In his seminal essay, "Dialectical and Rhetorical Rhetoric," Carl Holmberg distinguishes between what he calls dialectical and rhetoric on ontological grounds, each formulation of the art affirming a mutually exclusive ontology or "experience of Being."' Proponents of dialectical rhetoric, Such as Plato, maintain that only dialectic enables the rhetor to transcend his limited individual perspective, acquire knowledge rather than opinion, and recognize the "determinate" and unitary nature of Being or reality. The dialectical rhetor then seeks to convey this knowledge of reality to his audience, converting "believers of the non-correct view to the correct and most clear belief" (234). Holmberg argues that the rhetorical rhetor does not presume to use debate to arrive at knowledge of reality, but rather to affirm the validity of diverse opinions. Because every assertion is grounded in and restricted to a particular perspective or framework, one can only conclude that reality itself is indeterminate and amorphic (238). Rhetorical rhetoric thereby affirms a "relativism counter to the dialectical absolutism which would have us experience that only one view can be correct or true" (236).

Given these antithetical construals of rhetoric, Holmberg argues that Aristotle's rhetoric is rhetorical rather than dialectical, and is hence grounded in a view of Being as indeterminate. Holmberg bases his argument on Aristotle's definition of rhetoric and on one of its logical instruments, the enthymeme, Holmberg argues that Aristotle's definition of the art is consistent with a "rhetorical" rhetoric, for he defines rhetoric as the power of discovering pithanon, a term which Holmberg asserts is related etymologically to the term "framework." Holmberg thus translates Aristotle's definition of rhetoric as a "way of helping others apprehend different bases for viewing and living reality" (239). Aristotle's rhetor thus serves to justify diverse frameworks, each of which is an equally "viable" interpretation of an indeterminate reality (239). Holmberg also asserts that Aristotle's construal of the enthymeme reveals his rhetoric to be "rhetorical," because it differs essentially from his dialectical syllogism. Whereas the syllogism demonstrates tile necessary connection between a determinate reality and a conclusion, the enthymeme does not "clearly reveal the terms of connection of it premise and its supposed logical conclusion" (233); and hence it presupposes that reality itself is indeterminate.

In a response to Holmberg's characterization of Aristotle, Robert Gaines argues that Aristotle's rhetoric is not rhetorical in Holmberg's sense .3 Gaines rejects Holmberg's translation of Aristotle's definition of rhetoric, affirming tile more traditional rendering, wherein rhetoric is defined as "a faculty of observing (or perceiving) the available means of persuasion in (or concerning) each case" (1,96). Aristotle's rhetor, presumably, will use these strategies of persuasion to convince his audience to accept the truths discerned through a prior dialectical inquiry. Gaines also argues that for Aristotle the enthymeme does not differ essentially from the dialectical syllogism, both of which are grounded in a determinate reality, For whereas in some instances the rhetor need not delineate these connections, his choice is one of expediency rather than necessity; in other cases lie may "clearly reveal the terms of connection of premises and their conclusions" (198). Further, Gaines contends that Aristotle perceives rhetoric insofar as he explicitly classifies rhetoric as a mere "offshoot" or part of dialectic (198). One may add that Aristotle develops a plurality of other arts and sciences, and in several lie concludes that reality is in itself determinate. Presumably, the rhetor will have to rely upon the knowledge discovered through these sciences. For this reason one may conclude that his inquiries and assertions are grounded in a determinate view of reality.

Judging from Holmberg's and Gaines's arguments, one may feel compelled to decide whether Aristotle's rhetoric is rhetorical, grounded in and affirming all indeterminate reality; or whether it is dialectical, relying on and articulating truths about a determinate reality. But I contend that either choice distorts Aristotle's conception of the art, which is neither dialectical nor rhetorical in this sense, and which is neither grounded in nor affirmative of any construal of reality, be it determinate or indeterminate. In what follows I will argue that Aristotle presents a third alternative, a rhetoric that enables the rhetor to discern persuasive elements of a given framework of beliefs while remaining free of such ultimate ontological commitments. To support my thesis, I will differentiate Aristotle's construal of rhetoric from dialectical and rhetorical rhetoric with respect to the purpose of the art, the ontological status and implications of the rhetor's use of enthymeme and other instruments of inquiry, and the place of the art of rhetoric among possible alternative modes of inquiry.

