Did the evidence before the war indicate that Iraq was an imminent nuclear threat?
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency. "The IAEA is the world's center of cooperation in the nuclear field. It was set up as the world's "Atoms for Peace" organization in 1957 within the United Nations family. The Agency works with its Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies." (http://www.iaea.org/)
"Since 1991, the IAEA has carried out inspections in Iraq pursuant to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. Under Resolution 687, the IAEA's mandate in Iraq includes two tasks: (1) uncovering and dismantling Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme, and (2) developing and implementing an Ongoing Monitoring and Verification (OMV) Plan. The Agency implemented its mandate in Iraq until 16 December 1998. IAEA Iraq Action Team was officially renamed Iraq Nuclear Verification Office (INVO) - 1 Dec 2002. Inspections resumed - 27 Nov 2002."
The inspection teams were required by Security Resolution 1441 to report back to the UN regarding the results of their inspections and this was done on January 27th 2003 in "Statements of the Director General," a statement to the United Nations Security Council, by IAEA Director General Dr. ElBaradei. The following are portions of that report.
"First, we have inspected all of those buildings and facilities that were identified, through satellite imagery, as having been modified or constructed over the past four years [when inspections were not performed in Iraq]. IAEA inspectors have been able to gain ready access and to clarify the nature of the activities currently being conducted in these facilities. No prohibited nuclear activities have been identified during these inspections."
"In support of the IAEA inspections to date, the Iraqi authorities have provided access to all facilities visited - including presidential compounds and private residences - without conditions and without delay. The Iraqi authorities also have been co-operative in making available additional original documentation, in response to requests by IAEA inspectors."
"In addition to the new authorities granted by resolution 1441, I believe that the unified resolve of the Council to support the inspection process has been a vital ingredient, and must remain so, if we are to achieve a peaceful resolution of the situation in Iraq."
"To conclude: we have to date found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons programme since the elimination of the programme in the 1990s. However, our work is steadily progressing and should be allowed to run its natural course. With our verification system now in place, barring exceptional circumstances, and provided there is sustained proactive cooperation by Iraq, we should be able within the next few months to provide credible assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons programme. These few months would be a valuable investment in peace because they could help us avoid a war. We trust that we will continue to have your support as we make every effort to verify Iraq's nuclear disarmament through peaceful means, and to demonstrate that the inspection process can and does work, as a central feature of the international nuclear arms control regime."
They weren't given the chance to help the U.S. avoid the war.
UNIMOVIC
"The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) was created through the adoption of Security Council resolution 1284 of 17 December 1999. UNMOVIC was to replace the former UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and continue with the latter's mandate to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological weapons and missiles with a range of more than 150 km), and to operate a system of ongoing monitoring and verification to check Iraq's compliance with its obligations not to reacquire the same weapons prohibited to it by the Security Council. The Secretary-General of the United Nations appointed Dr. Hans Blix of Sweden to be the Commissions Executive Chairman." (http://www.unmovic.org/)
The Executive Chairman gave his twelfth quarterly report to the Security Council on February 28th 2003. This report details inspections that were well planned and thorough, made use of high-tech equipment, were well coordinated, obtained a wealth of information, and were performed by hundreds of well trained staff of 55 nationalities. The tone of the report is very optimistic about their progress so far and their hopes for even more Iraqi cooperation as inspections continued. Here are some excerpts:
"Since the arrival of the first inspectors in Iraq on 27 November 2002, UNMOVIC has conducted more than 550 inspections covering approximately 350 sites. Of these 44 sites were new sites. All inspections were performed without notice, and access was in virtually all cases provided promptly. In no case have the inspectors seen convincing evidence that the Iraqi side knew in advance of their impending arrival."
"The inspections have taken place throughout Iraq at industrial sites, ammunition depots, research centres, universities, presidential sites, mobile laboratories, private houses, missile production facilities, military camps and agricultural sites. At all sites, which had been inspected before 1998, re-baselining activities were performed. This included the identification of the function and contents of each building, new or old, at a site. It also included verification of previously tagged equipment, application of seals and tags, evaluation of locations for the future installation of cameras and other monitors, as well as taking samples and discussions with the site personnel regarding past and present activities. At certain sites, ground-penetrating radar was used to look for underground structures or buried equipment. Similar activities were performed at new sites. Inspections are effectively helping to bridge the gap in knowledge that arose due to the absence of inspections between December 1998 and November 2002."
