The principal idea of this essay is that the study of verbal art can and must overcome the divorce between an abstract "formal" approach and an equally abstract "ideological" approach. Form and content in discourse are one, once we understand that verbal discourse is a social phenomenon—social throughout its entire range and in each and every of its factors, from the sound image to the furthest reaches of abstract meaning.

It is this idea that has motivated our emphasis on "the stylistics of genre." The separation of style and language from the question of genre has been largely responsible for a situation in which only individual and period-bound overtones of a style are the privileged subjects of study, while its basic social tone is ignored. The great historical destinies of genres are overshadowed by the petty vicissitudes of stylistic modifications, which in their turn are linked with individual artists and artistic movements. For this reason, stylistics has been deprived of an authentic philosophical and sociological approach to its problems; it has become bogged down in stylistic trivia, it is not able to sense behind the individual and period-bound shifts the great and anonymous destinies of artistic discourse itself. More often than not, stylistics defines itself as a stylistics of "private craftsmanship" and ignores the social life of discourse outside the artist's study, discourse in the open spaces of public squares, streets, cities and villages, of social groups, generations and epochs. Stylistics is concerned not with living discourse but with a histological specimen made from it, with abstract linguistic discourse in the service of an artist's individual creative powers. But these individual and tendentious overtones of style, cut off from the fundamentally social modes in which discourse lives, inevitably come across as flat and abstract in such a formulation and cannot therefore be studied in organic unity with a work's semantic components.
Various schools of thought in the philosophy of language, in linguistics and in stylistics, have, in different periods (and always in close connection with the diverse concrete poetic and ideological styles of a given epoch), introduced into such concepts as "system of language," "monologic utterance," "the speaking individuum," various differing nuances of meaning, but their basic content remains unchanged. This basic content is conditioned by the specific sociohistorical destinies of European languages and by the destinies of ideological discourse, and by those particular historical tasks that ideological discourse has fulfilled in specific social spheres and at specific stages in its own historical development. These tasks and destinies of discourse conditioned specific verbal-ideological movements, as well as various specific genres of ideological discourse, and ultimately the specific philosophical concept of discourse itself—in particular, the concept of poetic discourse, which had been at the heart of all concepts of style.

The strength and at the same time the limitations of such basic stylistic categories become apparent when such categories are seen as conditioned by specific historical destinies and by the task that an ideological discourse assumes. These categories arose from and were shaped by the historical aktive forces at work in the verbal-ideological evolution of specific social groups; they comprised the theoretical expression of actualizing forces that were in the process of creating a life for language.

These forces are the forces that serve to unify and centralize the verbal-ideological world.

A unitary language constitutes the theoretical expression of the historical processes of linguistic unification and centralization, an expression of the centripetal forces of language. A unitary language is not something given [dan], but is always in essence posited [gaben]—and at every moment of its linguistic life it is opposed to the realities of heteroglossia. But at the same time it makes its real presence felt as a force for overcoming this heteroglossia, imposing specific limits to it, guaranteeing a certain maximum of mutual understanding and crystallizing into a real, although still relative, unity—the unity of the reigning conversational (everyday) and literary language (correct language).

A common unitary language is a system of linguistic norms. But these norms do not constitute an abstract imperative; they are rather the generative forces of linguistic life, forces that struggle to overcome the heteroglossia of language, forces that unite and centralize verbal-ideological thought, creating within a heteroglossic national language the firm, stable linguistic nucleus of an officially recognized literary language, or else defending an already formed language from the pressure of growing heteroglossia.

What we have in mind here is not an abstract linguistic minimum of a common language, in the sense of a system of elementary forms (linguistic symbols) guaranteeing a minimum level of comprehension in practical communication. We are taking language not as a system of abstract grammatical categories, but rather language conceived as ideologically saturated, language as a world view, even as a concrete opinion, insuring a maximum of mutual understanding in all spheres of ideological life. Thus a unitary language serves given ideological movements, as well as various specific genres of ideological discourse, and ultimately the specific philosophical concept of discourse itself—in particular, the concept of poetic discourse, which had been at the heart of all concepts of style.

Aristotelian poetics, the poetics of Augustine, the poetics of the medieval church, of "the one language of truth," the Cartesian poetics of neoclassicism, the abstract grammatical universalism of Leibniz (the idea of a "universal grammar"), Humboldt's insistence on the concrete—all these, whatever their differences in nuance, give expression to the same centripetal forces in sociolinguistic and ideological life; they serve one and the same project of centralizing and unifying the European languages. The victory of one reigning language (dialect) over the others, the supplanting of languages, their enslavement, the process of establishing with the True Word, the incorporation of barbarians and lower social strata into a unitary language of culture and truth, the canonization of ideological systems, philology with its methods of studying and teaching dead languages, languages that were by that very fact "unities." Indo-European linguistics with its focus of attention, directed away from language plurality to a single proto-language—all this determined the content and power of the category of "unitary language" in linguistic and stylistic thought, and determined its creative, style-shaping role in the majority of the poetic genres that coalesced in the channel formed by those same centripetal forces of verbal-ideological life.

But the centripetal forces of the life of language, embodied in a "unitary language," operate in the midst of heteroglossia. At any given moment of its evolution, language is stratified not only into linguistic dialects in the strict sense of the word (according to for-
mal linguistic markers, especially phonetic), but also—and for us this is the essential point—into languages that are socio-ideological: languages of social groups, “professional” and “generic” languages, languages of generations and so forth. From this point of view, literary language itself is only one of these heteroglot languages—and in its turn is also stratified into languages (generic, period-bound and others). And this stratification and heteroglossia, once realized, is not only a static invariant of linguistic life, but also what insures its dynamics: stratification and heteroglossia widen and deepen as long as language is alive and developing. Alongside the centripetal forces, the centrifugal forces of language carry on their uninterrupted work, alongside verbal-ideological centralization and unification, the uninterrupted processes of decentralization and disunification go forward.

Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear. The processes of centralization and decentralization, of unification and disunification, intersect in the utterance, the utterance not only answers the requirements of its own language as an individualized embodiment of a speech act, but it answers the requirements of heteroglossia as well; it is in fact an active participant in such speech diversity. And this active participation of every utterance in living heteroglossia determines the linguistic profile and style of the utterance to no less a degree than its inclusion in any normative-centralizing system of a unitary language. Every utterance participates in the “unitary language” (in its centrifugal forces and tendencies) and at the same time partakes of social and historical heteroglossia (the centrifugal, stratifying forces).

Such is the fleeting language of a day, of an epoch, a social group, a genre, a school and so forth. It is possible to give a concrete and detailed analysis of any utterance, once having exposed it as a contradiction-ridden, tension-filled unity of two embattled tendencies in the life of language.

The authentic environment of an utterance, the environment in which it lives and takes shape, is dialogized heteroglossia, anonymous and social as language, but simultaneously concrete, filled with specific content and accented as an individual utterance.

At the time when major divisions of the poetic genres were developing under the influence of the unifying, centralizing, centripetal forces of verbal-ideological life, the novel—and those artistic-prose genres that gravitate toward it—was being historically shaped by the current of decentralizing, centrifugal forces. At the time when poetry was accomplishing the task of cultural, national and political centralization of the verbal-ideological world in the higher official socio-ideological levels, on the lower levels, on the stages of local life and at evening spectacles, the heteroglossia of the clown sounded forth, ridiculing all “languages” and dialects, there developed the literature of the fabliaux and Schwänke of street songs, folksayings, anecdotes, where there was no language-center at all, where there was to be found a lively play with the “languages” of poetry, scholars, monks, knights and others, where all “languages” were masks and where no language could claim to be an authentic, incontestable face.

Heteroglossia, as organized in these low genres, was not merely heteroglossia vis-à-vis the accepted literary language (in all its various generic expressions), that is, vis-à-vis the linguistic center of the verbal-ideological life of the nation and the epoch, but was a heteroglossia consciously opposed to this literary language. It was parodic, and aimed sharply and polemically against the official languages of its given time. It was heteroglossia that had been dialogized.

Linguistics, stylistics and the philosophy of language that were born and shaped by the current of centralizing tendencies in the life of language have ignored this dialogized heteroglossia, in which is embodied the centrifugal forces in the life of language. For this very reason they could not make provision for the dialogic nature of language, which was a struggle among socio-linguistic points of view, not an intra-language struggle between individual wills or logical contradictions. Moreover, even intra-language dialogue (dramatic, rhetorical, cognitive or merely casual) has hardly been studied linguistically or stylistically up to the present day. One might even say outright that the dialogic aspect of discourse and all the phenomena connected with it have remained to the present moment beyond the ken of linguistics.

At the time when major divisions of the poetic genres were developing under the influence of the unifying, centralizing, centripetal forces of verbal-ideological life, the novel—and those artistic-prose genres that gravitate toward it—was being historically shaped by the current of decentralizing, centrifugal forces. At the time when poetry was accomplishing the task of cultural, national and political centralization of the verbal-ideological world in the higher official socio-ideological levels, on the lower levels, on the stages of local life and at evening spectacles, the heteroglossia of the clown sounded forth, ridiculing all “languages” and dialects, there developed the literature of the fabliaux and Schwänke of street songs, folksayings, anecdotes, where there was no language-center at all, where there was to be found a lively play with the “languages” of poetry, scholars, monks, knights and others, where all “languages” were masks and where no language could claim to be an authentic, incontestable face.

Heteroglossia, as organized in these low genres, was not merely heteroglossia vis-à-vis the accepted literary language (in all its various generic expressions), that is, vis-à-vis the linguistic center of the verbal-ideological life of the nation and the epoch, but was a heteroglossia consciously opposed to this literary language. It was parodic, and aimed sharply and polemically against the official languages of its given time. It was heteroglossia that had been dialogized.

Linguistics, stylistics and the philosophy of language that were born and shaped by the current of centralizing tendencies in the life of language have ignored this dialogized heteroglossia, in which is embodied the centrifugal forces in the life of language. For this very reason they could not make provision for the dialogic nature of language, which was a struggle among socio-linguistic points of view, not an intra-language struggle between individual wills or logical contradictions. Moreover, even intra-language dialogue (dramatic, rhetorical, cognitive or merely casual) has hardly been studied linguistically or stylistically up to the present day. One might even say outright that the dialogic aspect of discourse and all the phenomena connected with it have remained to the present moment beyond the ken of linguistics.

At the time when major divisions of the poetic genres were developing under the influence of the unifying, centralizing, centripetal forces of verbal-ideological life, the novel—and those artistic-prose genres that gravitate toward it—was being historically shaped by the current of decentralizing, centrifugal forces. At the time when poetry was accomplishing the task of cultural, national and political centralization of the verbal-ideological world in the higher official socio-ideological levels, on the lower levels, on the stages of local life and at evening spectacles, the heteroglossia of the clown sounded forth, ridiculing all “languages” and dialects, there developed the literature of the fabliaux and Schwänke of street songs, folksayings, anecdotes, where there was no language-center at all, where there was to be found a lively play with the “languages” of poetry, scholars, monks, knights and others, where all “languages” were masks and where no language could claim to be an authentic, incontestable face.