Aristotle defines rhetoric as a heuristic art, its purpose being "not so much to persuade, as to find out in each case the existing pithana" (1355bl0). For Gaines, this means that Aristotle's rhetor uses dialectic to discern truths about reality, and only subsequently engages in rhetoric, the "offshoot" of dialectic?to discern the available means for effectively conveying that truth. But Aristotle clearly differentiates his formulation of rhetoric from that of the dialectical rhetor, insisting that the rhetor cannot depend upon a prior conception of reality. For Aristotle does not assert that rhetoric is an "offshoot" of dialectic, as Gaines states, but rather an offshoot of dialectic and ethics.' This means that the rhetor's entire inquiry always occurs from within a particular cultural ethos. Whereas the dialectical rhetor presumes lie can discern first principles about reality in a discourse that is independent of the biases of a particular cultural ethos, Aristotle's rhetor engages in an inquiry in which the very meaning of the terms of his inquiry is determined by their use in a particular culture. White the dialectician may, for example, seek to determine the meaning of a term such as "guilt" in itself, Aristotle's rhetor makes no such pretense; for whereas it is possible for him to argue whether a given defendant is innocent or guilty of committing a particular crime within the context of a legal trial, it is not meaningful to assert that a defendant is or is not guilty "in reality" apart from the legal classification of crimes, the time and place of the trial, and the decisions a particular jury arrives at through its deliberations.

Holmberg correctly asserts that the pithanon Aristotle's rhetor seeks to discover is the audience's "framework" of beliefs, an apparatus comprised of ail array of commonplaces, accepted modes of reasoning, dominant figures of speech, and patterns of delivery, all of which articulate the logical, ethical, and emotional dimensions of ail audience's ethos. The rhetor seeks to reveal this framework, discerning how the array of factors in it permit and proscribe perception, interpretation, and belief. Because the rhetor's terms, statements, and arguments arc always articulated within the particular discourse of a Culturally determined framework, it violates their proper ontological status to claim that his formulation may be "objective" with respect to tile nature of reality in itself. But Aristotle's rhetor further differs from the rhetorical rhetor who concludes that because all frameworks are equally viable and relative, reality itself is ultimately indeterminate and inchoate. For Aristotle, the rhetor cannot claim that reality is "indeterminate" any more than he may claim that it is "determinate" apart from the particular framework from within which he is inquiring. An assertion that reality possesses any characteristics, be they traits of order or chaos, can only be made from within a cultural framework, and hence cannot claim a privileged or "objective" status. The rhetor cannot, in effect, "step outside" a given cultural framework, save into another such framework. Hence, Aristotle asserts that the presupposition that tile rhetor can arrive at "first principles" about reality in itself and thereby assert that reality is either determinate or indeterminate, often escapes the notice of rhetors, and indicates that they are transgressing "the limits of rhetoric" (1358a9).

Aristotle also distinguishes his rhetoric from dialectical and rhetorical rhetoric with respect to the ontological status of the instruments of rhetorical inquiry. Holmberg insists that because Aristotle's rhetor does not reveal the premises of the enthymeme, his use of the instrument implies that reality is indeterminate. Gaines counters that Aristotle's enthymeme is grounded in a determinate reality whether or not the rhetor reveals this ground. Gaines is correct in asserting that the enthymeme does involve a logical deduction from premises; but for Aristotle these premises are not based in "reality," and the use of enthymemes does not justify any conclusions about reality in itself. For Aristotle stresses that the arguments a rhetor invents, deductive enthymemes as well as "inductive" examples, originate neither in a determinate nor an indeterminate reality, but rather in the commonplaces of a culturally determined discourse. Aristotle's rhetor places or locates himself within his audience's discourse by first describing and articulating the topics or commonplaces within which he can discover arguments. He thus grounds his enthymemes in the audience's topics, which are the only "sources from which enthymemes should be derived" (1403bl4). These topics are not "first principles" that mirror "reality"; rather they are discursive sites for grounding arguments which do not necessarily reflect the nature of a reality in itself. The rhetor in effect "dwells" in the culturally determined discourse of the audience, its commonplaces, arguments, and tropes; his "reality" is a construct of that discourse.