"Iraq has from the outset satisfied the demand for prompt access to any site, whether or not it had been previously declared or inspected. There have thus been no sanctuaries in space. Nor have there been any sanctuaries in time, as inspections have taken place on holidays as on weekdays. Iraq has further been helpful in getting UNMOVIC established on the ground, in developing the necessary infrastructure for communications, transport and accommodation."
UNIMOVIC inspectors were regardless forced to withdraw from Iraq in March 2003 due to the U.S. invasion.
DIA
"The Defense Intelligence Agency is a Department of Defense combat support agency and an important member of the United States Intelligence Community. With over 7000 military and civilian employees worldwide, DIA is a major producer and manager of foreign military intelligence. We provide military intelligence to warfighters, defense policymakers and force planners, in the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community, in support of U.S. military planning and operations and weapon systems acquisition." (http://www.dia.mil/)
The DIA put out a study in 2002 outlining the Bush administration's claims against Iraq, but qualifying them by saying: "There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has -- or will -- establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities."
INR
"The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), drawing on all-source intelligence, provides value-added independent analysis of events to Department policymakers, ensures that intelligence activities support foreign policy and national security purposes; and serves as the focal point in the Department for ensuring policy review of sensitive counterintelligence and law enforcement activities. INR's primary mission is to harness intelligence to serve U.S. diplomacy... It is part of the U.S. Department of State and a member of the U.S. intelligence community." (http://www.state.gov/s/inr/)
The INR issued a National Intelligence Estimate in October 2002, outlining the Bush White House position that Saddam possessed WMD and was a threat to national security. However the report contained qualifications:
"The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (INR) believes that Saddam continues to want nuclear weapons and that available evidence indicates that Baghdad is pursuing at least a limited effort to maintain and acquire nuclear weapons-related capabilities. The activities we have detected do not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support such a judgment. Lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad has launched a coherent effort to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program, INR is unwilling to speculate that such an effort began soon after the departure of UN inspectors or to project a timeline for the completion of activities it does not now see happening. As a result, INR is unable to predict when Iraq could acquire a nuclear device or weapon".
"In INR's view Iraq's efforts to acquire aluminum tubes is central to the argument that Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, but INR is not persuaded that the tubes in question are intended for use as centrifuge rotors. INR accepts the judgment of technical experts at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the tubes Iraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges to be used for uranium enrichment and finds unpersuasive the arguments advanced by others to make the case that they are intended for that purpose."
CIA
The article "The Selling of the Iraq War" discusses how the Cental Intelligence Agency (CIA), through Tenet, was harrassed and bullied into supporting the Bush administration's case for war. But there were still many dissenting CIA officals.
"A senior CIA official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said the intelligence agency informed the White House on March 9, 2002 -- 10 months before Bush's nationally televised speech -- that an agency source who had traveled to Niger could not confirm European intelligence reports that Iraq was attempting to buy uranium from the West African country. Despite the CIA's misgivings, Bush said in his State of the Union address: "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium in Africa."
In the months before the State of the Union speech, the CIA official said, agency personnel told the State Department, National Security Council staffers and members of Congress that they doubted Iraq had been trying to buy uranium from Niger. One senior administration official, also speaking on the condition of anonymity because the intelligence reports remain classified, said the CIA's doubts were well-known and widely shared throughout the government before Bush's speech.
Among the most vocal proponents of publicizing the alleged Niger connection, two senior officials said, were Cheney and officials in the office of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld."
--Knight Ridder, June 13th 2003
"What disturbs me deeply is what I think are the disingenuous statements made from the very top about what the intelligence did say," said Greg Thielmann, who retired last September. "The area of distortion was greatest in the nuclear field." Thielmann was director of the strategic, proliferation and military issues office in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. His office was privy to classified intelligence gathered by the CIA and other agencies about Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear programs.
In Thielmann's view, Iraq could have presented an immediate threat to U.S. security in two areas: Either it was about to make a nuclear weapon, or it was forming close operational ties with al Qaeda terrorists. Evidence was lacking for both, despite claims by Mr. Bush and others, Thielmann said in an Associated Press interview this week. Suspicions were presented as fact, and contrary arguments ignored, he said."
--CBS/AP, June 7th 2003
INC
Iraqi National Congress. A group of Iraqi exiles lead by Ahmed Chalabi who was trusted by the Bush administration to provide evidence on Iraq's threat to the U.S. despite his sketchy and corrupt history. Chalabi was known (before the war) to have been convicted in Jordan of embezelling millions of dollars, and faces a 22 year prison sentence if he ever returns to Jordan. He has also failed polygraph tests on more than one occasion (before the war). Intelligence agencies were warned (before the war) that information from him was unreliable.