Heteroglossia, as organized in these low genres, was not merely heteroglossia vis-à-vis the accepted literary language (in all its various generic expressions), that is, vis-à-vis the linguistic center of the verbal-ideological life of the nation and the epoch, but was a heteroglossia consciously opposed to this literary language. It was parodic, and aimed sharply and polemically against the official languages of its given time. It was heteroglossia that had been dialogized.

Linguistics, stylistics and the philosophy of language that were born and shaped by the current of centralizing tendencies in the life of language have ignored this dialogized heteroglossia, in which is embodied the centrifugal forces in the life of language. For this very reason they could not make provision for the dialogic nature of language, which was a struggle among socio-linguistic points of view, not an intra-language struggle between individual wills or logical contradictions. Moreover, even intra-language dialogue (dramatic, rhetorical, cognitive or merely casual) has hardly been studied linguistically or stylistically up to the present day. One might even say outright that the dialogic aspect of discourse and all the phenomena connected with it have remained to the present moment beyond the ken of linguistics.
In the poetic image narrowly conceived (in the image-as-trope), all activity—the dynamics of the image-as-word—is completely exhausted by the play between the word (with all its aspects) and the object (in all its aspects). The word plunges into the inexhaustible wealth and contradictory multiplicity of the object itself, with its "virginal," still "unuttered" nature; therefore it presumes nothing beyond the borders of its own context (except, of course, what can be found in the treasure-house of language itself). The word forgets that its object has its own history of contradictory acts of verbal recognition, as well as that heteroglossia that is always present in such acts of recognition.

For the writer of artistic prose, on the contrary, the object reveals first of all precisely the socially heteroglot multiplicity of its names, definitions and value judgments. Instead of the virginal fullness and inexhaustibility of the object itself, the prose writer confronts a multitude of routes, roads and paths that have been laid down in the object by social consciousness. Along with the internal contradictions inside the object itself, the prose writer witnesses as well the unfolding of social heteroglossia surrounding the object, the Tower-of-Babel mixing of languages that goes on around any object; the dialectics of the object are interwoven with the social dialogue surrounding it. For the prose writer, the object is a focal point for heteroglot voices among which his own voice must also sound; these voices create the background necessary for his own voice, outside of which his artistic prose nuances cannot be perceived, and without which they "do not sound."

The prose artist elevates the social heteroglossia surrounding objects into an image that has finished contours, an image completely shot through with dialogized overtones, he creates artistically calculated nuances on all the fundamental voices and tones of this heteroglossia. But as we have already said, every extra-artistic prose discourse—in any of its forms, quotidian, rhetorical, scholarly—cannot fail to be oriented toward the "already uttered," the "already known," the "common opinion" and so forth. The dialogic orientation of discourse is a phenomenon that is, of course, a property of any discourse. It is the natural orientation of any living discourse. On all its various routes toward the object, in all its directions, the word encounters an alien word and cannot help encountering it in a living, tension-filled interaction. Only the mythical Adam, who approached a virginal and essentially unqualified world with the first word, could really have escaped from start to finish this dialogic inter-orientation with the alien word that occurs in the object. Concrete historical human discourse does not have this privilege: it can deviate from such inter-orientation only on a conditional basis and only to a certain degree.

It is all the more remarkable that linguistics and the philosophy of discourse have been primarily oriented precisely toward this artificial, preconditioned status of the word, a word excised from dialogue and taken for the norm (although the primacy of dialogue over monologue is frequently proclaimed). Dialogue is studied merely as a compositional form in the structuring of speech, but the internal dialogism of the word (which occurs in a monologic utterance as well as in a rejoinder), the dialogism that penetrates its entire structure, all its semantic and expressive layers, is almost entirely ignored. But it is precisely this internal dialogism of the word, which does not assume any external compositional forms of dialogue, that cannot be isolated as an independent act, separate from the word's ability to form a concept [koncipirovanie] of its object—it is precisely this internal dialogism that has such enormous power to shape style. The internal dialogism of the word finds expression in a series of peculiar features in semantics, syntax and stylistics that have remained up to the present time completely unstudied by linguistics and stylistics (nor, what is more, have the peculiar semantic features of ordinary dialogue been studied).

The word is born in a dialogue as a living rejoinder within it; the word is shaped in dialogic interaction with an alien word that is already in the object. A word forms a concept of its own object in a dialogic way.

9. The hornsian lyric, Villon, Heine, Laforgue, Annenksij and others—despite the fact that these are extremely varied instances.
In poetic genres, artistic consciousness—understood as a unity of all the author's semantic and expressive intentions—fully realizes itself within its own language; in them alone is such consciousness fully immanent, expressing itself in it directly and without mediation, without conditions and without distance. The language of the poet is his language, he is utterly immersed in it, inseparable from it, he makes use of each form, each word, each expression according to its unmediated power to assign meaning (as it were, "without quotation marks"), that is, as a pure and direct expression of his own intention. No matter what
The language in a poetic work realizes itself as something about which there can be no doubt, something that cannot be disputed, something all-encompassing. Everything that the poet sees, understands and thinks, he does through the eyes of a given language, in its inner forms, and there is nothing that might require, for its expression, the help of any other or alien language. The language of the poetic genre is a unitary and singular Ptolemaic world outside of which nothing else exists and nothing else is needed. The concept of many worlds of language, all equal in their ability to conceptualize and to be expressive, is organically denied to poetic style.

The world of poetry, no matter how many contradictions and insoluble conflicts the poet develops within it, is always illuminated by one unitary and indisputable discourse. Contradictions, conflicts and doubts remain in the object, in thoughts, in living experiences—in short, in the subject matter—but they do not enter into the language itself. In poetry, even discourse about doubts must be cast in a discourse that cannot be doubted.

To take responsibility for the language of the work as a whole at all of its points as its language, to assume a full solidarity with each of the work’s aspects, tones, nuances—such is the foundational prerequisite for poetic style; style so conceived is fully adequate to a single language and a single linguistic consciousness. The poet is not able to oppose his own poetic consciousness, his own intentions to the language he uses, for he is completely within it and therefore cannot turn it into an object to be perceived, reflected upon or related to. Language is present to him only from inside, in the work it does to effect its intention, and not from outside, in its objective specificity and boundedness. Within the limits of poetic style, direct unconditional intentionality, language at its full weight and the objective display of language (as a socially and historically limited linguistic reality) are all simultaneous, but incompatible. The unity and singularity of language are the indispensable prerequisites for a realization of the direct (but not objectively typifying) intentional individuality of poetic style and of its monologic steadfastness.

This does not mean, of course, that heteroglossia or even a foreign language is completely shut out of a poetic work. To be sure, such possibilities are limited: a certain latitude for heteroglossia exists only in the “low” poetic genres—in the satiric and comic genres and others. Nevertheless, heteroglossia (other socio-ideological languages) can be introduced into purely poetic genres, primarily in the speeches of characters. But in such a context it is objective. It appears, in essence, as a thing, it does not lie on the same plane with the real language of the work: it is the depicted gesture of one of the characters and does not appear as an aspect of the word doing the depicting. Elements of heteroglossia enter here not in the capacity of another language carrying its own particular points of view, about which one can say things not expressible in one’s own language, but rather in the capacity of a depicted thing. Even when speaking of alien things, the poet speaks in his own language. To shed light on an alien world, he never resorts to an alien language, even though it might in fact be more adequate to that world. Whereas the writer of prose, by contrast—as we shall see—attempts to talk about even his own world in an alien language (for example, in the nonliterary language of the teller of tales, or the representative of a specific socio-ideological group), he often measures his own world by alien linguistic standards.

As a consequence of the prerequisites mentioned above, the language of poetic genres, when they approach their stylistic limit, often becomes authoritarian, dogmatic and conservative, sealing itself off from the influence of extraliterary social dialects. Therefore such ideas as a special “poetic language,” a “language of the gods,” a “priestly language of poetry” and so forth could flourish on poetic soil. It is noteworthy that the poet, should he not accept the given literary language, will sooner resort to the artificial creation of a new language specifically for poetry than he will to the exploitation of actual available social dialects. Social languages are filled with specific objects, typical, socially localized and limited, while the artificially created language of poetry must be a directly intentional language, unitary and singular.

Thus, when Russian prose writers at the beginning of the twen-
The twentieth century began to show a profound interest in dialects and skaz, the Symbolists (Bal'mont, V. Ivanov) and later the Futurists dreamed of creating a special "language of poetry," and even made experiments directed toward creating such a language (those of V. Khlebnikov).

The idea of a special unitary and singular language of poetry is a typical utopian philosopheme of poetic discourse: it is grounded in the actual conditions and demands of poetic style, which is always a style adequately serviced by one directly intentional language from whose point of view other languages (conversational, business and prose languages, among others) are perceived as objects that are in no way its equal.

The idea of a "poetic language" is yet another expression of that same Ptolemaic conception of the linguistic and stylistic world.

Language—like the living concrete environment in which the consciousness of the verbal artist lives—is never unitary. It is unitary only as an abstract grammatical system of normative forms, taken in isolation from the concrete, ideological conceptualizations that fill it, and in isolation from the uninterrupted process of historical becoming that is a characteristic of all living language. Actual social life and historical becoming create within an abstractly unitary national language a multitude of concrete worlds, a multitude of bounded verbal-ideological and social belief systems; within these various systems (identical in the abstract) are elements of language filled with various semantic and axiological content and each with its own different sound.

Literary language—both spoken and written—although it is unitary not only in its shared, abstract, linguistic markers but also in its forms for conceptualizing these abstract markers, is itself stratified and heteroglot in its aspect as an expressive system, that is, in the forms that carry its meanings.

This stratification is accomplished first of all by the specific organisms called genres. Certain features of language (lexicological, semantic, syntactic) will knit together with the intentional aim, and with the overall accentual system inherent in one or another genre: oratorical, publicistic, newspaper and journalistic genres, the genres of low literature (penny dreadfuls, for instance) or, fi-

13. Such was the point of view taken by Latin toward national languages in the Middle Ages.
mogeneous, as the oral and written language of a dominant social group, there is nevertheless always present, even here, a certain degree of social differentiation, a social stratification, that in other eras can become extremely acute. Social stratification may here and there coincide with generic and professional stratification, but in essence it is, of course, a thing completely autonomous and peculiar to itself.

Social stratification is also and primarily determined by differences between the forms used to convey meaning and between the expressive planes of various belief systems—that is, stratification expresses itself in typical differences in ways used to conceptualize and accentuate elements of language, and stratification may not violate the abstractly linguistic dialectological unity of the shared literary language.

What is more, all socially significant world views have the capacity to exploit the intentional possibilities of language through the medium of their specific concrete instancing. Various tendencies (artistic and otherwise), circles, journals, particular newspapers, even particular significant artistic works and individual persons are all capable of stratifying language, in proportion to their social significance, they are capable of attracting its words and forms into their orbit by means of their own characteristic intentions and accents, and in so doing to a certain extent alienating these words and forms from other tendencies, parties, artistic works and persons.

Every socially significant verbal performance has the ability—sometimes for a long period of time, and for a wide circle of persons—to infect with its own intention certain aspects of language, so that even possible to have a family (argos) define the societal limits of a language, as, for instance, the argos of the Irenenev in Tolstoy, with its special vocabulary and unique accentual system.