Finally, Aristotle differentiates his art of rhetoric from the dialectical and rhetorical formulations with respect to its place among other viable modes of inquiry. The dialectical and rhetorical rhetor each insist that their respective arts are universal and exclusive, tile former assimilating rhetoric to a dialectic that reveals a determinate reality, the latter denying the possibility of any inquiry that transcends a relativistic perspective. Like the rhetorical rhetor, Aristotle states that rhetoric is a universal art, permitting a rhetor to inquire into any subject whatsoever (1355b8); and he argues that the rhetor's inquiry always occurs from within the discourse of a particular cultural framework, one that prohibits him from speaking objectively about reality in itself. But Aristotle also insists that the art is not exclusive, and that there is nothing inherent in the art of rhetoric that would prohibit the possibility of engaging in inquiries in languages not grounded in particular cultural frameworks. And to this end he develops a plurality of alternative modes of inquiry, including sciences such as physics and ontology which ostensibly afford knowledge of a determinate reality. Aristotle thus differs from the rhetorical rhetor who would prohibit tile possibility of such sciences arriving at knowledge of reality in itself. Whereas rhetorical inquiry is grounded in and expressive of a cultural framework, one has no basis for asserting that every inquiry must be rhetorical. It is entirely consistent with Aristotle's view to conclude that whereas some inquiries are grounded in a cultural framework and its discourse, hence demanding rhetorical inquiry, it is nevertheless possible to engage in inquiries that are independent of a cultural framework and may reveal?- perhaps in a universal language such as mathematics-- knowledge of reality in itself.

Aristotle's placement of rhetoric among his plurality of modes of inquiry also differentiates his rhetoric from that of the dialectical rhetor. Just as Aristotle's rhetoric is not an application or mere offshoot of dialectic, neither is it derived from or directly dependent upon the conclusions arrived at in any of the other arts and sciences Aristotle develops. The ontological conclusions of these various sciences are not the basis for rhetorical inquiry, and rhetorical inquiry does not depend upon the validity of their specific conclusions. If some of the "truths" revealed in Aristotle's or anyone else's physics or psychology are proved incorrect, this does not undermine the viability of the rhetor's inquiries, which are dependent not upon the ultimate "truth" of scientific discoveries but upon their being accepted as true from within a particular framework. Indeed, when one engages in rhetorical inquiry, the conclusions drawn from the sciences themselves become rhetorical assertions. In a court room, for example, the assertions by a psychologist concerning the sanity of a defendant will be accepted as true only when they are placed in the context of various "rhetorical" considerations such as the expert's credentials and credibility, the reliability and conditions under which he conducted his tests, and any possible contradictory testimony by other experts.

One may argue that even though Aristotle's rhetor does not rely on ultimate ontological assumptions concerning the determinate or indeterminate nature of reality, he nevertheless relics upon a "reality" comprising the realm of deliberation and choice. That is, he requires a knowledge of human psychology, and about the nature of reasoning, deliberation, and choice; in this respect he depends upon a determinate conception of social, political, and ethical reality. This is the case for the dialectical rhetor, who perceives the rhetorical domain as being comprised by a determinate set of forces within which he must convey his message. But for Aristotle, the rhetor must recognize that he is an integral part of the "reality" he confronts and that his actions in it may dramatically alter that reality. For reality in the rhetorical domain is a product of a cultural framework and its discourse; and this framework is always open to change. The rhetor, through a shared inquiry with his audience, may actively transform and recreate that framework, and hence their perception of reality. Every rhetorical inquiry is fundamentally a new inquiry, in a new place and time. Tile rhetor's discernment of commonplaces, development of enthymemes and examples, and articulation of new metaphors, may potentially alter the ways in which his audience perceives of and lives in the world.

1. Carl Holmberg, "Dialectical and Rhetorical Rhetoric," Philosophy and Rhetoric 10 (1977): 232.

2. It must be emphasized that Holmberg's primary purpose is not to categorize Aristotle's rhetoric, but to present a distinction that may lead to further exploration of a wide range of epistemological, linguistic, and ethical issues. His categorization of Aristotle also has a significant impact, however, on the ongoing inquiry into the nature of Aristotle's rhetoric. In this regard, see especially the recent essays by Eugene Garver, "Aristotle's Rhetoric as a Work of Philosophy," Philosophy and Rhetoric 19 (1986): 1-22; and James Kinneavy, "William Grimaldi--Reinterpreting Aristotle," Philosophy and Rhetoric 20 (1987): 183-200.

3. Robert N. Gaines, "Aristotle's Rhetorical Rhetoric," Philosophy and Rhetoric 19 (1986): 94-100. I embody further references to Gaines's essay parenthetically in my essay.

4. Aristotle, The "Art" of Rhetoric, trans. John Henry Freese (London: Wm. Heinemann Ltd., 1967), 1356a25. I embody further references to Aristotle's text parenthetically within my essay.