to begin providing covert aid to the UNITA rebels in Angola (Crocker, 1992; James, 1992; Shultz, 1993; Scott, 1996).

Case 24 -- Exceeding SALT II -- Decision by the Reagan administration in May 1986 to deploy the 131st ALCM-armed B-52, thereby exceeding the nuclear arsenal subcielings prescribed by the unratified SALT II agreement (Talbott, 1988).

Case 25 -- Negotiating Noriega’s Departure -- Decision by the Reagan administration in May of 1988 to try to negotiate Noriega’s departure from Panama (Shultz, 1993).

Case 26 -- Attacking Panama -- Decision by the Bush administration in December of 1989 to launch Operation Just Cause and remove Manuel Noriega from power by force (Buckley, 1991; Donnelly et al., 1991; Mervin, 1996; Woodward, 1991).

Case 27 -- Gulf War I/Desert Shield -- Decision by the Bush administration in early August 1990 to protect Saudi Arabia from a potential Iraqi attack by sending a large US military force to the region (Duffy and Goodgame, 1992; Freedman and Karsh, 1993; Gordon and Trainor, 1995; Hermann, 1994; Hybel, 1993; Mervin, 1996; Wayne, 1993; Woodward, 1991).

Case 28 -- Gulf War II/Desert Storm -- Decision by the Bush administration on October 30, 1990 to increase the size of the American force to the level which the military felt was necessary to enable a successful attack against Iraq (Freedman and Karsh, 1993; Gordon and Trainor, 1995; Hermann, 1994; Hybel, 1993; Woodward, 1991).

Case 29 -- Gulf War III/ The End -- Decision by the Bush administration on February 26, 1991 to end the war against Iraq after 100 hours of fighting on the ground (Freedman and Karsh, 1993; Gordon and Trainor, 1995; Hermann, 1994; Hybel, 1993; Woodward, 1991).

Case 30 -- Adopting “Lift and Strike” -- Decision by the Clinton administration on May 1, 1993 to propose the “Lift and Strike” policy in the former Yugoslavia. This proposal called for lifting the arms embargo, and using air strikes against the Serbians if they attempted to strengthen their position before the Bosnians were armed (Drew, 1994).

Case 31 -- Leaving Somalia -- After the failed attempt to capture Mohamed Farah Aideed, the Clinton administration’s decision in early October 1993 to boost troop strength to protect the remaining US forces in Somalia and to begin a disengagement process that would remove all US troops from the area by March 31, 1994 (Drew, 1994).

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Table B

Operational Definitions of Situational Context Variables

Table C

Operational Definitions of Group Structural Variables

Table D

Operational Definitions of Information Processing Variables