And finally, at any given moment, languages of various epochs and periods of socio-ideological life cohabit with one another. Even languages of the day exist: one could say that today's and yesterday's socio-ideological and political "day" do not, in a certain sense, share the same language; every day represents another socio-ideological semantic "state of affairs," another vocabulary, another accentual system, with its own slogans, its own ways of assigning blame and praise. Poetry depersonalizes "days" in language, while prose, as we shall see, often deliberately intensifies difference between them, gives them embodied representation and dialogically opposes them to one another in unsolvable dialogues.

Thus at any given moment of its historical existence, language is heteroglot from top to bottom: it represents the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past, between differing epochs of the past, between different socio-ideological groups in the present, between tendencies, schools, circles and so forth, all given a bodily form. These "languages" of heteroglossia intersect each other in a variety of ways, forming new socially typifying "languages."

Each of these "languages" of heteroglossia requires a methodology very different from the others; each is grounded in a completely different principle for marking differences and for establishing units [for some this principle is functional, in others it is the principle of theme and content, in yet others it is, properly speaking, a socio-dialectological principle]. Therefore languages do not exclude each other, but rather intersect with each other in many different ways [the Ukrainian language, the language of the epic poem, of early Symbolism, of the student, of a particular generation of children, of the run-of-the-mill intellectual, of the Nietzschean and so on]. It might even seem that the very word "language" loses all meaning in this process—for apparently there is no single plane on which all these "languages" might be juxtaposed to one another.

In actual fact, however, there does exist a common plane that methodologically justifies our juxtaposing them: all languages of heteroglossia, whatever the principle underlying them and making each unique, are specific points of view on the world, forms
for conceptualizing the world in words, specific world views, each characterized by its own objects, meanings and values. As such they all may be juxtaposed to one another, mutually supplemented one another, contradict one another and be interrelated dialogically. As such they encounter one another and co-exist in the consciousness of real people—first and foremost, in the creative consciousness of people who write novels. As such, these languages live a real life, they struggle and evolve in an environment of social heteroglossia. Therefore they are all able to enter into the unitary plane of the novel, which can unite in itself parodic stylizations of generic languages, various forms of stylizations and illustrations of professional and period-bound languages, the languages of particular generations, of social dialects and others (as occurs, for example, in the English comic novel). They may all be drawn in by the novelist for the orchestration of his themes and for the refracted (indirect) expression of his intentions and values. This is why we constantly put forward the referential and expressive—that is, intentional—factors as the force that stratifies and differentiates the common literary language, and not the linguistic markers (lexical coloration, semantic overtones, etc.) of generic languages, professional jargons and so forth—markers that are, so to speak, the sclerotic deposits of an intentional process, signs left behind on the path of the real living project of an intention, of the particular way it imparts meaning to general linguistic norms. These external markers, linguistically observable and fixable, cannot in themselves be understood or studied without understanding the specific conceptualization they have been given by an intention.

Discourse lives, as it were, beyond itself, in a living impulse ['napravlennost'] toward the object; if we detach ourselves completely from this impulse all we have left is the naked corpse of the word, from which we can learn nothing at all about the social situation or the fate of a given word in life. To study the word as such, ignoring the impulse that reaches out beyond it, is just as senseless as to study psychological experience outside the context of that real life toward which it was directed and by which it is determined.

By stressing the intentional dimension of stratification in literary language, we are able, as has been said, to locate in a single series such methodologically heterogeneous phenomena as professional and social dialects, world views and individual artistic works, for in their intentional dimension one finds that common plane on which they can all be juxtaposed, and juxtaposed dialogically. The whole matter consists in the fact that there may be, between "languages," highly specific dialogic relations; no matter how these languages are conceived, they may all be taken as particular points of view on the world. However varied the social forces doing the work of stratification—a profession, a genre, a particular tendency, an individual personality—the work itself everywhere comes down to the (relatively) protracted and socially meaningful (collective) saturation of language with specific (and consequently limiting) intentions and accents. The longer this stratifying saturation goes on, the broader the social circle encompassed by it and consequently the more substantial the social force bringing about such a stratification of language, then the more sharply focused and stable will be those traces, the linguistic changes in the language markers (linguistic symbols), that are left behind in language as a result of this social force's activity—sent stable (and consequently social) semantic nuances to authentic dialectological markers (phonetic, morphological and others), which permit us to speak of particular social dialects. As a result of the work done by all these stratifying forces in language, there are no "neutral" words and forms—words and forms that can belong to "no one"; language has been completely taken over, shot through with intentions and accents. For any individual consciousness living in it, language is not an abstract system of normative forms but rather a concrete heteroglot conception of the world. All words have the "taste" of a profession, a genre, a tendency, a party, a particular work, a particular person, a generation, an age group, the day and hour. Each word tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life; all words and forms are populated by intentions. Contextual overtones (generic, tendentious, individualistic) are inevitable in the word.
As soon as a critical interanimation of languages began to occur in the consciousness of our peasant, as soon as it became clear that these were not only various different languages but even internally variegated languages, that the ideological systems and approaches to the world that were indissolubly connected with these languages contradicted each other and in no way could live in peace and quiet with one another—then the inviolability and predetermined quality of these languages came to an end, and the necessity of actively choosing one's orientation among them began.

Heteroglossia, once incorporated into the novel (whatever the forms for its incorporation), is another's speech in another's language, serving to express authorial intentions but in a refracted way. Such speech constitutes a special type of double-voiced discourse. It serves two speakers at the same time and expresses simultaneously two different intentions: the direct intention of the character who is speaking, and the refracted intention of the author. In such discourse there are two voices, two meanings and two expressions. And all the while these two voices are dialogically interrelated, they—as it were—know about each other just as two exchanges in a dialogue know of each other and are structured in this mutual knowledge of each other; it is as if they actually hold a conversation with each other. Double-voiced discourse is always internally dialogized. Examples of this would be comic, ironic or parodic discourse, the refracting discourse of a narrator, refracting discourse in the language of a character and finally the discourse of a whole incorporated genre—all these discourses are double-voiced and internally dialogized. A potential dialogue is embedded in them, one as yet unfolded, a concentrated dialogue of two voices, two world views, two languages.

Double-voiced, internally dialogized discourse is also possible, of course, in a language system that is hermetic, pure and unitary, a system alien to the linguistic relativism of prose consciousness; it follows that such discourse is also possible in the purely poetic genres. But in those systems there is no soil to nourish the development of such discourse in the slightest meaningful or essential way. Double-voiced discourse is very widespread in rhetorical genres, but even there—remaining as it does within the boundaries of a single language system—it is not fertilized by a deep-rooted connection with the forces of historical becoming that serve to stratify language, and therefore rhetorical genres are at best merely a distanced echo of this becoming, narrowed down to an individual polemic.

Such poetie and rhetorical double-voicedness, cut off from any process of linguistic stratification, may be adequately unfolded into an individual dialogue, into individual argument and conversation between two persons, even while the exchanges in the dialogue are immanent to a single unitary language: they may not be in agreement, they may even be opposed, but they are diverse neither in their speech nor in their language. Such double-voicing, remaining within the boundaries of a single hermetic and unitary language system, without any underlying fundamental socio-linguistic orchestration, may be only a stylistically secondary accompaniment to the dialogue and forms of polemic.23 The internal bifurcation (double-voicing) of discourse, sufficient to a single and unitary language and to a consistently monologic style, can never be a fundamental form of discourse: it is merely a game, a tempest in a teapot.

The double-voicedness one finds in prose is of another sort altogether. There—on the rich soil of novelistic prose—double-voicedness draws its energy, its dialogized ambiguity, not from individual dissonances, misunderstandings or contradictions however tragic, however firmly grounded in individual destinies, in the novel, this double-voicedness sinks its roots deep into a fun-

22. In neoclassicism, this double-voicing becomes crucial only in the low genres, especially in satire.
23. Within the limits of the world of poetry and a unitary language, everything important in such disagreements and contradictions can and must be laid out in a direct and pure dramatic dialogue.
damental, socio-linguistic speech diversity and multi-languagedness. True, even in the novel heteroglossia is by and large always personified, incarnated in individual human figures, with disagreements and oppositions individualized. But such oppositions of individual wills and minds are, in the novel, by and large always personified, incarnated in individual human figures, with disagreements and oppositions individualized. But such oppositions of individual wills and minds are subsumed in social heteroglossia, they are re-conceptualized through it. Oppositions between individuals are only surface upheavals of the untamed elements in social heteroglossia, surface manifestations of those elements that play on such individual oppositions, make them contradictory, saturate their consciousness and discourses with a more fundamental speech diversity.

Therefore the internal dialogism of double-voiced prose discourse can never be exhausted thematically (just as the metaphorical energy of language can never be exhausted thematically), it can never be developed into the motivation or subject for a manifest dialogue, such as might fully embody, with no residue, the internally dialogic potential embedded in linguistic heteroglossia. The internal dialogism of authentic prose discourse, which grows organically out of a stratified and heteroglot language, cannot fundamentally be dramatized or dramatically resolved (brought to an authentic end); it cannot ultimately be fitted into the frame of any manifest dialogue, into the frame of a mere conversation between persons; it is not ultimately divisible into verbal exchanges possessing precisely marked boundaries. This double-voicedness in prose is prefigured in language itself (in authentic metaphors, as well as in myth), as a social phenomenon that is becoming in history, socially stratified and weathered in this process of becoming.

The relativizing of linguistic consciousness, its crucial participation in the social multi- and vari-languagedness of evolving languages, the various wanderings of semantic and expressive intentions and the trajectory of this consciousness through various languages (languages that are all equally well conceptualized and equally objective), the inevitable necessity for such a consciousness to speak indirectly, conditionally, in a refracted way—these are all indispensible prerequisites for an authentic double-voiced prose discourse. This double-voicedness makes its presence felt by the novelist in the living heteroglossia of language, and in the multi-languagedness surrounding and nourishing his own consciousness; it is not invented in superficial, isolated rhetorical polemics with another person.

If the novelist loses touch with this linguistic ground of prose style, if he is unable to attain the heights of a relativized, Galilean linguistic consciousness, if he is deaf to organic double-voicedness and to the internal dialogization of living and evolving discourse, then he will never comprehend, or even realize, the actual possibilities and tasks of the novel as a genre. He may, of course, create an artistic work that compositionally and thematically will be "made" exactly as a novel is made, but he will not thereby have created a novel. The style will always give him away. We will recognize the naively self-confident or obtusely stubborn unity of a smooth, pure single-voiced language (perhaps accompanied by a primitive, artificial, worked-up double-voicedness). We quickly sense that such an author finds it easy to purge his work of speech diversity: he simply does not listen to the fundamental heteroglossia inherent in actual language, he mistakes social overtones, which create the timbres of words, for irritating noises that it is his task to eliminate. The novel, when torn out of authentic linguistic speech diversity, emerges in most cases as a "closet drama," with detailed, fully developed and "artistically worked out" stage directions (it is, of course, bad drama). In such a novel, divested of its language diversity, authorial language inevitably ends up in the awkward and absurd position of the language of stage directions in plays.

