This paper studies the effects of private debt on risk sharing and welfare, where individual residents are assumed to have access to both international and domestic asset markets. Like Jeske (2006), the assumption is that domestic residents cannot commit to repay their debts across borders. Unlike the previous literature, the novel feature in this paper is the introduction of limited commitment to debt contracts within borders. The marginal rate of substitution (henceforth, MRS) is no longer necessarily equalized among all residents in any one country. The pervasive risk of default creates heterogeneity in MRS for countries that are, as a whole, constrained in the international asset market. A constrained country's domestic interest rate is equal to the reciprocal of the lowest MRS within that country. However, non-constrained countries still have equalized MRS, which determines the international interest rate. A wider gap between international and domestic financing cost emerges. This leads to harsher punishment for international debt defaulters; hence, allows more international risk sharing. Although limited commitment within borders hinders domestic risk sharing and prevents aggregate welfare from reaching an even higher standard, it improves the original level of aggregate welfare in Jeske's setup. This paper shows how this improvement depends upon the interaction between the endogenous borrowing constraints in international and domestic asset markets. Empirical evidence from 26 emerging market economies reveals that the part of external debt owed by private sectors is significantly higher in countries with weak domestic debt enforcement.