In his well-known works on the theory and technique of the novel, Spielhagen focuses on precisely such unnovelistic novels, and ignores precisely the kind of potential specific to the novel as a genre. As a theoretician Spielhagen was deaf to heteroglot languages and to that which it specifically generates: double-voiced discourse.
Our motif carries even greater weight in the realm of religious thought and discourse (mythological, mystical and magical). The primary subject of this discourse is a being who speaks: a deity, a demon, a soothsayer, a prophet. Mythological thought does not, in general, acknowledge anything not alive or not responsive. Divining the will of a deity, of a demon (good or bad), interpreting signs of wrath or beneficence, tokens, indications and finally the transmission and interpretation of words directly spoken by a deity [revelation], or by his prophets, saints, soothsayers—all in all, the transmission and interpretation of the divinely inspired [as opposed to the profane] word are acts of religious thought and discourse having the greatest importance. All religious systems, even primitive ones, possess an enormous, highly specialized methodological apparatus [hermeneutics] for transmitting and interpreting various kinds of holy word.

The situation is somewhat different in the case of scientific thought. Here, the significance of discourse as such is comparatively weak. Mathematical and natural sciences do not acknowledge discourse as a subject in its own right. In scientific activity one must, of course, deal with another's discourse—the words of predecessors, the judgments of critics, majority opinion and so forth; one must deal with various forms for transmitting and interpreting another's word—struggle with an authoritative discourse, overcoming influences, polemics, references, quotations and so forth—but all this remains a mere operational necessity and does not affect the subject matter itself of the science, into whose composition the speaker and his discourse do not, of course, enter. The entire methodological apparatus of the mathematical and natural sciences is directed toward mastery over mute objects, brute things, that do not reveal themselves in words, that do not comment on themselves. Acquiring knowledge here is not connected with receiving and interpreting words or signs from the object itself under consideration.

In the humanities—as distinct from the natural and mathematical sciences—there arises the specific task of establishing, transmitting and interpreting the words of others (for example, the problem of sources in the methodology of the historical disciplines). And of course in the philological disciplines, the speaking person and his discourse is the fundamental object of investigation.

Philology has specific aims and approaches to its subject (the
speaker and his discourse] that determine the ways it transmits and represents others' words (for example, discourse as an object of study in the history of language). However, within the limits of the humanities (and even of philology in the narrow sense) there is possible a twofold approach to another's word when it is treated as something we seek to understand.

The word can be perceived purely as an object (something that is, in its essence, a thing). It is perceived as such in the majority of the linguistic disciplines. In such a word-object even meaning becomes a thing: there can be no dialogic approach to such a word of the kind immanent to any deep and actual understanding. Understanding, so conceived, is inevitably abstract: it is completely separated from the living, ideological power of the word to mean—from its truth or falsity, its significance or insignificance, beauty or ugliness. Such a reified word-thing cannot be understood by attempts to penetrate its meaning dialogically: there can be no conversing with such a word.

In philology, however, a dialogic penetration into the word is obligatory (for indeed without it no sort of understanding is possible): dialogizing it opens up fresh aspects in the word (semantic aspects, in the broadest sense), which, since they were revealed by dialogic means, become more immediate to perception. Every step forward in our knowledge of the word is preceded by a “stage of genius” a sharpened dialogic relationship to the word—that in turn uncovers fresh aspects within the word.

Precisely such an approach is needed, more concrete and that does not deflect discourse from its actual power to mean in real ideological life, an approach where objectivity of understanding is linked with dialogic vigor and a deeper penetration into discourse itself. No other approach is in fact possible in the area of poetics, or the history of literature (and even of philology in the narrow sense) there is possible a twofold approach to another's word when it is treated as something we seek to understand.

The word can be perceived purely as an object (something that is, in its essence, a thing). It is perceived as such in the majority of the linguistic disciplines. In such a word-object even meaning becomes a thing: there can be no dialogic approach to such a word of the kind immanent to any deep and actual understanding. Understanding, so conceived, is inevitably abstract: it is completely separated from the living, ideological power of the word to mean—from its truth or falsity, its significance or insignificance, beauty or ugliness. Such a reified word-thing cannot be understood by attempts to penetrate its meaning dialogically: there can be no conversing with such a word.

In philology, however, a dialogic penetration into the word is obligatory (for indeed without it no sort of understanding is possible): dialogizing it opens up fresh aspects in the word (semantic aspects, in the broadest sense), which, since they were revealed by dialogic means, become more immediate to perception. Every step forward in our knowledge of the word is preceded by a “stage of genius” a sharpened dialogic relationship to the word—that in turn uncovers fresh aspects within the word.

Precisely such an approach is needed, more concrete and that does not deflect discourse from its actual power to mean in real ideological life, an approach where objectivity of understanding is linked with dialogic vigor and a deeper penetration into discourse itself. No other approach is in fact possible in the area of poetics, or the history of literature (and even of philology in the narrow sense) there is possible a twofold approach to another's word when it is treated as something we seek to understand.

The word can be perceived purely as an object (something that is, in its essence, a thing). It is perceived as such in the majority of the linguistic disciplines. In such a word-object even meaning becomes a thing: there can be no dialogic approach to such a word of the kind immanent to any deep and actual understanding. Understanding, so conceived, is inevitably abstract: it is completely separated from the living, ideological power of the word to mean—from its truth or falsity, its significance or insignificance, beauty or ugliness. Such a reified word-thing cannot be understood by attempts to penetrate its meaning dialogically: there can be no conversing with such a word.

In philology, however, a dialogic penetration into the word is obligatory (for indeed without it no sort of understanding is possible): dialogizing it opens up fresh aspects in the word (semantic aspects, in the broadest sense), which, since they were revealed by dialogic means, become more immediate to perception. Every step forward in our knowledge of the word is preceded by a “stage of genius” a sharpened dialogic relationship to the word—that in turn uncovers fresh aspects within the word.

Precisely such an approach is needed, more concrete and that does not deflect discourse from its actual power to mean in real ideological life, an approach where objectivity of understanding is linked with dialogic vigor and a deeper penetration into discourse itself. No other approach is in fact possible in the area of poetics, or the history of literature (and even of philology in the narrow sense) there is possible a twofold approach to another's word when it is treated as something we seek to understand.

The word can be perceived purely as an object (something that is, in its essence, a thing). It is perceived as such in the majority of the linguistic disciplines. In such a word-object even meaning becomes a thing: there can be no dialogic approach to such a word of the kind immanent to any deep and actual understanding. Understanding, so conceived, is inevitably abstract: it is completely separated from the living, ideological power of the word to mean—from its truth or falsity, its significance or insignificance, beauty or ugliness. Such a reified word-thing cannot be understood by attempts to penetrate its meaning dialogically: there can be no conversing with such a word.

In philology, however, a dialogic penetration into the word is obligatory (for indeed without it no sort of understanding is possible): dialogizing it opens up fresh aspects in the word (semantic aspects, in the broadest sense), which, since they were revealed by dialogic means, become more immediate to perception. Every step forward in our knowledge of the word is preceded by a “stage of genius” a sharpened dialogic relationship to the word—that in turn uncovers fresh aspects within the word.
ity to expand and renew their meanings in new living contexts—
they essentially die as discourse, for the signifying word lives
beyond itself, that is, it lives by means of directing its purposive-
ness outward. The exclusive concentration on another's dis-
course as a subject does not, however, in itself inevitably indicate
such a rupture between discourse and reality.

Rhetorical genres possess the most varied forms for transmis-
son of another's speech, and for the most part these are intensely
dialogized forms. Rhetoric relies heavily on the vivid re-ac-
centuating of the words it transmits (often to the point of distorting
them completely) that is accomplished by the appropriate fram-
ing context. Rhetorical genres provide rich material for studying
a variety of forms for transmitting another's speech, the most vari-
ed means for formulating and framing such speech. Using rhet-
toric, even a representation of a speaker and his discourse of the
sort one finds in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
sity of voices, in most cases the double-voicedness of rhetoric is
abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis of
the ideas that are parceled out in prose art is possible—but the rhetorical double-
voicedness of such images is usually not very deep: its roots do
not extend to the dialogical essence of evolving language itself; it
is not structured on authentic heteroglossia but on a mere diver-
si
generalized utterances in someone else's manner of speaking, thus utterances that may be taken as socially typical or characteristic. These extra-artistic forms, concentrated as they are on the transmission (even if free and creative) of utterances, do not endeavor to recognize and intensify images lying behind the isolated utterances of social language, a language that realized itself in them but is not exhausted by them, for it is precisely an image—and not a positivistic, empirical given of that language. In an authentic novel there can be sensed behind each utterance the elemental force of social languages, with their internal logic and internal necessity. The image in such cases reveals not only the reality of a given language but also, as it were, its potential, its ideal limits and its total meaning conceived as a whole, its truth together with its limitations.

Thus double-voicedness in the novel, as distinct from double-voicedness in rhetorical or other forms, always tends toward a double-languagelessness as its own outside limit. Therefore novelistic double-voicedness cannot be unfolded into logical contradictions or into purely dramatic contrasts. It is this quality that determines the distinctiveness of novelistic dialogues, which push to the limit the mutual nonunderstanding represented by people who speak in different languages.

We must once again emphasize that what is meant here by social language is not the undifferentiated mass [sorokupost'] of linguistic markers determining the way in which a language is dialectologically organized but rather the concrete, living, integral mass [celokupost'] made up of all the markers that give that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, then, is a concrete socio-linguistic belief system that defines a distinct identity for itself within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that makes up of all the markers that give that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguistically unitary language. A social language, therefore, is not the undifferentiated mass that determines the way in which a language is dialectologically organized, but rather the concrete, living, integral mass that gives that language its social profile, a profile that by defining itself through semantic shifts and lexical choices can be established even within the boundaries of a linguisticall unitary language development, a process teeming with future and former languages, with prim but moribund aristocrat-languages, with parvenu-languages and with countless pretenders to the status of language—which are all more or less successful, depending on their degree of social scope and on the ideological area in which they are employed.

The image of such a language in a novel is the image assumed by a set of social beliefs, the image of a social ideologeme that has fused with its own discourse, with its own language. Therefore such an image is very far from being formalistic, and artistic play with such languages far from being formalistic play. In the novel formal markers of languages, manners and styles are symbols for sets of social beliefs. External linguistic features are frequently used as peripheral means to mark socio-linguistic differences, sometimes even in the form of direct authorial commentaries on the characters' language. In Fathers and Sons, for example, Turgenev sometimes goes out of his way to emphasize his characters' peculiarities in word usage or pronunciation (which can be, by the way, extremely characteristic from a sociohistorical point of view).

There is no direct, external commentary on the peculiarities of characters' languages is typical for the novel as a genre, but it is not of the characterological zones discussed in the preceding chapter). The context surrounding represented speech plays a major role...
in creating the image of a language. The framing context, like the sculptor's chisel, hews out the rough outlines of someone else's speech, and carves the image of a language out of the raw empirical data of speech life, it concentrates and fuses the internal impulse of the represented language with the exterior objects it names. The words of the author that represent and frame another's speech create a perspective for it, they separate light from shadow, create the situation and conditions necessary for it to sound; finally, they penetrate into the interior of the other's speech, carrying into it their own accents and their own expressions, creating for it a dialogizing background.

Thanks to the ability of a language to represent another language while still retaining the capacity to sound simultaneously both outside it and within it, to talk about it and at the same time to talk in and with it—and thanks to the ability of the language being represented simultaneously to serve as an object of representation while continuing to be able to speak to itself—thanks to all this, the creation of specific novelistic images of languages becomes possible. Therefore, the framing authorial context can least of all treat the language it is representing as a thing, a mute and unresponsive speech object, something that remains outside the authorial context as might any other object of speech.

All devices in the novel for creating the image of a language may be reduced to three basic categories: (1) hybridizations, (2) the dialogized interrelation of languages and (3) pure dialogues.

What is a hybridization? It is a mixture of two social languages within the limits of a single utterance, an encounter, within the arena of an utterance, between two different linguistic consciousnesses, separated from one another by an epoch, by social differentiation or by some other factor.

Such mixing of two languages within the boundaries of a single utterance is, in the novel, an artistic device (or more accurately, a system of devices) that is deliberate. But unintentional, unconscious hybridization is one of the most important modes in the historical life and evolution of all languages. We may even say that language and languages change historically primarily by means of hybridization, by means of a mixing of various "languages" co-existing within the boundaries of a single dialect, a single national language, a single branch, a single group of different branches or different groups of such branches, in the historical as well as paleontological past of languages—but the crucial for this mixing always remains the utterance."

The artistic image of a language must by its very nature be a linguistic hybrid (an intentional hybrid): it is obligatory for two linguistic consciousnesses to be present, the one being represented and the other doing the representing, with each belonging to a different system of language. Indeed, if there is not a second representing consciousness, if there is no second representing language-intention, then what results is not an image [obraz] of language but merely a sample [obrazcek] of some other person's language, whether authentic or fabricated.

The image of a language conceived as an intentional hybrid is first of all a conscious hybrid (as distinct from a historical, organic, obscure language hybrid); an intentional hybrid is precisely the perception of one language by another language, its illumination by another linguistic consciousness. An image of language may be structured only from the point of view of another language, which is taken as the norm.

What is more, an intentional and conscious hybrid is not a mixture of two impersonal language consciousnesses (the correlates of two languages) but rather a mixture of two individual languageconsciousnesses (the correlates of two specific utterances, not merely two languages and two individual language-intentions, as the individual representatives can only theoretically consciously and will), on the one hand, and the individualized linguistic consciousness and will of the character represented, on the other. For indeed, since concrete, isolated utterances are constructed in this represented language, it follows that the represented linguistic consciousness must necessarily be embodied in "authors" of some sort who speak in the given language, who structure utterances in that language and who therefore introduce into the potentialities of language itself their own actualizing language.

Such historically unconscious hybrids are similar to double-language hybrids but they are, of course, single voiced. Semi-organic, semi-intentional hybridization is characteristic of a system of literary language. 15. Even though these "authors" may be impersonal, merely types—as in the stylizations of generic languages and of public opinion.
intention. Thus there are always two consciousnesses, two lan-

guage-intentions, two voices and consequently two accents par-

ticipating in an intentional and conscious artistic hybrid.

While noting the individual element in intentional hybrids, we
must once again strongly emphasize the fact that in novelistic ar-

tistic hybrids that structure the image of a language, the individ-

ual element, indispensable as it is for the actualization of lan-

guage and for its subordination to the artistic whole of the novel
[here the destinies of languages are interwoven with the indi-

vidual destinies of speaking persons], is nevertheless inexorably
merged with the socio-linguistic element. In other words, the
novelistic hybrid is not only double-voiced and double-accented
(as in rhetoric) but is also double-languaged, for in it there are not
only (and not even so much) two individual consciousnesses, two
voices, two accents, as there are two socio-linguistic conscious-
nesses, two epochs, that, true, are not here unconsciously mixed
(as in an organic hybrid), but that come together and consciously
fight it out on the territory of the utterance.

The Two Stylistic Lines of Development in the European Novel

The novel is the expression of a Galilean perception of language,
one that denies the absolutism of a single and unitary language—
that is, that refuses to acknowledge its own language as the sole
verbal and semantic center of the ideological world. It is a percep-
tion that has been made conscious of the vast plentitude of na-
tional and, more to the point, social languages—all of which are
equally capable of being "languages of truth," but, since such is
the case, all of which are equally relative, reified and limited, as
they are merely the languages of social groups, professions and
other cross-sections of everyday life. The novel begins by presum-
ing a verbal and semantic decentering of the ideological world, a
certain linguistic homelessness of literary consciousness, which
no longer possesses a sacrosanct and unitary linguistic medium
for containing ideological thought; it is a consciousness man-
ifesting itself in the midst of social languages that are surrounded
by a single [national] language, and in the midst of [other] na-
tional languages that are surrounded by a single culture [Hellen-
istic, Christian, Protestant], or by a single cultural-political world
(the Hellenistic kingdoms, the Roman Empire and so forth).

What is involved here is a very, important, in fact a radical revo-
lution in the destinies of human discourse: the fundamental lib-
eration of cultural-semantic and emotional intentions from the
hegemony of a single and unitary language, and consequently the
simultaneous loss of a feeling for language as myth, that is, as an
absolute form of thought. Therefore it is not enough merely to
uncover the multiplicity of languages in a cultural world or the
speech diversity within a particular national language—we must
see through to the heart of this revolution, to all the conse-
quences flowing from it, possible only under very specific
so-ciohistorical conditions.

In order that an artistically profound play with social languages
become possible, it is necessary to alter radically the feel for dis-

course at the level of general literature and language. It is neces-

sary to come to terms with discourse as a reified, "typical" but at
the same time intentional phenomenon; we must learn how to
become sensitive to the "internal form" (in the Humboldtian
sense) of an alien language, and to the "internal form" of one's
own language as an alien form; we must learn how to develop a
sensitivity toward the brute materiality, the typicality, that is the
essential attribute not only of actions, gestures and separate
words and expressions, but the basic ingredient as well in points
of view, in how the world is seen and felt, ways that are organical-
ly part and parcel with the language that expresses them. Such a
perception is possible only for a consciousness organically par-
ticipating in the universal of mutually illuminating languages.
What is wanted for this to happen is a fundamental intersecting
of languages in a single given consciousness, one that participates equally in several languages.

The decentralizing of the verbal-ideological world that finds its expression in the novel begins by presuming fundamentally differentiated social groups, which exist in an intense and vital interaction with other social groups. A sealed-off interest group, caste or class, existing within an internally unitary and unchanging core of its own, cannot serve as socially productive soil for the development of the novel unless it becomes riddled with decay or shifted somehow from its state of internal balance and self-sufficiency. This is the case because a literary and language consciousness operating from the heights of its own unconquestably authoritative unitary language fails to take into account the fact of heteroglossia and multi-languagedness. The heteroglossia that ranges beyond the boundaries of such a sealed-off cultural universe, a universe having its own literary language, is capable of sending into the lower genres only purely reified, unintentional speech images, word-things that lack any novelistic-prose potential. It is necessary that heteroglossia wash over a culture's awarenessness of itself and its language, penetrate to its core, relativize the primary language system underlying its ideology and literature and deprive it of its naive absence of conflict.

But even this will not suffice. Even a community torn by social struggle—if it remains isolated and sealed-off as a national entity—will be insufficient social soil for relativization of literary-language consciousness at the deepest level, for its re-turning into a new prosaic key. The internal speech diversity of a literary dialect and of its surrounding extraliterary environment, that is, the entire dialectological makeup of a given national language, must have the sense that it is surrounded by an ocean of heteroglossia, heteroglossia that is, moreover, primary and that fully reveals an intentionality, a mythological, religious, sociopolitical, and deprive it of its naive absence of conflict. By "disassociation" we have in mind here a destruction of any absolute bonding of ideological meaning to language, which is the defining factor of mythological and magical thought. An absolute fusion of word with concrete ideological meaning is, without a doubt, one of the most fundamental constitutive features of myth, on the one hand determining the development of mythological images, and on the other determining a special feeling for the forms, meanings and stylistic combinations of language. Mythological thinking in the power of the language containing it—a language generating out of itself a mythological reality that has its own linguistic connections and interrelationships—then substitutes itself for the connections and interrelationships of reality itself [this is the transposition of language categories and dependences into theogonic and cosmogonic categories]. But language too is under the power of images of the sort that dominate myth, on the one hand determining the development of language categories to achieve a wider application and greater flexibility, a purer formal structure [this would result from their fusion with materially concrete relationships], they limit the word's potential for greater expressiveness.

The absolute hegemony of myth over language as well the hegemony of language over the perception and conceptualization of reality are of course located in the prehistorical [and therefore necessarily hypothetical] past of language consciousness. But

36. We cannot here engage in depth the problem of the interrelationship of language and myth, in the relevant literature this problem has up to now been treated on the psychological level alone, with an orientation toward folklore, and without linking it to concrete problems in the history of language consciousness (Steinthal, Lazarus, Wundt and others). An Rossi Potebna and Veselkovskii demonstrated the fundamental relationship between these two problems.

37. This scientific area is first deemed worthy of scientific inquiry in the "paleontology of meanings" of the Japhetists.
even in those eras where the absolutism of this hegemony has long since been displaced—in the already historical epochs of language consciousness—a mythological feeling for the authority of language and a faith in the unmediated transformation into a seamless unity of the entire sense, the entire expressiveness inherent in that authority, are still powerful enough in all higher ideological genres to exclude the possibility of any artistic use of linguistic speech diversity in the major literary forms. The resistance of a unitary, canonic language, of a national myth bolstered by a yet-unshaken unity, is still too strong for heteroglossia to relativize and decenter literary and language consciousness. This verbal-ideological decentering will occur only when a national culture loses its sealed-off and self-sufficient character, when it becomes conscious of itself as only one among other cultures and languages. It is this knowledge that will sap the roots of a mythological feeling for language, based as it is on an absolute fusion of ideological meaning with language; there will arise an acute feeling for language boundaries (social, national and semantic), and only then will language reveal its essential human character; from behind its words, forms, styles, nationally characteristic and socially typical faces begin to emerge, the images of speaking human beings. This will occur, moreover, at all layers of language without exception, even in the layers of greatest intentionality—the languages of the high ideological genres. Language (or more precisely, languages) will itself become an artistically complete image of a characteristic human way of sensing and seeing the world. Language, no longer conceived as a sacrosanct and solitary embodiment of meaning and truth, becomes merely one of many possible ways to hypothesize meaning.

The situation is analogous in those cases where a single and unitary literary language is at the same time another's language. What inevitably happens is a decay and collapse of the religious, political and ideological authority connected with that language. It is during this process of decay that the decentralized language consciousness of prose art ripens, finding its support in the social heteroglossia of national languages that are actually spoken. This is how those germs of novelistic prose appear in the polyglot world of the Hellenistic era, in Imperial Rome and during the disintegration and collapse of the church-directed centralization of discourse and ideology in the Middle Ages. Even in modern times, the flowering of the novel is always connected with a disintegration of stable verbal-ideological systems and with an intensification and intentionalization of speech diversity that are counterpoised to the previously reigning stable systems, an activity that goes on both within the limits of the literary dialect itself and outside it.

\[\text{DISCOURSE IN THE NOVEL}\]

with a disintegration of stable verbal-ideological systems and with an intensification and intentionalization of speech diversity that are counterpoised to the previously reigning stable systems, an activity that goes on both within the limits of the literary dialect itself and outside it.

---

47. Translating and assimilating alien material is completed here not in the individual consciousness of the creators of novels, but rather constructs an artistic image of it. Thus the chivalric romance in verse, while it too is defined by a rupture between material and language, is able to overcome this gap and to assimilate material to its language, thereby creating a special variant of authentic novelistic style.
The concept "general literariness" regulates the area of spoken and written heteroglossia that swirls in from all sides on the fixed and strict poetic genre—genres whose demands spring neither from conversational nor from everyday written language. "General literariness" attempts to introduce order into this heteroglossia, to make single, particular style canonical for it.

We repeat, the concrete content of this extra-generic literariness of language can be profoundly diverse, with varying degrees of specificity and concreteness; for its support it may rely on a variety of cultural-ideological intentions, it may motivate itself with the most diverse interests and values—and all this in order to preserve the socially sealed-off quality of a privileged community ("the language of respectable society"), or to preserve local interests at the national level—for example, to reinforce the hegemony of the Tuscan dialect in the Italian literary language—or to defend the interests of cultural-political centralization, as occurred for example in France in the seventeenth century. A wide variety of concrete forces may fill this category: its function may be served by an academic grammar, a school, salons, literary tendencies, specific genres and so forth. And this category may seek to extend its borders to the limit of language [as opposed to style], that is, to the outer limits defining a language: in such cases it achieves a maximal degree of generality but is deprived of almost all ideological coloration and specificity (in such cases it motivates itself with phrases of the type "such is the spirit of language," "that is very French," etc.). But it may also do the opposite, and seek its stylistic [as opposed to linguistic] limit: in this case its content becomes even more ideologically concrete, and acquires a certain definitiveness as regards objects and emotions. These new requirements serve to define, with great specificity, those who speak and those who write (in such cases, it motivates itself in this way: "thus should every respectable person think, talk, and write," or "every refined and sensitive man does thus and so ...", etc.). In the latter instance, the "literariness" regulating the genres of ordinary everyday life (conversations, letters, diaries) cannot fail to exercise an influence—sometimes very profound—on the way we think in our actual lives, and even on our very life-styles, creating "literary people" and "literary deeds." And finally, there is great variety in the degree to which this category may be historically actualized and essential in the history of literature and literary language: it may be great, for instance, as in France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but it can also be negligible, thus in other epochs, heteroglossia [even dialectological heteroglossia] spills over even into the high poetic genres. All of this—the nature and varying degrees of historical actuality—depends of course on the content of "literary language," on the force and durability of the cultural and political instantiation upon which it relies.

We are touching here only fleetingly on the extremely important category of the "general literariness of language." We are not concerned with its significance in literature in general or in the history of literary language, but only as it plays a role in the history of novelistic style. And its importance here is enormous: it has a direct significance in novels of the First Stylistic Line, and an indirect significance in novels of the Second Line.

Novels of the First Stylistic Line aspire to organize and stylistically order the heteroglossia of conversational language, as well as of written everyday and semiliterary genres. To a significant extent this impulse to order determines their relationship to heteroglossia. Novels of the Second Stylistic Line, however, transform this already organized and ennobled everyday and literary language into essential material for its own orchestration, and into people for whom this language is appropriate, that is, into "literary people" with their literary way of thinking and their literary ways of doing things—that is, such a novel transforms them into authentic characters.

An understanding of the stylistic essence of the First Line is impossible without taking into account the following extremely important consideration, namely the special relationship these novels have with conversational language and with life and everyday genres. Discourse in the novel is structured on an uninterrupted mutual interaction with the discourse of life. The chi-

50. The horizon of "literary language" may be considerably narrowed down in other epochs—when one or another semi-literary genre works out a fixed and sharply differentiated canon (for example, the epistolary genre).
vulgar romance in prose sets itself against the "low," "vulgar" heteroglossia of all areas of life and counterbalances to it its own specifically idealized, "ennobled" discourse. Vulgar, nonliterary discourse is saturated with low intentions and crude emotional expressions, oriented in a narrowly practical direction, overrun with petty philistine associations and reeks of specific contexts. The chivalric romance opposes to all this its own discourse, linked only with the highest and noblest associations, filled with references to lofty contexts (historical, literary, scholarly). Thus may the ennobled word—as distinct from the poetic word—replace the vulgar word in conversations, letters and other everyday genres just as a euphemism replaces a coarse expression, for it seeks to orient itself in the same sphere as real-life discourse.

Poetry also comes upon language as stratified, language in the process of uninterrupted ideological evolution, already fragmented into "languages." And poetry also sees its own language surrounded by other languages, surrounded by literary and extra-literary heteroglossia. But poetry, striving for maximal purity, works in its own language as if that language were unitary, the only language, as if there were no heteroglossia outside it. Poetry behaves as if it lived in the heartland of its own language territory, and does not approach too closely the borders of this language, where it would inevitably be brought into dialogic contact with heteroglossia; poetry chooses not to look beyond the boundaries of its own language. If, during an epoch of language crises, the language of poetry does change, poetry immediately canonizes the new language as one that is unitary and singular, as if no other language existed.
What is present in the novel is a system of languages, or more accurately a system of images of languages, and the real task of stylistic analysis consists in uncovering all the available orchestrating languages in the composition of the novel, grasping the precise degree of distancing that separates each language from its most immediate semantic instantiation in the work as a whole, and the varying angles of refraction of intentions within it, understanding their dialogic interrelationships and—finally—if there is direct authorial discourse, determining the heteroglot background outside the work that dialogizes it (for novels of the First Line, this final task is the primary one).

A resolution of these stylistic tasks necessitates first and foremost profound artistic and ideological penetration into the novel.65 Only by such a penetration (reinforced, of course, by factual knowledge) can the artistic meaning of the whole be mastered and we begin to sense how that artistic meaning is the source from which everything flows: the tiniest differences in distance between individual aspects of language and their most immediate semantic instantiation in the work, the most subtle nuances in the way an author accents various languages and their different aspects. No purely linguistic observations, however subtle, can ever uncover this movement and play of authorial intentions as they are at work among different languages and aspects of languages. Artistic and ideological penetration into the whole of the novel must at all times be guided by stylistic analysis. One must not forget during this process that the languages introduced into the novel are shaped into artistic images of languages (they are not raw linguistic data), and this shaping may be more or less artistic and successful, may more or less respond to the spirit and power of the languages that are being represented.

But, of course, artistic penetration by itself is not enough. Stylistic analysis encounters a whole series of difficulties, especially when it deals with works from distant times and alien languages, where our artistic perception cannot rely on a living feel for a language. In such a case (figuratively speaking) the entire language—as a consequence of our distance from it—seems to lie on one and the same plane; we cannot sense in it any three-dimensionality or any distinction between levels and distances. Here historico-linguistic research into the language systems and styles available to a given era [social, professional, generic, tendentious] will aid powerfully in re-creating a third dimension for the language of the novel, will help us to differentiate and find the proper distances within that language. But linguistic analysis is, of course, an indispensable support even when studying contemporary works.

But even this is not enough. A stylistic analysis of the novel cannot be productive outside a profound understanding of heteroglossia, an understanding of the dialogue of languages as it exists in a given era. But in order to understand such dialogue, or even to become aware initially that a dialogue is going on at all, mere knowledge of the linguistic and stylistic profile of the languages involved will be insufficient: what is needed is a profound understanding of each language's socio-ideological meaning and an exact knowledge of the social distribution and ordering of all the other ideological voices of the era.

An analysis of novel style confronts a unique difficulty in the fact that the processes of transformation (to which every language phenomenon is subject) occur at a very rapid rate of change: the process of canonization, and the process of re-accentuation. When certain aspects of heteroglossia are incorporated into the

65. Such insight also involves a value judgment on the novel, one not only artistic in the narrow sense but also ideological—for there is no artistic understanding without evaluation.
language of a novel—for example, provincialism, characteristic professional and technical expressions and so forth—they may serve to orchestrate authorial intentions [consequently they are language of a novel—for example, provincialism, characteristic consequently sensed by the author as no longer within the system of provincial patois or professional jargon but as belonging rather to the system of literary language. It would be a gross mistake to ascribe to such aspects an orchestrating function: they either already lie on the same plane as the author's language or, in those cases where the author is not at one with contemporary literary language, they exist within a different orchestrating language [a literary, not provincial, language]. In other instances it even becomes very difficult to decide what, for the author, has become an already canonized element of the literary language and in what he still senses heteroglossia. The more distant the work to be analyzed is from contemporary consciousness, the more serious this difficulty becomes. It is precisely in the most sharply heteroglot eras, when the collision and interaction of languages is especially intense and powerful, when heteroglossia washes over literary language from all sides [that is, in precisely those eras that most conduce to the novel] that aspects of heteroglossia are canonized with great ease and rapidly pass from one language system to another: from everyday life into literary language, from literary language into the language of everyday, from professional jargon into more general use, from one genre to another and so forth. In this intense struggle, boundaries are drawn with new sharpness and simultaneously erased with new ease; it is sometimes impossible to establish precisely where they have been erased or where certain of the warring parties have already crossed over into alien territory. All this gives rise to enormous difficulties for the analyst. In more stable eras languages are more conservative; canonization is accomplished more slowly, with more difficulty, and thus it can be easily traced. We should add, however, that the speed with which canonization is accomplished creates difficulties only in trivial matters, in the details of stylistic analysis (primarily in analyzing others' words scattered sporadically throughout authorial speech). For anyone who grasps the basic orchestrating languages and the basic lines of movement and play of intentions, canonization is no obstacle.

The second process—re-accentuation—is considerably more complicated and may fundamentally distort the way novel style is understood. This process has to do with the "feel" we have for distancing, and involves the tact with which an author assigns his accents, sometimes smudging and often completely destroying for us their finer nuances. We have already had occasion to point out that several types and variants of double-voiced discourse can, when being perceived, very easily lose their second voice and fuse with single-voiced direct speech. Thus a parodic quality (in those situations where it is not an end in itself, but is united with a representing function) may under certain circumstances be easily and quickly lost to perception, or be significantly weakened. And under changed conditions this meaning may emit bright new rays, burning away the retifying crust that had grown up around it and thus removing any real ground for a parodic accentuation, dimming or completely extinguishing such re-accentuation. In this process we must keep in mind the following peculiarity of every true prosaic image: authorial intentions move through it as if along a curve, the distances between discourse and intentions are always changing [other words, the angle of refraction is always changing], a complete solidarity between the author and his discourse, a fusion of their voices, is only possible at the apexes of the curve. At the nadir of the curve the opposite occurs: it is possible to have a full reification of the image (and consequently a gross parody on it), that is, it becomes possible to have an image deprived of any real dialoguality. A fusion of authorial intentions with the image may alternate abruptly with complete reification of an image, and this within the space of a short section of the work [in Pushkin, for instance, this can be seen in the author's relationship to Onegin's image and occasionally to Lensky's]. The curve tracing the movement of authorial intentions may be more or less sharp, the prose image may be both less fraught and better balanced. Under changed conditions for perceiving an image, the curve may become less sharp and may even be stretched out into a straight
line: the image then either becomes entirely or directly intentional, or [on the contrary] it may become purely reified and crudely parodic.

What conditions this re-accentuation of images and languages in the novel? It is a change in the background animating dialogue, that is, changes in the composition of heteroglossia. In an era when the dialogue of languages has experienced great change, the language of an image begins to sound in a different way, or is bathed in a different light, or is perceived against a different dialogizing background. In this new dialogue, a proper, direct intentionality in both the image and its discourse may be strengthened and deepened, or [on the contrary] may become completely reified (a comic image may become tragic, the one who had been unmasked may become the one who strips away mask and image).

In re-accentuations of this kind there is no crude violation of the author's will. It can even be said that this process takes place within the image itself, i.e., not only in the changed conditions of perception. Such conditions merely actualize in an image a potential already available to it (it is true that while these conditions strengthen some possibilities, they weaken others). We could say with justification that in one respect the image has become better understood and better "heard" than ever before. In any case, a certain degree of incomprehension has been coupled here with a new and more profound comprehension.

Within certain limits the process of re-accentuation is unavoidable, legitimate and even productive. But these limits may easily be crossed when a work is distant from us and when we begin to perceive it against a background completely foreign to it. Perceived in such a way, it may be subjected to a re-accentuation that radically distorts it. Such has been the fate of many novels, oversimplifies re-accentuation (which is cruder in all respects than that of the author and his time) and that turns a two-voiced image into one that is flat, single-voiced into a stilted heroic image. A basic method for transferring a character from the comic plane to the tragic, for instance, or the other way around.

Dibelius, in his books, offers interesting examples of just such a creation of new images by means of a re-accentuation of old ones. The classic example is Tchaikovsky's rather considerable emergence during the Middle Ages, which played such a crucial role in preparing the way for the novel of the Second Stylistic Line [its parallel classical expression was Ariosto]. Of great importance as well is the re-accentuation of images during their translation out of literature and into other art forms—into drama, opera, painting. The classic example is Tchaikovsky's rather considerable re-accentuation of Evgenii Onegin: it has had a powerful influence on the philistine perception of this novel's images, greatly weakening the quality of parody in them.66

66. This problem of double-voiced parodic and ironic discourse (more accurately, its analogues) in opera, in music, in choreography [parodic dances] is extremely interesting.
Such is the process of re-accentuation. We should recognize its
great and seminal importance for the history of literature. In any
objective stylistic study of novels from distant epochs it is neces-
sary to take this process continually into consideration, and to
rigorously coordinate the style under consideration with the
background of heteroglossia, appropriate to the era, that dialog-
zizes it. When this is done, the list of all subsequent re-accentu-
ations of images in a given novel—say, the image of Don Qui-
xote—takes on an enormous heuristic significance, deepening
and broadening our artistic and ideological understanding of
them. For, we repeat, great novelistic images continue to grow
and develop even after the moment of their creation; they are ca-

capable of being creatively transformed in different eras, far distant
from the day and hour of their original birth.

GLOSSARY

Bakhtin’s technical vocabulary presents certain difficulties, while
he does not use jargon, he does invest everyday words with spe-
cial content. In the interests of a smooth translation we have ren-
dered these words in a variety of ways, here we collect and sum-
marize the terms most central to his theory.

The page numbers indicate where in the text useful illustra-
tions or discussions of the concept occur.

ACCENT [akcent] [p. 5]
accentuation [akcentuaciia]
accentuating system [akcentnaja sistema]
reaccentuation [pereokcentuaciia]

An accent, stress or emphasis. Every language or discourse sys-

tem accents—highlights and evaluates—its material in its own
way, and this changes through time. The parallel with a lan-
guage’s stress system is not accidental, but it might be noted that
as a rule Russian words have only one stress per word, and this is
highly marked, so changes in stress can substantially alter the
sound of a word in context.

ALIEN, other, another, someone else’s [čužoj] [p. 43]
čužoj is the opposite of svoj [one’s own] and implies
other-


ness—of place, point of view, possession or person. It does not (as
does “alien” in English) imply any necessary estrangement or ex-

oticism; it is simply that which someone has made his own, seen
(or heard) from the point of view of an outsider. In Bakhtin’s sys-
tem, we are all čužoj to one another by definition: each of us has
his or her own [svoj] language, point of view, conceptual system
that to all others is čužoj. Being čužoj makes dialogue possible.

The novel is that literary art form most indebted to čužnost
[otherness].

ARTISTIC GENRES [xudožestvennye žanry]
artistic-prose discourse [xudožestvenno-prozaičeskoe slovo]
[pp. 260–261]
ARTISTIC CRAFTSMANSHIP IN PROSE

The opposite of "artistic" here is either extra-artistic [vnestudozhestvennoi] or bytovoy [everyday, casual, ordinary]. "Artistic" genres are those that are reworked to aesthetic purpose and can therefore be re-contextualized [a sonnet, a portrait, an art song]. An "everyday genre" is a mode of expression that involves conventions [a personal letter, table talk, a chat over the back fence, throwing rice at weddings] but is of the byt [ordinary everyday life] or rooted in specific contexts. The project in "Discourse in the Novel" is precisely to establish a legitimate place for the novel in the artistic genres, novel theory, Bakhtin laments, too often presumes novel language to be a neutral medium, unreworked, or openly polemical, as in rhetoric.

ASSIMILATION DURING TRANSMISSION [usvojajusaja peredača] pp. 341

Also, "simultaneous appropriation and transmission"

We communicate by crossing barriers: leaving our svoi, or making another's čuzoi our own. Transmission of information is therefore always simultaneously an appropriation [or assimila- tion] of it. But there is always a gap between our own intentions and the words—which are always someone else's words—we speak to articulate them. The gap may be greater or smaller, however, depending on the "fit" between what we believe and what we are saying. If I am a believing Christian, how I recite the Lord's Prayer will indicate my closeness to the world view of the text. I assimilate its ideology while transmitting it. If I were an independent atheist, I would, in the ways I chose to speak it, indicate my distance from the prayer. I would dramatize nonassimilation of its "message" in my transmission.


This is privileged language that approaches us from without, it is distanced, taboo, and permits no play with its framing context [Sacred Writ, for example]. We recite it. It has great power over us, but only while in power; if ever dethroned it immediately becomes a dead thing, a relic. Opposed to it is internally-persuasive discourse [vnutrenne-ubeditelnoe slovo], which is more akin to retelling a text in one's own words, with one's own accents, gestures, modifications. Human coming-to-consciousness, in Bakhtin's view, is a constant struggle between these two types of discourse: an attempt to assimilate more into one's own system, and the simultaneous freeing of one's own discourse from the authoritative word, or from previous earlier persuasive words that have ceased to mean.

GLOSSARY
the forces at work in the culture system from which they spring. COMPLETED—finished, closed-off, finalized [zaverien] and its antonym nezaverieno [inconclusiveness, openness].

This implies not just completed, but capable of definitive finalization. Dialogue, for example, can be zaverien [as in a dramatic and its noun COMPLETED-finished, closed-off, finalized dialogue)—it can be laid out in all its complexity as it continues to live. Epic time is zaverieno; novel-time, opening and a close. A dialogized word, on the other hand, can be zaverieno: the resonance or oscillation of possible meanings within it is not only not resolved, but must increase in complexity as it continues to live. Epic time is zaverieno, novel-time, the present oriented toward the future, is always nezaverieno.

CONTemporaneity, contemporary life [sovremennost'] [pp. 14ff.] also, contemporary reality

The Russian word implies a simultaneity of times—in past, present or future, for Bakhtin the concept is most productive when the two temporal simultaneities are that of author and creature, or of author and event. Epic occurs in an absolute past that could never have been sovremenny to its author-bard or to its audience, regardless of when the related events had occurred in “real” historical time. The novel, in contrast, permits authorial- and reader-access to the artistically represented world.

DIALOGISM [dialogizm]

Dialogism is the characteristic epistemological mode of a world dominated by heteroglossia. Everything means, is understood, as a part of a greater whole—there is a constant interaction between meanings, all of which have the potential of conditioning others. Which will affect the other, how it will do so and in what degree is what is actually settled at the moment of utterance. This dialogic imperative, mandated by the pre-existence of the language world relative to any of its current inhabitants, insures that there can be no actual monologue. One may, like a primitive tribe that knows only its own limits, be deluded into thinking there is one language, or one may, as grammarians, certain political figures and normative framers of “literary language. In both cases the unitariness is relative to the overpowering force of heteroglossia, and thus dialogism.

DIALOGUE [dialog] [pp. 41ff.]

dialogizing [dialogušči-

dialogized [dialogizovanii]
EVALUATIVE, judgmental, valorized, axiological, value-[cen-
nostnyj]

Evaluation never takes place in a void, to assign value means to
assess and rank. Thus when Bakhtin (in “Epic and Novel”) speaks
of the epic past as a cennostno-vremenno (temporally valorized,
or time-and-value) category, he means to emphasize the fact that
the time, like all other sequences, is hierarchical along a good/bad
axis as well as a before/after, the epic past is not only past, but
good because it is past.

EVERYDAY LIFE [byt]
everyday genre [bytovoi žanr]

This is what ordinary people live, and their means for commun-
icating with each other [bytovoi žanr]—the private letter, the
laundry note—are not considered artistic. They are, however,
both conventionalized and canonized; indeed, all communication
must take place against a certain minimum background of shared
generic expectations.

GENRE [žanr]

In the most general terms, a horizon of expectations brought to
bear on a certain class of text types. It is therefore a concept larger
than literary genre [examples of everyday genres [bytovye žanry]
would be the shopping list or telephone conventions]. A genre
both unifies and stratifies language [p. 288]. In these essays, how-
ever, the term is most frequently invoked to define the kind of
formulae that have tended to limit literary discourse. The novel
is seen as having a different relationship to genre, defining itself
precisely by the degree to which it cannot be framed by
pre-existing categories.

HETEROGLÖSSIA [raznorečie, raznorečivost'] [p. 363]

The base condition governing the operation of meaning in any
utterance. It is that which insures the primacy of context over
utter text. At any given time, in any given place, there will be a set of
conditions—social, historical, meteorological, physiological—
that will insure that a word uttered in that place and at that
time will have a meaning different than it would have under any other
conditions; all utterances are heteroglot in that they are func-
tions of a matrix of forces practically impossible to recoup, and
therefore impossible to resolve. Heteroglossia is as close a con-
ceptualization as is possible of that locus where centripetal and
centrifugal forces collide, as such, it is that which a systematic
linguistics must always suppress.

HYBRID [gibrid] [pp. 305ff.]
hybridization [gibridizatsia] [pp. 358ff.]

The mixing, within a single concrete utterance, of two or more
different linguistic consciousnesses, often widely separated in
time and social space. Along with dialogization of languages and
pure dialogues, this is a major device for creating language-im-
ages in the novel. Novelistic hybrids are intentional [namerenn-
yj] [unlike, say, naive mixing in everyday speech], their double-
voicedness [dvugolosnost'] is not meant to resolve. Since hybrids
can be read as belonging simultaneously to two or more systems,
they cannot be isolated by formal grammatical means, by quota-
tion marks (Bakhtin analyzes the hybrid constructions in Dick-
ens’ Little Dorrit [pp. 300ff.]): Hybridization is the peculiar mark
of the epic past is not only past, but

time and social space. Along with dialogization of languages and
are not considered artistic. They are, however,
both conventionalized and canonized; indeed, all communication
must take place against a certain minimum background of shared
generic expectations.

Everyday Life [byt]

This is what ordinary people live, and their means for commu-
icating with each other [bytovoi žanr]—the grocery note, the
laundry note—are not considered artistic. They are, however,
both conventionalized and canonized; indeed, all communication
must take place against a certain minimum background of shared
generic expectations.

Genre [žanr]

In the most general terms, a horizon of expectations brought to
bear on a certain class of text types. It is therefore a concept larger
than literary genre [examples of everyday genres [bytovye žanry]
would be the shopping list or telephone conventions]. A genre
both unifies and stratifies language [p. 288]. In these essays, how-
ever, the term is most frequently invoked to define the kind of
formulae that have tended to limit literary discourse. The novel
is seen as having a different relationship to genre, defining itself
precisely by the degree to which it cannot be framed by
pre-existing categories.

Heteroglossia [raznorečie, raznorečivost'] [p. 363]

The base condition governing the operation of meaning in any
utterance. It is that which insures the primacy of context over
utter text. At any given time, in any given place, there will be a set of
conditions—social, historical, meteorological, physiological—
that will insure that a word uttered in that place and at that
time will have a meaning different than it would have under any other
conditions; all utterances are heteroglot in that they are func-
tions of a matrix of forces practically impossible to recoup, and
therefore impossible to resolve. Heteroglossia is as close a con-
ceptualization as is possible of that locus where centripetal and
centrifugal forces collide, as such, it is that which a systematic
linguistics must always suppress.
The major relativizing force in de-privileging languages. When cultures are closed and deaf [gluxoj] to one another, each considers itself absolute; when one language sees itself in the light of another, “novelness” has arrived. Each language regards itself as absolute; when one language perceives itself in the light of another, “novelness” has arrived. With novelness, “two myths perish simultaneously: the myth of a language that presumes to be the only language, and the myth of a language that presumes to be completely unified” [p. 68].

We see here Bakhtin’s fondness for vision metaphors [cf. “refraction,” krugozor] as well as play with the Russian word prosveshchenie [education, enlightenment], which comes about only in the light of another.

LANGUAGE [jazyk]
Bakhtin seems to endorse that broad definition of language offered by Jurij Lotman in *The Structure of the Artistic Text*, “any communication system employing signs that are ordered in a particular manner” [p. 8]. With this in mind, Bakhtin differentiates between:

- ALIEN/OTHER/ANOTHER’S LANGUAGE [čuzoj jazyk]: a language not one’s own, at any level.
- SOCIAL LANGUAGE [social’nyj jazyk]: a discourse peculiar to a specific stratum of society (professional, age group, etc.) within a given social system at a given time.
- NATIONAL LANGUAGE [nacional’n~jazyk]: the traditional linguistic unities (English, Russian, French, etc.) with their coherent grammatical and semantic systems.

**HETEROGLOSSIA** [raznorečie, raznojazyčie]
**OTHER-LANGUAGEDEDNESS** [inojazyčie]
**POLYGLOSSIA** [mnogojazyčie]
**MONOGLOSSIA** [odnojazyčie]

The distinction between razno- [hetero-] and mnogo [poly-] is the difference between type and quantity, but the two attributes are often used together.

**ORCHESTRATION** [orkestrovka]

Bakhtin’s most famous borrowing from musical terminology is the “polyphonic” novel, but orchestration is the means for achieving it. Music is the metaphor for moving from seeing [such as in “the novel is the encyclopedia of the life of the era”] to hearing [as Bakhtin prefers to recast the definition, “the novel is the maximally complete register of all social voices of the era”]. For Bakhtin this is a crucial shift. In oral/aural arts, the “overtones” of a communication act individualize it. Within a novel perceived as a musical score, a single “horizontal” message [melody] can be harmonized vertically in a number of ways, and each of these scores with its fixed pitches can be further altered by giving the notes to different instruments. The possibilities of orchestration make any segment of text almost infinitely variable. The literary CHRONOTOPE (see above), with its great sensitivity to time [p. 86], finds a natural kinship with the overwhelmingly temporal art of music.

**PENETRATION, insight** [proniknoveniie] [pp. 416–417]

Such blunt, often crudely material expressions are characteristic of Bakhtin’s somewhat militarized language. Ideologies “battle it out in the arena of the utterance.” Novelness “invades” privileged discourse. Boundaries between svoj and čuzoj are “violated.” Behind this aggressive talk is Bakhtin’s concern that the reader feel the forces involved here as bodies, in concrete competition for limited supplies of authority and territory. A true “penetration” into the novel is more than a mere scholarly investigation of it: it is a sortie onto a battlefield, where victory belongs (but never for long) to the one who can best map the movement of hostile forces. These essays, written in the mid-1930s and early 1940s, perhaps reflect the general militarization of Soviet life and language during the prewar and war years. But such rhetoric is of course also impeccably Marxist—although Bakhtin, as it were, recoups the class struggle for epistemology.

**PHILOSOPHEME** [filosofim]

Any concept that is recognizably a unit of a philosophical system [cf. ideologeme].

**POLYGLOSSIA** [mnogojazyčie]

The simultaneous presence of two or more national languages interacting within a single cultural system (Bakhtin’s two historical models are ancient Rome and the Renaissance).

**PRECONDITIONED, qualified, “with reservations”** [ogovorennyj] [p. 331]

cf. its noun ogovorennost’ (“already bespoke quality”)

ogovorka, a reservation [pp. 8–9]

The only un-preconditioned world was Eden, and since its Fall we have all spoken about the world in someone else’s [čuzoj] words. The world of objects and meanings [predmetno-smyslovoy mit] in which we live is therefore highly relativized; Bakhtin’s
use of the term merely alludes to the encrustation of meanings
bonded to any word or object.

PRINCIPLED, systematic, rigorous, regular [principial'nyj]
The Russian has no moral overtones as does its English equivalent, and bears some resemblance to what is meant today by structure: a "principled" solution is one that relates to a larger system, that presumes certain regularities or norms for itself. When Bakhtin complains that there has been no principial'nyj approach to the novel, he is referring not to the absence of a canon but to the absence of a minimal list of constitutive features.

REFRACTION [perelom] [pp. 299–300; 410ff.] cf. the verb prelomlit'sja, to be refracted
In Bakhtin's ideal case, the poet writes in a directly intentional language, one that means what he wants it to mean, while the prose writer's intentions are of necessity "refracted" at various angles through already claimed territory. Authorial refraction is central to the light-ray metaphor Bakhtin uses to illustrate the complexity in reading a prose communication. Every word is like a ray of light on a trajectory to both an object and a receiver. Both paths are strewn with previous claims that slow up, distort, or negate process. It is cheerful war, the Tower of Babel as maypole. To create new strata is the express purpose of art, or as Lotman happily put it, "art is a magnificently organized generator of languages" (Structure of the Artistic Text, p. 4).

QUASI-DIRECT SPEECH [ne-soobstvenno-protjamaja reč']. This category is given very detailed treatment in chapter 4 of V. N. Volosinov's Marxism and the Philosophy of Language [tr. Matejka and Titunik, New York, 1973], pp. 149–159.) Quasi-direct speech involves discourse that is formally authorial, but that belongs in its "emotional structure" to a represented character, his "inner speech transmitted and regulated by the author" [p. 319, where the passage cited is an internal monologue of Nezhdanov's from Turgenev's Virgin Soil].

Quasi-direct speech is a threshold phenomenon, where authorial and character intentions are combined in a single intentional hybrid. Measuring the relative strength of these competing intentions is a major task of novel stylistics.

STRATIFICATION [rasloenie] [p. 289]
For Bakhtin this is a process, not a state. Languages are continuously stratifying under pressure of the centrifugal force, whose project everywhere is to challenge fixed definitions. Represented characters in a novel exist in order to find, reject, redefine a stratum of their own; formal authors exist to coordinate these stratifying impulses.

Stratification destroys unity, but—as with our military metaphors discussed above (PENETRATION)—this is not a negative or negating process. It is cheerful war, the Tower of Babel as maypole. To create new strata is the express purpose of art, or as Lotman happily put it, "art is a magnificently organized generator of languages" (Structure of the Artistic Text, p. 4).

TENTENTIAL, period-bound, belonging to a certain school or trend [naprovječeskij]
Tendentious language is a type of social language heavily influenced by the norms of a given literary school or period, i.e., the vocabulary and presuppositions shared at any given time by Naturalists, Neoclassicists and so forth.

UTTERANCE. [vykazivanie] cf. adj. ob'ektifikaciya, objectified, reified, "turned into a thing"

The process [rhetorically intended or historically caused] of stripping a word [slovo] of its "normal" contexts. This happens when a word is pokazano [exhibited].

Character speech [reč' geroev]: this refers not to the speeches of a character but to a manner of speaking specific to him.

Between the two traditional grammatical categories of DIRECT SPEECH [protjamaja reč'] and INDIRECT SPEECH [kosvenno-bač'c]
In each speech act, subjective experience perishes in the objective fact of the enunciated word-utterance, and the enunciated word is subjectified in the act of responsive understanding in order to generate, sooner or later, a counterstatement.”

voice  [golos, -glas]

This is the speaking personality, the speaking consciousness. A voice always has a will or desire behind it, its own timbre and overtones. SINGLE-VOICED DISCOURSE [edinogolosnoe slovo] is the dream of poets; DOUBLE-VOICED DISCOURSE [dvugolosnoe slovo] the realm of the novel. At several points Bakhtin illustrates the difference between these categories by moving language-units from one plane to the other—for example, shifting a trope from the plane of poetry to the plane of prose [pp. 327ff.]: both poetic and prose tropes are ambiguous [in Russian, dvusmyslennyi, literally “double-meaning”] but a poetic trope, while meaning more than one thing, is always only single-voiced. Prose tropes by contrast always contain more than one voice, and are therefore dialogized.

ZONE  [zona]

c. zones  [zony geroev]
speech zones  [rednych zony]

Zones are both a territory and a sphere of influence. Intentions must pass through “zones” dominated by other [zony] characters, and are therefore refracted. A character’s zone need not begin with his directly quoted speech but can begin far back in the text; the author can prepare the way for an autonomous voice by manipulating words ostensibly belonging to “neutral” authorial speech. This is a major device of comic style [see Bakhtin’s analysis of Little Dorrit [pp. 302–307]].

In Bakhtin’s view there are no zones belonging to no one, no “no-man’s land.” There are disputed zones, but never empty ones. A zone is the locus for hearing a voice; it is brought about by the voice.